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2Thesis Abstract
Background: An estimated 15-30% of individuals referred to epilepsy
clinics are diagnosed with non-epileptic attack disorder (NEAD). NEAD
is a well-known clinical problem which poses diagnostic and therapeutic
challenges to neurological and psychological professionals (Gates &
Erdahl, 1993). There are multiple theories on the mechanisms that
underlie non-epileptic seizures; however there is limited empirical
support for these.
The development of implicit cognition has attracted much attention in
the last few decades but has yet to be developed in the context of
seizure research. This thesis aimed to offer a novel perspective on the
psychological mechanisms underlying NEAD by examining implicit and
explicit self-esteem and anxiety in people with seizures. It also explored
the relationship of these constructs with experiential avoidance and
seizure frequency.
Methodology: 86 participants were recruited and completed a series of
self-report questionnaires. The Rosenberg self-esteem questionnaire
was used to measure explicit self-esteem. Spielberger’s State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory was used to assess explicit anxiety. The Patient
Health Questionnaire-15 was utilised to estimate somatic symptoms.
The Multi-dimensional Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire was used
to examine differences in avoidance. Finally they were administered
two versions of the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP-
Anxiety; IRAP-Self-esteem) to examine implicit self-esteem and anxiety.
Results: Analysis of Variance (ANOVAs) found no significant
differences in implicit self-esteem and anxiety between the NEAD,
epilepsy or non-clinical control groups. However, the NEAD group
reported a significantly lower explicit self-esteem, higher avoidance and
more somatic symptoms than their epilepsy counterparts. Although the
NEAD and epilepsy groups reported high levels of anxiety, only the
3NEAD group differed significantly from controls. The NEAD group had
significantly larger implicit-explicit discrepancies for both anxiety and
self-esteem, with explicit and discrepant scores correlating with self-
reported avoidance and seizure frequency.
A logistical regression model using explicit self-esteem, experiential
avoidance and somatisation correctly classified 84.9% of individuals
with seizures. However, the implicit measures did not add anything to
the model.
Conclusions: There are several interpretations for the implicit-explicit
discrepancies observed. One suggestion is the high implicit low explicit
profile reflects ‘damaged’ self-esteem, which can be understood more
fully in context of events preceding seizure onset as well as the
corollaries of diagnosis. Other authors have suggested that this profile
reflects an unstable self-image, understood from early parenting and
attachment perspectives. Given the correlation with discrepant scores it
is possible that avoidance and seizures serve to reduce dissonance
between implicit and explicit cognition. These findings support various
psychological models of NEAD and offer a rationale for a range of
psychological treatments that target avoidant behaviour patterns as well
as deliberate evaluations that are within a person’s awareness.
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Abstract
To lay the groundwork for utilising the implicit association test (IAT) as a
diagnostic measure, a systematic literature review was conducted on all
IAT studies published to date, which report statistical discrepancies on
IAT scores between clinical samples of people with psychological
disorders. PSYCINFO, EMBASE, MEDLINE, and ALLIED AND
CONTEMPORARY MEDICINE, Google scholar, and bibliographies
were used to select the articles, 16 of which met the selection criteria.
The utility of the IAT as a differentiating measure was considered within
the context of four selected domains: internal validity, order and
proximity, sample characteristics, and implicit-explicit correspondence.
The review attempts to account for the variations in significance across
the studies and establish under what conditions the IAT is more likely to
distinguish clinical populations
The review revealed that despite offering a range of stipulations and
neglecting to adopt a generic measure, the IAT offers a powerful tool of
differentiation. The review also concluded that although significant, the
IAT is not a better discriminatory measure independently of explicit
ones. However, integrative models offer a more accurate solution for
predicting behaviours of distress and symptoms associated with
psychological disorders. Arguably the IAT may offer an alternative to
existing diagnostic tools and be a more useful predictive measure
beyond the remits of diagnoses.
Key words: Implicit association test, psychological disorder(s), clinical
population, predictive
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1. Introduction
1.1. Rationale
1.1.1. Implicit processes
Dual process theories postulate two underlying processes which drive
human behaviour; implicit and explicit (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler,
2000). While explicit processes describe those which lack automaticity,
implicit processes according to De Houwer and Moors (in press),
possess features of automaticity; that is they are unintentional,
uncontrolled, unconscious, fast, and/or efficient processes.
1.1.2. Implicit association test
While explicit processes are reportable, if a process is uncontrolled or
unconscious, it begs the question “How do we measure it?” It is
believed that implicit processes are a result of associative learning
where associations are formed between representations. Various
measures have been developed which claim to examine implicit
processes based on this theory, such as the Implicit Association Test
(IAT) (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). The IAT is a
computerised latency-based method designed to measure the relative
strengths of associations between target categories and attributes. The
premise is that responding should be faster in conditions where
categories and attributes are more associated; it is the latency score
(measured in milliseconds) which is the measure rather than the IAT
itself. Over the last two decades, research into this contentious concept
has grown exponentially and a previous meta-analysis (Greenwald,
Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009) found the IAT to be a better
predictor of human behaviour above and beyond that of explicit self-
report measures. Examples of the IAT can be found at
http://www.implicit.harvard.edu/implicit.
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1.1.3. IAT measures of self-esteem and self-concept
The IAT was developed to measure personality traits such as self-
esteem and self-concept whereby attributes such as pleasant versus
unpleasant word meanings are classified into the concepts of self and
other categories (e.g. me, they, self, other)(Greenwald & Farnham,
2000). Greenwald and Banaji (1995) attempted to operationalise the
term ‘implicit self-esteem’ as “the introspectively unidentified effect of
self-attitude on evaluation of self-associated and self-dissociated
objects”(p11). Despite its best efforts, this circular definition can still
leave the reader wondering what an attitude is. Hughes, Barnes-
Holmes & de Houwer (in press) arguably surpassed this definition by
defining ‘attitude’ as the “integration of cognitive evaluations and
affective experiences towards an object [which may include the self]
that can vary in strength” where evaluation is the “association between
the object and positive of negative valence.”(p3)
1.1.4. Implicit self-esteem and self-concept correlates with
psychological measures
IATs have been increasingly used to examine correlations between
implicit self-esteem or self-concept, and psychometric measures such
as the Beck depression inventory, the Positive and Negative Affect
Scale (Haeffel et al., 2007), the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (Greenwald
et al., 2009) and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Egloff &Schmukle,
2002). The results are hopeful with good correlations between implicit
measures and symptomology.
Much of the initial research on correlations between IAT measures and
psychometrics utilised samples of undergraduates, but in doing so
provided a good argument to investigate clinical populations. Since
then a number of studies have made use of the IAT to investigate
people with psychological disorders. While there is no single definition
of a psychological disorder, for the purpose of this review, a
psychological disorder will be classified by criteria as set out by the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV)
18
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994) or the International
Classification of Diseases (ICD-10) (World Health Organization, 1992).
In recent empirical studies, self-esteem and self-concept IAT measures
have successfully differentiated people with psychological disorders.
They have been used to explain functions of psychiatric behaviour such
as delusions (McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2007) and the
refractoriness of anxiety disorders and depression (Glashouwer & de
Jong, 2010). However in other studies, IAT measures have been shown
to unsuccessfully differentiate people with psychological disorders from
non-clinical samples (MacKinnon, Newman-Taylor, & Stopa, 2011a).
1.1.5. Implications
A diagnosis is a time consuming and costly process which can limit
clinicians’ ability to offer a thorough assessment and accurate
diagnosis. Shear et al. (2000) found a high proportion of clinicians using
unstructured and open-ended approaches, as well as minimal training
in evidence-based techniques, and perhaps unsurprising they found
that misdiagnosis is not uncommon practice.
Although some psychometrics such as the Patient Health Questionnaire
have been validated and are used to inform diagnosis (Spitzer, Kroenke
& Williams 1999), they rely on explicit measures which are more subject
to falsification. Implicit measures such as the IAT offer an unobtrusive
method, which is harder to falsify, and could potentially compliment the
process by making it a more time and cost efficient route.
Additionally, the IAT offers a framework on which to conceptualise
psychological distress, and used clinically, could guide psychological
interventions; such as working with self-associations.
1.2. Objectives
The present systematic review is the first to primarily examine and
review how well IAT measures of self-concept and self-esteem
differentiate adult populations with psychological disorders. In addition,
it sought to establish how well IAT measures differentiate groups with
19
diagnoses compared with explicit self-report measures across a variety
of psychological disorders.
2. Methods
2.1. Eligibility criteria
Clinical studies examining implicit self-esteem and/or self-concept using
the implicit association test in psychiatric patients were included.
Studies not in English language were excluded. Studies where
participants were aged 18 years and over and included one or more
comparison groups with a psychiatric diagnosis, as defined by either by
the DSM-IV or ICD-10 criteria were considered (see appendix A for
criteria list).
2.2. Information Sources
Studies were identified by searching electronic databases, a search
engine, and scanning reference lists. Limits were applied for language
and only papers in English were acquired. A limit of 18 years and above
was applied to sample age. The search was also limited to peer review
journals only. This search was applied to PsycINFO (1806 - present),
Allied and Complementary Medicine (1985 - present), Embase (1980 -
present), and Medline (1948 - present). In addition, a Google Scholar
search was reviewed. The last search was run on 8th July 2011. Of
those studies found from the database searches, reference lists were
hand searched.
2.3. Search
After peer and expert review, the main search terms agreed on for the
database searches were ‘implicit association test’ or ‘implicit measure’
or ‘implicit attitude’ or ‘automatic attitudes’ or ‘implicit social cognition’,
and ‘clinical’ or ‘clinical sample’ or ‘clinical population’ or ‘patient’ or
‘explode patients’ (the explode function will search the database for all
articles indexed with that heading as well as articles indexed with
related narrower terms) or ‘psychiatric’ or ‘explode psychiatric patients’
or ‘diagnos*’ (the symbols used to identify all words beginning with
diagnos e.g. diagnoses, diagnosed) or ‘exp diagnosis’. These were
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applied to title, key word, and abstract (see appendix B for search
strategy).
2.4. Study selection
Titles and abstracts were screened and assessed against the eligibility
criteria, un-blinded by one reviewer. Unpublished studies, conference
abstracts, dissertations, theses, and book chapters were not included in
the review. Of 552 studies, 138 were excluded as they were duplicates.
394 were excluded as they were in samples under the age of 18 years,
in non-psychiatric populations, did not use the implicit association test,
and/or did not attempt to differentiate groups. 20 potential papers were
identified and the full text of these was reviewed. For the same reasons
above which were not apparent in the abstracts plus using an adapted
single category IAT, another four were eliminated, leaving 16 papers to
be reviewed. Figure 1 illustrates the selection process.
2.5. Abstraction process
The 16 included studies were abstracted by one reviewer. For this
purpose, an abstraction form was developed for abstracting detailed
methods and results information from each study (see appendix C).
Information was extracted from each study on: country, clinical sample,
numbers of participants, percentage of females recruited, mean age,
IAT measure(s), diagnostic procedure, explicit measures, category and
stimulus words, latency exclusion criteria and rules, algorithm used for
analysis, p-values, and any other data considered by the author to be
note-worthy.
In addition, based on the abstraction, the methodological quality of
each study was evaluated. For this purpose, an adaptation of the
Critical Appraisal Skills Programme (CASP) (Public Health Resource
Unit, 2011, see appendix D) was used due to its approval for studies in
public health (Ciliska, Thomas & Buffet, 2008). The CASP was used as
a checklist, evaluating items such as: clarity of issue being targeted by
the study (e.g. whether the question was focused in terms of the
population studied or outcome considered), derivation and
21
characteristics of the study population (e.g. reporting of specific criteria
for participant inclusion and whether all were included who should have
been, and appropriately matched), collection of the data (e.g. whether
the procedure order was detailed, same measures between groups,
reporting of possible biases), and results (e.g. whether the results are
detailed with sufficient and justified reporting, controlling for potentially
confounding variables).
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Figure 1. Prisma diagram to illustrate selection process of papers
included in this review (PRISMA, 2009)
Records identified
through database
searching
(n = 383 )
Additional records
identified through
other sources
(n = 169 )
Records after duplicates
removed
(n = 414 )
Records
screened
(n = 414 )
Records excluded
on the basis of title
and abstract;
Non-adult
Non-psychiatric popn
Non IAT
Not between sample
Study aims to
manipulate IAT
Not self-esteem/
self-concept
(n = 394)
Full-text articles
assessed for
eligibility
(n = 20 )
Full-text
articles
excluded: as
above, single
category IAT
(n = 4)Studies included
in qualitative
synthesis
(n = 16 )
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2.6. Development of domains
To begin structuring the review, all potentially influential factors
identified in the abstraction process were separated into four major
categories or domains. Finally sub-categories were listed and allocated
to each relevant domain. For example ‘internal validity’ had two sub-
categories: materials and procedural design.
2.7. Description of included studies
Tables 1. and 2. present a summary of characteristics and significance
values of the selected studies. Studies span only four years (2007-
2011) of publications, reflecting the contemporary approach of using
IATs with clinical groups. All the studies were cross-sectional, and
populations studied were conducted in westernised countries: Europe
(13 studies), USA (2 studies) and Australia (1 study). 7075 participants
completed IAT measures of self-esteem (10 studies) or self-concept (6
studies). The mean age across studies was 36 years, with 57.3% of
female participants. 13 of the 16 studies compared psychologically
disordered populations with healthy controls, and the remaining 3
studies made comparisons among disordered groups. All the studies
used rigorous diagnostic measures to differentiate the populations
according to the DSM-IV or ICD-10, such as the structured clinical
interview (SCID) or composite international diagnostic interview (CIDI).
All but one of the studies utilising the IAT measure of self-esteem
compared outcomes on the IAT with the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale
(Rosenberg, 1965) as an explicit measure of self-esteem. Self-concept
studies used a range of explicit measures (as detailed in table 2).
Studies also utilised symptom measures such as the Beck Depression
Inventory or Hamilton Rating Scale, however these are not reported in
this review as the focus was on the measures of self-esteem and self-
concept.
24
Table 1. Demographic details of selected studies.
Author N Mean age
(years)
Females
(%)
MacKinnon, Taylor &Stopa (2010) 36 56.5 38.9
Kesting et al. (2010) 139 37.2 43.0
McKay, Langdon &Coltheart (2007) 29 37.3 79.3
Moritz, Werner &Collani (2006) 88 29.7 Not stated
Buhlmann et al. (2007) 55 24.1 81.8
Buhlman et al. (2009) 63 28.0 88.9
Cockerham et al. (2008) 40 21.9 100.0
Glashouwer& de Jong (2010) 2981 41.9 66.5
Raedt, Schacht, Franck & De Houwer (2005) 30 42.6 73.3
Risch et al. (2010) 119 43.8 59.7
Franck et al. (2008) 102 42.3 81.6
Glashouwer et al. (2010) 2981 41.9 66.5
Nock et al. (2009) 157 35.9 58.1
Teachman, Smith-Janik&Saporito (2007) 81 35.5 61.5
Rusch et al. (2007a) 150 29.8 61.5
Rusch et al. (2007b) 60 27.7 60
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Table 2. Characteristics and significance values of selected IAT studies across clinical samples
Authors
(date)
[country]
Psychological disorders
looked at
Healthy
controls
Implicit
associations
Explicit association
measures
Significance (p value)
IAT Explicit
MacKinnon, Taylor &Stopa
(2011)
[UK]
-Persecutory delusions Y Self-esteem Rosenberg self-esteem
scale (RSE-S)
Brief core schema scale
.07 <.01
<.01
Kesting et al.
(2010)
[Germany]
-Schizophrenia
(with persecutory delusions)
-Depression
Y Self-esteem RSE-S .34 <.001
McKay, Langdon
&Coltheart (2007)
[Australia]
-Persecutory delusions Y Self-esteem RSE-S
Adjective self- relevance
rating task
.003 .012
.03
Moritz, Werner &Collani
(2006)
[Germany]
-Schizophrenia
-Depression
Y Self-esteem RSE-S .00 <.001
Buhlmann et al. (2008)
[Germany]
-Body dysmorphic disorder Y Self-esteem RSE-S
Belief about appearance
scale
.03 <.001
<.001
Buhlman et al. (2009)
[Germany]
-Body dysmorphic disorder Y Self-esteem RSE-S .04 <.001
Cockerham et al. (2008)
[UK]
-Bulimia nervosa Y Self-esteem RSE-S
Shape and weight based
self-esteem inventory
<.01 <.01
<.001
Glashouwer& de Jong
(2010)
-Depression
-Anxiety
Y Self-depression
Self-anxiety
Explicitly rated IAT
attributes
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
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(Table 2.Conintued)
Note: Y = healthy control sample present, N = no healthy control sample used
[Netherlands]
Raedt, Schacht, Franck &
De Houwer (2005)
[Netherlands]
-Depression Y Self-esteem No explicit association
measures used
>.05
Risch et al. (2010)
[Germany]
-Depression Y Self-esteem Dysfunctional attitude
scale
<.000 .000
Franck et al. (2008)
[Belgium]
-Depression Y Self-esteem RSE-S <.01 <.001
Glashouwer et al. (2010)
[Netherlands]
-Various (focus on suicidal
ideation & attempt)
N Self-depression
Self-anxiety
Explicitly rated IAT
attributes
.01
.01
.01
.01
Nock et al. (2009)
[USA]
-Various (focus on suicidal
attempt)
N Self-
death/suicide
Self-injurous thoughts
and behaviour interview
<.05 <.05
Teachman, Smith-
Janik&Saporito (2007)
[USA]
-Panic disorder Y Self-panic Fear questionnaire-
agoraphobia subscale
.04 <.001
Rusch et al. (2007a)
[Germany & Switzerland]
-Borderline personality
disorder (BPD)
-Social phobia
Y Self-shame Experiential shame scale
Test of self-conscious
affect-3
.005 <.001
<.001
Rusch et al. (2007b)
[Germany & Switzerland]
-BPD with comorbid PTSD N Self-anxiety State-trait anxiety index
Test of self-conscious
affect-3
.02 .05
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3. Synthesis for effectiveness
3.1. Internal validity of the IAT
3.1.1. Materials
As illustrated in table 3, all the studies reviewed reported a range of
‘self’ and ‘other’ category terms, which each specified. However of the
16 studies selected, two did not stipulate the descriptive adjectives for
the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ categories used (Moritz, Werner, & von
Collani, 2006; Franck, De Raedt, & De Houwer, 2008).
The generation of terms varied across studies, with some using more
robust systematic methods compared with others. For example,
MacKinnon, Newman-Taylor, and Stopa (2011) and Cockerham, Stopa,
Bell, and Gregg (2009) generated words based on valence ratings
carried out by qualified and trainee clinical psychologists. Several of the
studies made reference to earlier papers and existing data pools
(McKay et al., 2007; Moritz et al., 2006; Buhlmann, Teachman,
Gerbershagen, Kikul, & Rief, 2008; Buhlmann, Teachman, Naumann,
Fehlinger, & Rief, 2009; Glashouwer & de Jong, 2010; De Raedt et al.,
2006; Risch et al., 2010; Glashouwer et al., 2010; Teachman, Smith-
Janik, &Saporito, 2007), yet the remaining seven studies did not offer
any rationale for the terms applied.
Although using external raters for selecting terms appears to be an
advantage on the surface compared with experimenter generated
terms, the educational back-ground of such raters may vary significantly
with that of participants in the exercise. Thus the understanding and
attributed meaning of such words is not necessarily transferable. Utility
of an IAT measure as a clinical tool relies on information being
transferable to a range of populations.
The numbers of ‘self’ and ‘other’ terms ranged from four to six words,
whilst the adjective categories ranged from three to twenty words. This
review supports earlier observations; there was no obvious trend in the
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number of stimulus items and significance reporting. Nosek,
Greenwald, and Banaji (2005) reported that IAT effects are largely
unaffected by the number of stimulus items per category, but
recognised that they should clearly belong to the category, which all
studies appeared to do (see table 3).
29
Table 3. Summary of category stimuli in the selected studies
Author Language
of test
materials
Words in
the “self”
category
Words in the
“other”
category
Target words Words generated
MacKinnon,
Taylor &Stopa
(2010)
English I
Me
Mine
First name
His
Hers
They
Them
Clever
Charismatic
Intelligent
Interesting
Deserving
Adored
Loveable
Worthy
Unlovable
Stupid
Worthless
Incompetent
Dislike
Inadequate
Inferior
Useless
32 words from self-esteem IAT(Tanner, Stopa, & De
Houwer, 2006) rated by 8 clinical psychologists and
trainees on positive and negative representations on a
scale of 1-10, 16 selected.
Kesting et al.
(2010)
German I
My
Me
First name
You
Her
They
Other first
name
Good
Clever
Marvellous
Popular
Bad
Stupid
Disgusting
Terrible
Not stated
McKay, Langdon
&Coltheart (2007)
English I
Me
My
Mine
Myself
They
Them
Their
Theirs
Themselves
Love
Laugh
Friend
Freedom
Holidays
Pain
Death
Murder
Torture
Abortion
Obtained from MRC Database
(http://www.psy.uwa.edu.au/MRCDatabase/uwa_mrc.htm)
Moritz, Werner
&Collani (2006)
German First name
Country of
birth Month
of birth
Computer
created Other
alternative
stimuli
13 non-
specified
‘positive’
adjectives
13 non-
specified
‘negative’
adjectives
Not stated
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Buhlmann et al.
(2007)
German Me
Self
I
Me
Other
Not me
Them
They
Excellent
Good
Wonderful
Great
Despicable
Bad
Dreadful
Awful
Greenwald & Farnham, 2000
(http://www.implicit.harvard.edu/implicit)
Buhlman et al.
(2009)
German Me
Self
I
Me
Other
Not me
Them
They
Excellent
Good
Wonderful
Great
Despicable
Bad
Dreadful
Awful
Greenwald & Farnham, 2000
(http://www.implicit.harvard.edu/implicit)
Cockerham et al.
(2008)
English Me
I
Myself
My
Mine
Own
They
Them
Themselves
Their
Theirs
Others
Valuable
Worthy
Acceptable
Competent
Reliable
Confident
Defective
Inadequate
Inferior
Weak
Worthless
Critical
List of fifty six words (28 positive and 28 negative) rated
by 20 qualified and trainee psychologists to generate final
12 final stimulus words.
Glashouwer& de
Jong (2010)
Dutch I
Myself
Self
My
Own
Other
You
They
Them
Themselves
Positive
Optimistic
Active
Valuable
Cheerful
Useless
Pessimistic
Inadequate
Negative
Meaningless
Not stated; but does point to website for example
(http://www.implicit.harvard.edu/implicit).
Raedt, Schacht,
Franck & De
Houwer (2005)
Dutch First name
Surname
Hometown
Month of
birth
Results from
previous
participant
Capable
Competent
Good
Inferior
Failed
Bad
Personalised by participant. Doesn’t specify adjectives.
Risch et al.
(2010)
German I
Me
My
Me(2)
Self
You
Yours
You (2)
Yours (2)
Others
Sociable
Adventurous
Enthusiastic
Cheerful
Composed
Lovely
Open
Free
Unwanted
Unattractive
Timid
Useless
Senseless
Needy
Helpless
Fragile
Pronouns based on (Steffens, Kirschbaum, &Glados,
2008).
Adjectives selected from the item pool used by (Gemar,
Segal, Sagrati, & Kennedy, 2001).
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Sincere
Calm
Passive
Inferior
Franck et al.
(2008)
Belgium First name
Family name
Place of
residence
Data from
previous
participant
Valuable: 20
positive self-
descriptive
adjectives
Worthless: 20
negative self-
descriptive
adjectives
Not stated
Glashouwer et al.
(2010)
Dutch I
Myself
Self
My
Own
Other
You
They
Them
Themselves
Positive
Optimistic
Active
Valuable
Cheerful
Useless
Pessimistic
Inadequate
Negative
Meaningless
As seen in (Pinter & Greenwald, 2005)
Nock et al. (2009) English I
Myself
My
Mine
Self
They
Them
Their
Theirs
Other
Alive
Survive
Live
Thrive
Breathing
Die
Dead
Deceased
Lifeless
Suicide
Not stated
Teachman,
Smith-
Janik&Saporito
(2007)
English Me
Self
I
My
Not me
Other
They
Them
Calm
Relaxed
Serene
Tranquil
Panicked
Scared
Anxious
Frightened
Based on validated panic-IAT (Teachman, 2005).
Adopted four items based on (Nosek et al., 2005).
Rusch et al.
(2007a)
Dutch and
Swiss
I
First name
Last name
Date of birth
She
First name
Last name
Date of birth
Shame
Embarrassed
Ashamed
Anxiety
Fear
Anxious
Not stated
Rusch et al.
(2007b)
Dutch and
Swiss
I
First name
Last name
Date of birth
She
First name
Last name
Date of birth
Shame
Embarrassed
Ashamed
Anxiety
Fear
Anxious
Not stated
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3.1.2. Procedural design
Studies included in this review used procedural variations of the IAT as
summarised in table 4. Over the years, authors have strived to improve
the reliability and validity of the IAT, and address its criticisms. A
majority of the studies in this review used an updated standard
procedure as summarised by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003).
This improved scoring algorithm proposed sorting of concept categories
(e.g. me and other) and attribute categories (e.g. good and bad) using
seven blocks, and using data from four of the blocks in the final
analysis, opposed to the originally proposed two in the conventional
model. The improved algorithm also uses alternative elimination criteria;
the conventional method encouraged elimination of participant data
which was excessively slow or had high error rates subject to the
investigators observations. The latter version more precisely, removes
trials with latencies greater than 10,000 milliseconds (ms). The
improved algorithm also excludes subjects for whom more than 10% of
trials have latencies less than 300ms. These error latencies were
replaced in the new model, with block means and penalty scores. It is
claimed that such improved algorithms compensate for any cognitive
deficits amongst participants or between groups (Greenwald et al.,
2003).
A difficulty in reviewing the existing literature was the assorted reporting
of procedural designs. In some studies claiming to use the improved
algorithm, it was apparent that an adapted version had been covertly
used, opposed to a replicated version. For example, Kesting, Mehl,
Rief, Lindenmeyer, and Lincoln (2011) used the improved algorithm,
however excluded latencies less than 100ms rather than the suggested
300ms. Rüsch et al. (2007a) and Rüsch et al. (2007b) reported to use
the improved algorithm, yet with only five blocks. Risch et al. (2010) on
the other hand, had a lower upper limit on response latencies, with
responses greater than 3000ms excluded, and no penalties applied.
Interestingly, in the studies investigating participants with persecutory
delusions, it was the two which excluded latencies above 2000ms that
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found a significant difference between groups (McKay et al., 2007;
Moritz et al., 2006). It is possible that the cognitive deficits of
schizophrenia could impact on the results more heavily in studies that
use either the conventional algorithm or adapted un-validated versions
of the improved one, and readers should be cautious when attempting
to replicate or interpret such results.
The depression studies reflected an opposite pattern, with only one of
the four studies showing no significant difference in its attempt to
differentiate clinically depressed participants (see table 1). This study
was by De Raedt et al. (2006), who excluded latencies above 3000ms
rather than the suggested 10,000ms, indicating that the improved
algorithm may be preferential for differentiating people with depression.
The remaining studies on other clinical presentations were all significant
(p<.05) and reported using the improved algorithm, despite some
variation, suggestive of its utility.
3.2. Order and proximity
Greenwald et al. (2003) reported that IAT effects diminish with the
number of IAT measures completed. Only three of the reported studies
used more than one IAT measure (Glashouwer de Jong, 2010;
Glashouwer et al., 2010; Teachman et al., 2007), all of which found
significant effects in spite of this.
Nosek et al. (2005) indicate that outcomes on implicit and explicit tasks
are minimally influenced by the order in which they are completed.
Surprisingly, four of the studies did not overtly report the order of
measure administration (Kesting et al., 2011; McKay et al., 2007; Rüsch
et al., 2007a; Rüsch et al., 2007b). From the remaining studies, a
majority administered the IAT before the explicit attitude measures,
presumably to avoid possible priming effects. Regardless of the order,
significant values were observed in studies both which administered the
IAT prior to explicit measures (e.g. Cockerham et al., 2009; Buhlmann
et al., 2008; Buhlmann et al., 2009) and vice versa (Franck et al., 2008).
Beyond this, Teachman et al. (2007) attempted to counterbalance the
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tasks between participants, a possible solution to any concerns over
administration order, and an advisable option for researchers in the
future.
3.3. Sample Characteristics
3.3.1. Demographics
Sample characteristics of the studies in this review varied enormously,
from accessing 29 participants in one study (McKay et al., 2007) and
2981 in another (Glashouwer& de Jong, 2010). Perhaps not
coincidently, the studies by MacKinnon, et al. (2011) and De Raedt et
al. (2006) which were two of the three studies demonstrating no
significant group differences in IAT scores, both recruited small
samples; thirty-six and thirty respectively.
The most consistent large significance values were amongst the
research differentiating groups with depression. These studies all
accessed large numbers of over one hundred, with the exception of De
Raedt et al., (2006) as mentioned previously (see table 2). This perhaps
reflects the relative ease of recruiting samples with depression
compared to those with delusions. A possible reason for this could be
the nature of symptoms; those with persecutory delusions for example
may voice suspicion over the purpose of the study and/or its intentions.
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Table 4. Table to summarise procedural variations of the IAT in the selected studies
Authors Scoring algorithm (blocks) Exclusion latencies Errors and penalties
MacKinnon, Taylor &Stopa
(2010)
2003
(7)
Participant data where >more
than 10% of trials <300ms
>10000ms Error responses replaced
with block mean + 600ms
Kesting et al. (2010) 2003
(7)
<100ms >10000ms Error responses replaced
with block mean + 600ms
McKay, Langdon &Coltheart
(2007)
2000
(5)
<100ms >2000ms Incorrect latencies and Error
responses omitted from
analysis.
Moritz, Werner &Collani
(2006)
2003
(7)
<300ms >2000ms Error trials omitted from
analysis and replaced with
block mean +500ms
Buhlmann et al. (2007) 2003
(not stated)
Participant data where more
than 10% of trials < 300ms
Not stated Excluded if >30% errors
Buhlman et al. (2009) 2003
(not stated)
Participant data where more
than 10% of trials < 300ms
Not stated Excluded if 30% errors
Cockerham et al. (2008) 2003
(not stated)
More than 10% trials <300ms >10000ms Error trials replaced with
block mean and penalty (not
stated)
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Glashouwer& de Jong (2010) 2003
(7)
More than 10% of trials
<300ms (10 participants)
>10000ms Error trials replaced with
block mean plus 600ms
penalty
Raedt, Schacht, Franck & De
Houwer (2005)
2003
(7)
<300ms >3000ms Not stated
Risch et al. (2010) 2003
(not stated)
<300ms >3000ms Error trials included, no
penalties used (Steffens,
2004)
Franck et al. (2008) 2003
(not stated)
Not stated Not stated Not stated
Glashouwer et al. (2010) 2003
(not stated)
Not stated >10000ms Error trials replaced with
block mean plus 600ms
penalty
Nock et al. (2009) 2003
(not stated)
Not stated Not stated Not stated
Teachman, Smith-
Janik&Saporito (2007)
2003
(not stated)
Not stated Not stated Not stated
Rusch et al. (2007) 2003
(5)
Not stated Not stated Not stated
Rusch et al. (2007) 2003
(5)
Not stated Not stated Not stated
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Despite attempts to match controls on age and sex, it proved difficult for
some (MacKinnon et al., 2011); however, this was acknowledged,
reported on and controlled for during the final statistical analyses.
3.3.2. Selection bias
One of the major quality issues of the studies reviewed was selection
bias. All studies used a cross-sectional design, recruiting clinical
populations at different points in their recovery. Ultimately, accessing
acutely unwell participants proves difficult, and it is likely that the
populations who were willing to engage with some of the studies were
those less unwell, particularly in the persecutory delusion sample
studies (McKay et al., 2007; Moritz et al., 2006; MacKinnon et al., 2011;
Kesting et al., 2011).
Buhlmann et al. (2008) also highlight this as a limitation, and go on to
question the gender differences in their sample; which appeared to be a
trend in a majority of the studies. Fascinatingly, it was only the reports
utilising persecutory delusion samples which recruited less than 50% of
females. Bearing this in mind and that mixed results were proportionally
larger in the persecutory delusion samples, it may be that such biases
are partly accountable for the variation of significance.
3.3.3. Specific disorders
This review looked at the effectiveness of the IAT in differentiating
clinical groups which in the selected papers, covered multiple
diagnoses of psychological disorders; schizophrenia, depression,
anxiety disorders, borderline personality disorder, body dysmorphic
disorder, and bulimia nervosa. With the exception of the
schizophrenia/persecutory delusion studies, all showed promising
results. In addition to the methodological flaws described above, it may
be that having persecutory delusions is inherently different from the
other conditions, in so far that an IAT measure fails to adequately
differentiate it. On the other hand, these studies all examined self-
esteem; Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood, and Kinderman (2001)
speculate that persecutory delusions are a defence for low self-esteem.
One argument for non -significant results in this sample is that the
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delusions do in fact serve as a protective function for self-esteem.
Subsequently, it may well be that an alternative IAT measure of self-
concept opposed to esteem, could more reliably distinguish this group
from healthy controls. Ultimately, the IAT cannot be ruled out on the
conclusions of these limited reports.
Some studies (e.g. Teachman et al., 2007) did not control for co-
morbidity, which authors argued was to increase external validity.
Similarly the suicide studies (Glashouwer et al., 2010; Nock et al.,
2010) used populations with a range of diagnoses. It is possible that
the primary findings of such studies can be explained by the existence
of co-morbid diagnoses and results should be cautiously considered in
light of this.
3.4. Implicit – explicit correspondence
3.4.1. Power to differentiate
Despite the significant p-values for a majority of the studies, all but one
(Rüsch et al., 2007a) reported values equal or less than those of implicit
measures. Whilst this may suggest that the IAT is less powerful than
explicit measures at differentiating psychological disorders, some
studies captivatingly found the self-esteem IAT to be a better predictor
of symptom severity in comparison with explicit measures of self-
esteem (Glasshouwer& de Jong, 2010). Buhlman et al. (2009) also
showed a significant correlation between implicit associations of self-
esteem and symptom scores (p<.01), but contradicted Glasshouwer&
de Jong by concluding that they were not any greater than explicit
measures of self-esteem at predicting symptom scores. One option that
could be considered to explain these differences is that both papers
examined not only different diagnoses, but utilised different IAT
measures (one of self-esteem, the other of self-concept).
3.4.2. Correlations between implicit and explicit measures
It may be worth noting that a number of studies in this review reported a
lack of correlation with explicit measures (McKay et al., 2007;
MacKinnon et al., 2011). This supports the concept that IAT measures
examine or tap into different processes than explicit ones.
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Interestingly however, this trend was not observed across studies.
Glashower and de Jong (2010) conversely found significant correlations
between automatic and explicit self-anxious and self-depressive
associations. Furthermore, correlations were established between
dissimilar implicit and explicit measures. For example, Risch et al.
(2010) found a significant correlation (p=.04) between a self-esteem
IAT and the explicit dysfunctional attitude scale in healthy controls
whilst Buhlman et al. (2009) showed a correlation between implicit self-
esteem and explicit beliefs about appearance. Rüsch et al. (2007b)
demonstrated a correlation between implicit shame and explicit self-
esteem.
Whilst the findings appear contradictory, what they do suggest is either
the IAT adds something different, or it compliments what already exists
with an overlap in psychological constructs being assessed. Either
way, it has to be gainful.
3.4.3. Interactions
Several studies attempted to integrate the results to produce interactive
models with the aim of being more predictive. Glashouwer et al. (2010)
found that integrating IAT scores of both self-depression and self-
anxiety concepts coupled with an explicit measure of anxiety, predicted
clinical participants with suicidal ideation, much greater than implicit or
explicit measures in isolation. Similarly, Nock et. al. (2010) reported that
dichotomised scores on the IAT predicted future suicide attempts six-
fold above explicit measures alone.
Teachman et al. (2007) present a detailed and elaborate model,
integrating other implicit measures with explicit ratings, and offer an
integrative construct, with greater predictive validity of panic symptoms
than the IAT measure in isolation. Such models infer that implicit
measures such as the IAT offer something additional which explicit
measures cannot achieve alone. This is consistent with the previous
meta-analysis which examined the predictive validity of the IAT
(Greenwald et al., 2009).
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Future studies with an interest in differentiation, may therefore benefit
from attempting to assimilate results on various measures and in doing
so increase the chances of developing more efficient and robust
measures.
4. Discussion
4.1. Summary and implications
The present review found considerable variability of significance
between groups with psychological disorders in performance on the IAT
measures used. The studies used a number of statistical measures to
check for differences, with p-values ranging from <.000 to .07 .
Cautiously, the variation in significance may be explained by a range of
factors. For the purpose of this review, these factors have been
categorised into four domains: internal validity, order and proximity,
sample characteristics, and implicit-explicit correspondence.
The points of this review come with both research and clinical
implications. With limited papers suggesting that the IAT is a better
predictor of clinical symptoms and behaviours, they pose a quandary as
to whether the focus of future IAT studies should be on differential
diagnoses. Recently, the British Psychological Society (2011)
presented a position paper on diagnoses, arguing that it overlooks the
nature of mental health as being on a continuum. The IAT could offer a
tool which supports this spectrum approach and in doing so be more
valuable. Future work may be more advantageous if it examined the
predictability of the IAT in clinical settings. By adding to the existing
literature on the IAT’s predictive validity and producing implicit-explicit
interactive models, pending research could see the IAT being used
clinically, with more utility than existing measures.
4.2. Limitations
A literature review such as this, designed to synthesise the existing
power of the IAT in clinical populations comes with two major
difficulties. Firstly, the variability of the IAT measures; from the category
terms used, to latency inclusion and exclusion criteria, the lack of
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uniformity in the procedural aspects prevents any direct and solid
comparison being made across groups. Similarly the actual words and
number of terms applied varied considerably, even with the same
concepts being investigated i.e. anxiety or esteem. This makes it hard
to draw any firm conclusions about which concepts may or may not be
useful in differentiating populations more successfully.
Secondly, there was no existing structure in which to analyse the
papers under review. Subsequently the CASP was adapted to assess
the quality of studies, and a record sheet was designed to aid
abstracting. Whilst the CASP is a widely approved tool, the abstraction
method was devised by the author and peers, and is subject to its own
limitations. The data was abstracted, appraised and synthesised by
only one researcher, and may be vulnerable to their biases, additional
researchers would hopefully improve objectivity and accuracy. The
review also limited studies which were published, which could create a
publication bias.
Furthermore, another restriction is the wide range of statistics reported
by the reviewed studies. The focus of most studies within this review
was whether there were significant differences in IAT scores between
clinical/non-clinical groups. This does not necessarily reflect its ability to
predict group membership. Although the few regression studies
included show promising results, they do not sufficiently justify adopting
an IAT measure as a diagnostic measure just yet. Additional regression
analyses on a larger scale, and a meta-analysis is needed to make any
definitive conclusions.
Finally, the concept of diagnoses raises some disputes. Its reliability is
an on-going debate, despite efforts to improve it (Aboraya, Rankin,
France, El-Missiry, & John, 2006). It is possible that variations in the
IAT studies are a result of differences in approaches to diagnosis, and
not necessarily reflect a weakness in the IAT as a measure.
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4.3. Conclusions
A majority of studies in this review have demonstrated some auspicious
results in the ability of self-esteem and self-concept IAT measures to
differentiate groups. In the face of other less significant studies, this
review has highlighted the difficulties not only with the internal validity of
the IAT, but also experimental design particularly with selection biases.
The variation in reporting also makes it difficult to generalise results,
and future studies need to adopt a standardised measure before the
IAT can be compared with confidence in order to become clinically
useful.
Despite being a powerful differentiating tool, with regards to its utility
over explicit measures this review does not show the IAT to be any
more significant. However, a couple of the studies in this review have
indicated that an amalgamation of explicit and implicit measures may
offer a predictive tool, above and beyond their use exclusively.
Specifically, these integrated models appear to be greater predictors of
behaviour and/or symptoms of psychological distress rather than
diagnostic categories. This requires further exploration, utilising
regression analyses to examine the predictability of such models, and a
meta-analysis to examine the predictive validity of the IAT for clinical
behaviours.
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Abstract
The present study examined implicit and explicit self-esteem and
anxiety, and explored whether these constructs related to experiential
avoidance and seizure frequency in people with epilepsy and non-
epileptic attack disorder (NEAD). We hypothesised that non-epileptic
seizures would be associated with higher implicit-explicit discrepancies,
and based on cognitive dissonance theory we anticipated that
discrepancies would correlate with experiential avoidance. We found no
significant differences in implicit self-esteem or anxiety between the
groups, but as expected there were larger discrepancies in the NEAD
group which also correlated with experiential avoidance. Furthermore,
explicit and discrepant self-esteem and anxiety correlated with the
frequency of non-epileptic seizures but not epileptic seizures. The
results are discussed in relation to the psychosocial consequences of
seizures and psychological models of NEAD.
Key words: Implicit, Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure,
psychogenic non-epileptic seizure, cognition, self-esteem, anxiety,
avoidance, epilepsy, seizures.
52
Introduction
Diagnosis and epidemiology
Non-epileptic attack disorder (NEAD) is a well-recognised clinical
problem, made more complicated by its clinical symmetry with epilepsy
(e.g. abnormal sensation, movement, or behaviours). Bodde and
colleagues [1] define a psychogenic non-epileptic seizure as:
‘an observable abrupt paroxysmal change in behaviour or
consciousness, that resembles an epileptic seizure, but that is not
accompanied by the electrophysiological changes that accompany an
epileptic seizure or clinical evidence for epilepsy, for which no other
evidence is found for other somatic causes for the seizures, whereas
there is positive evidence or a strong suspicion for psychogenic factors
that may have caused the seizure’ (p.546).
An estimated 15-30% of patients referred to epilepsy clinics are
diagnosed as having NEAD, and 75-80% of those are female [2, 3].
Differential diagnosis of NEAD remains an issue and currently takes
around 7 years [3] posing enduring diagnostic and therapeutic
challenges to psychological, neurological and psychiatric professionals
[4]. Given that early diagnosis and access to relevant treatment
correlates with better outcomes [5] it is unsurprising that at least 25-
35% of NEAD patients become chronic [3]. This subsequently impacts
enormously on quality of life [6] and is a substantial financial burden for
both patients and healthcare providers [7].
Psychological comorbidity and personality
NEAD is associated with a complex psychological profile, distinct from
people with epilepsy [8], and is related to a number of psychological
disorders including depression and anxiety [5, 9-12]. Individuals with
NEAD also report a higher prevalence of trauma and PTSD relative to
epilepsy [13-15]. Furthermore, they report using more avoidant coping
strategies [16-18] and higher levels of somatisation [19].
53
Multiple studies have examined the prevalence of personality disorders
showing that compared with epilepsy, individuals with NEAD have
higher levels of Cluster B disorders, especially the borderline type, and
Cluster C disorders, particularly avoidant and compulsive [20-22].
Anxiety and avoidance in NEAD
NEAD can be understood from a range of theoretical perspectives
including psychodynamic, cognitive, behavioural and systemic models.
Whilst they offer different accounts for non-epileptic seizures, all of
these recognise anxiety as a significant factor, suggesting that
symptoms are functional and an indicator of some failure or
unwillingness to experience ones internal world, also known as
experiential avoidance [23].
There is growing support for an aetiological role of anxiety in NEAD [26]
however; studies have primarily focused on exploring differences with
epilepsy and not investigated the relationship between anxiety and
avoidance or seizure frequency. Furthermore, anxiety is understood to
be a complex physiological and behavioural experience that consists of
both implicit (unconscious) and explicit (conscious) cognitive
components [24, 25]. NEAD research in this area has relied on self-
report measures and overlooked implicit cognitive processes thus not
necessarily reflecting a true anxiety score [27].
Self-esteem in NEAD
Self-esteem is one of the most extensively investigated constructs in
psychology. It can be defined as the verbal relation between self and a
point on an intrinsic spectrum of valency, from positive to negative,
shaped by an individual’s context and learning history. This can be a
deliberate evaluation of self (explicit self-esteem) [28] or an
unintentional evaluation (implicit self-esteem) [29, 30].
Both implicit and explicit self-esteem have demonstrated strong links
with mental health [31-36]. Moreover, discrepancies between the two
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are thought to be maladaptive and have been shown to correlate with
psychological distress: in depression, [37] bulimia nervosa, [38] and
borderline personality disorder [39].
Whilst it is appreciated that individuals with NEAD are vulnerable to low
self-esteem [40, 41] there is little empirical data to support that view.
The only identified study examining self-esteem in this clinical
population concentrated on explicit self-esteem and although it reported
that self-esteem was lower in individuals with NEAD compared to
healthy controls; it did not report a significantdifference from those with
epilepsy [42]. Furthermore, despite the relationship between seizure
frequency and self-esteem being examined in epilepsy, [43], no
identified studies have examined the same relationship in NEAD.
Implicit cognition
As well as controlled/ conscious processing (explicit cognition), there is
an increasing body of literature to suggest that some processing of
information occurs automatically/ unconsciously (implicit cognition;
[50]). Automaticity and unconsciousness are two terms used to
describe implicit cognition. Whilst studies on selective attention have
tended to use the term automaticity, research on implicit memory has
used unconsciousness. Throughout this paper, the terms implicit,
automatic and unconscious will be used interchangeably, to describe
constructs assessed by tasks which do not rely on conscious
introspection. Therefore the term implicit refers to hypothetical
psychological attributes that are introspectively inaccessible [44].
The ability to discriminate between explicit and implicit processes relies
on the ability of measurement to capture it. Accordingly, it is not the
measure itself that holds validity, but the scores and the meaning(s)
that we attribute to measures understood to measure this unobservable
construct. Furthermore, our interpretation of these scores is dependent
on our acceptance that the construct reasonably exists.
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Implicit measurement
‘Implicit measure’ can be defined as ‘the outcome of a measurement
procedure that is causally produced by psychological attributes in an
automatic manner’ [p.347: 45]. Automaticity infers efficiency; consuming
little or no attentional capacity [46, 47]. In contrast to traditional explicit
measures such as self-report, researchers have claimed that implicit
measures provide an index of attitude or cognition without relying on
participants’ awareness [48] having conscious access to the attitude or
cognition [49], or having control over the measurement outcome [50].
Assuming that implicit associative processes emulate the strength/
salience of stimuli in memory and reflected in response time patterns,
latency methods have emerged. Research has offered simultaneous
evidence for the convergent and discriminant validity of explicit and
implicit measurement [51, 52]. While the success to measure
something meaningful is echoed in the ability of implicit methods to
reliably predict behaviour, over and above explicit self-report [53].
Nosek and Frazier [54] listed more than 20 ‘implicit measures’ used in
social cognition research, of which the latency-based Implicit
Association Test (IAT) [55] is by far the most established, accounting
for 43.6% of citations. The IAT claims to assess the strength of
associations between target categories (e.g. self versus others) and
attribute categories (e.g. negative versus positive). Through assessing
speed on a computer-based categorisation task, the basic assumption
is that categorisation is easier and therefore faster when categories are
more associated in memory. For example, in one IAT study participants
were required to categorise names of flowers with positive attributes
and names of insects with negative attributes in one task. In a second
task, these categorisations were reversed. Performance was faster on
trials with more associated categories (e.g. flower + pleasant) than less
related ones (e.g. insect + pleasant) [55]. This effect has been shown in
numerous studies examining a range of attitudes and successfully
predicted behaviour [53].
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Despite its popularity, the IAT has a number of limitations [see 56].
Although alternative method procedures have addressed some of these
[57] one limitation remains inherent; they do not measure the
directionality of associations (i.e. relations). Thus if “I am” and positive
words are strongly related, it is implied that such associations are
representative of an underlying belief that I am positive. Furthermore,
they cannot measure what is understood to be a complex framework of
conditional relationships and directional associations (i.e. relational
networks) [58].
A contemporary measurement of implicit cognition born out these
criticisms, is the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP;
developed from Relational Frame Theory (RFT)) [58] to examine the
relations between stimuli. RFT is a contemporary behavioural account
of human language and proposes that cognition is the product of core
relational acts and not associations per se. Unlike the IAT, the IRAP
involves presenting stimuli with specific relational terms (e.g. true, false,
same, opposite) so that properties of relations among stimuli (named
verbal relations) can be assessed. For example presenting a statement
such as ‘I am – capable’ with true or false. Participants are asked to
respond quickly and accurately in ways that depending on the trial-type,
are consistent or inconsistent with pre-experimentally established
verbal relations. It is assumed that the strength of specific relations are
reflected in the response times - the basic IRAP principle is that
average response latencies are relatively shorter on blocks consistent
with beliefs compared to blocks inconsistent with beliefs. It is further
assumed that participant’ contextual factors as well verbal and
nonverbal history will influence responding.
A number of studies have replicated the IRAP effect, generating
support for its utility. As well as suggesting that the IRAP is comparable
to the IAT on measures of individual differences [59], studies have
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shown the IRAP to be less susceptible to faking [60], and provide better
at discriminating between groups [61].
Relational elaboration and coherence model
Cautiously, whilst implicit and explicit measures clearly capture
something different, it is unfeasible to assume that any measure of
implicit processes can entirely separate automatic and controlled
processes [45, 62]. One account of what explicit and implicit measures
capture is the Relational Elaboration and Coherence model (REC)[63].
This is underpinned by the core assumptions of RFT, and proposes that
automatic and deliberate responses sit at opposite ends of a continuum
rather than representing distinct or dichotomous processes. This model
assumes that implicit measurement targets a particular type of
response; brief and immediate relational responding, whereas explicit
measures rely on subsequent extended and elaborated relational
responses. According to the REC model, divergence or convergence
between implicit and explicit processes is more than an interaction
between associative and propositional processes, but a reflection of the
elaboration and coherence between relational responses. The model
assumes that convergence effects between implicit and explicit
cognition occur when brief and immediate responses “cohere” with
extended and elaborated responses. Alternatively, when they do not
cohere, the measures diverge.
Research connotations
Although a promising methodology, implicit measurement has yet to be
developed in seizure research and has only been used in one identified
NEAD study, examining covert attitudes towards sickness [65]. Specific
relations between seizure presentation and underlying psychological
mechanisms remain inconclusive [3]. Models that integrate implicit
cognition offer a framework on which to conceptualise psychological
distress, and used clinically could guide psychological interventions for
non-epileptic seizures; such as working with verbal relations to the self.
Concluding from the studies mentioned above, discrepant implicit and
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explicit self-esteem may create higher states of arousal. We therefore
hypothesised that there would be larger discrepancies in implicit and
explicit measures (particularly self-esteem) in people with NEAD
compared with epilepsy and nonclinical controls. According to cognitive
dissonance theory [66], there is a motivational drive to reduce
dissonance and consequently it’s associated arousal. For that reason
we also anticipated that discrepancies in implicit and explicit measures
would be related to behaviours associated with attempts to reduce
arousal i.e. experiential avoidance and non-epileptic seizures.
Furthermore, video-electroencephalography (VEEG) is currently the
gold-standard for diagnosis, but is expensive and has practical
limitations; often dependent on hospital admission and relies on
capturing a seizure in progress. Although some psychometrics such as
personality inventories have been recommended as efficacious
screening tools [64] they rely on explicit self-report which are subject to
falsification and rely on concepts being within participants’ awareness –
which according to theories of medically unexplained symptoms may be
problematic. Implicit measures such as the IRAP offer an unobtrusive
method, which is more resilient to social desirability bias and less reliant
on introspection, a method which could potentially compliment the
diagnostic process, making it a more time and cost efficient assessment
process.
In summary, the aim of the following study was to offer a novel
perspective using implicit measurement born out of relational frame
theory, to examine implicit cognitive processes in people with seizures.
Relating to the aim above, four objectives were specified:
1. To examine and compare implicit (and explicit) anxiety in
individuals with NEAD, epilepsy, and nonclinical controls.
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2. To examine and compare implicit (and explicit) self-esteem in
individuals with NEAD, epilepsy, and nonclinical controls.
3. To explore the relationship between self-esteem and anxiety with
experiential avoidance and seizure frequency.
4. To explore whether implicit measurement has any predictive
utility in facilitating clinical diagnosis.
Method
Participants
30 adults with NEAD and 25 adults with epilepsy were recruited from
outpatient epilepsy clinics at a National Health Service Hospital in the
North of England between February and September 2012. All
participants were identified by specialist neurologists, and only those
with a diagnosis supported by video/EEG evidence were included. 31
adults, who reported no history of seizures served as a nonclinical
control group, recruited from staff teams through an advertisement.
Participants were excluded if they were under 18 years old, not fluent in
English and/or were physically unable to a use a computer.
Ethical Approval
The proposal was approved by an NHS Research and Ethics
Committee (REC). All participants provided written informed consent in
accordance with the REC guidance, and Helsinki Good Clinical
Practice.
Measures
Participants completed a demographic/medical history questionnaire
and four validated self-report questionnaires. In addition, participants
were administered two versions of the Implicit Relational Assessment
Procedure (IRAP-Anxiety; IRAP-Self-esteem) developed for this study.
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Demographic and medical history. Basic demographic
information (age, gender, level of education), medical history (seizure
and psychiatric diagnosis) and seizure frequency was obtained. This
minimal data set was considered important for secondary analyses, but
small enough to minimise participant fatigue.
Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (RSS) [67]. The RSS was
employed to examine explicit self-esteem. It is a 10-item questionnaire,
which asks for responses on a 4-point Likert from 0 to 3 with endpoints
labelled strongly agree and strongly disagree. Scores range from 0 to
30, with higher scores reflecting a greater sense of worth and
achievement. This measure is one of the most widely used self-esteem
measures, it has been found to have high internal consistency (alpha of
.88) and highly correlated test-retest reliability (r= .82). In the current
study the Cronbach alpha was .90.
Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) [69]. The
STAI was utilised to obtain an explicit anxiety score and attempts to
determine state from trait anxiety. It is composed of forty questions on
a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all/ almost never) to 4 (very
much so/ almost always). These are evenly split to give two scores; one
for trait anxiety, one for state anxiety. Total scores range from 20 to 80,
with higher scores reflecting more support for anxiety factors.
The STAI was chosen because of its ability to examine both state and
trait constructs, with test retest reliability of .40 and .86 respectively. It
also has concurrent validity with other measures of anxiety, having
correlations around .80 [70]. The Cronbach alphas for the state and trait
measures in this study were .93 and .95 correspondingly.
Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-15) [71]. The PHQ-15 was
used for its ability to briefly screen for somatisation and somatic
symptoms. The measure comprises of 15 somatic symptoms, each
scored either 0 ("not bothered at all"), 1 (“bothered a little”), or 2
61
("bothered a lot"). Total scores range from 0 to 30 and classified as
either mild (0-4), mild (5-9), moderate (10-14), or severe (15+)
somatisation. The measure was not developed as a standalone
diagnostic tool, but used to supplement other clinical information. The
PHQ-15 has good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha of 0.80) and
moderate associations between items [71]. The test-retest reliability is
PRGHUDWHZLWKDțFRHIILFLHQWRI>@
Multidimensional Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire
(MEAQ) [73]. Experiential avoidance was measured with the MEAQ.
Gámez and colleagues [73] reported good relationships between the
MEAQ with psychopathology and quality of life. This self-report
questionnaire asks participants to indicate the extent to which they
agree or disagree with 62 statements (e.g. “When negative thoughts
come up, I try to fill my head with something else”) on a 6-point Likert
scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Total scores
range from 62 to 372, with a higher score endorsing a stronger support
of the avoidance-related statements.
The MEAQ consists of six subscales relating to aspects considered to
reflect experiential avoidance as defined by multiple theoretical
approaches: behavioural avoidance, distress aversion, procrastination,
distraction and suppression, repression and denial, and distress
endurance. Each subscale demonstrates good internal consistency
(averaging alphas of .83). The alpha for the total MEAQ score is
excellent (.91-.92) with average inter-item correlation in the low to
moderate range (.15) reflecting the multidimensional nature of the
questionnaire and indicating its assessment of a broader range of
content compared with other measures of experiential avoidance. In
this study the Cronbach alpha was .91 for the overall scale with
subscales averaging at .84.
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Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP). Stimuli and
responses were presented and recorded by the IRAP software. One of
two category labels (“I am” or “Others are”) were presented on each
trial, with a single target stimulus taken from two sets of stimuli. In the
self-esteem IRAP (IRAPSE) these were a set of pleasant attributes (e.g.,
capable) and a second set of semantically opposite terms (e.g.,
incompetent). In the anxiety IRAP (IRAPANX) the two sets of target
stimuli were anxious terms (e.g., anxious) and their semantically
opposite terms (e.g., calm). Two response options (“true” or “false”)
were also presented on each trial. Thus, in the IRAP-SE participants
were asked to confirm that they were competent and worthy on
consistent blocks, and on inconsistent blocks confirm that they were
not. Comparably, in the IRAPANX they were asked to confirm that they
were anxious in inconsistent blocks and calm in consistent ones.
The IRAPSE stimulus set (table 5) was developed by the authors to
reflect a model of self-esteem as competence and worthiness similar to
the explicit Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale. Similarly the stimulus set for
the IRAPANX (table 6) was developed to reflect the dimensions of the
STAI.
Table 5. The stimulus arrangements for the IRAPSE
Sample 1: I am Sample 2: Others are
Response Option 1: True Response Option 2: False
Target stimuli consistent with
sample 1
Target stimuli consistent with
sample 2
Capable
Proud
Valuable
Successful
Clever
Attractive
Useless
Ashamed
Worthless
Incompetent
Stupid
Ugly
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Table 6 The stimulus arrangements for the IRAPANX
Sample 1: I am Sample 2: Others are
Response Option 1: True Response Option 2: False
Target stimuli consistent sample 1 Target stimuli consistent with
sample 2
Calm
Relaxed
Rested
Comfortable
Secure
Laid-back
Tense
Nervous
Anxious
Scared
Afraid
Worried
Procedure
Prior to the IRAP tasks, participants completed the STAI, RSS, PHQ-
15, MEAQ, and a brief demographic questionnaire. The order of the
questionnaires was randomised using an online research randomiser
(available from http://www.randomizer.org)
All participants completed the IRAP tasks second. The order of IRAPSE
and IRAPANX were counterbalanced. Each IRAP task was presented on
a portable laptop. Participants were presented with visual instructions
which were read through with the experimenter (see Appendix J).
These instructions explained the IRAP procedure, how to complete the
task, and highlighted accuracy and speed in responding as a
prerequisite to progress to the test phase. Participants were specifically
informed that it would sometimes be necessary to respond to the stimuli
in a manner consistent with their beliefs and sometimes in ways that
may go against what they believed. Participants were asked to find the
sorting rule and offered prompts, but were not told which trials were
considered to be consistent or inconsistent. To ensure understanding of
the task, and minimise random responding, each participant was
administered at least two practice blocks until they achieved an average
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response time of less than 3 seconds and an accuracy rating above
80% (in line with previous research) [74].
Each trial comprised of a category label (“I am” or “Others are”)
appearing at the top of the screen, 1 of 12 target words in the centre
(e.g., “anxious”, “worried”, “calm”), and the two response options “true”
and “false” in the bottom corners. All of the stimuli (label, target, and
response options) were presented simultaneously (see figures 2 and 3).
Until the participant selected one of the relational terms by pressing the
D key for true or the K key for false, all of the stimuli remained on the
screen. Choosing the relational term deemed “correct” for a particular
trial removed all stimuli from the screen for 400 milliseconds before the
next trial was presented. Choosing the relational term that was deemed
“incorrect” for that particular trial produced a red “X” in the centre of the
screen. To remove the X and proceed to the 400millisecond inter-trial
interval, participants were required to select the correct response
option.
The response correctness was dependent of whether the participant
was administered a consistent or inconsistent trial. During consistent
blocks of the IRAPSE, participants were required to respond to
themselves as competent and worthy (e.g. I am – Capable – True; I am
– Worthless – False) and others as incompetent and worthless (e.g.
Other are – Worthless – True; Others are – Capable – False). During
consistent blocks of the IRAPANX, participants were required to respond
to themselves as calm (e.g. I am – Calm – True; I am – Anxious –
False) and others as anxious (e.g. Other are – Anxious – True; Others
are – Calm – False). During inconsistent blocks the response
contingencies were reversed. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the two
category labels with their respective consistent/inconsistent stimuli.
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Figure 2. Examples of the four trial types in IRAP-SE
Arrows with text boxes showing responses consistent/inconsistent with
self-esteem did not appear onscreen
Figure 3. Examples of the four trial types in IRAP-ANX
Arrows with text boxes showing responses consistent/inconsistent with
self-esteem did not appear onscreen.
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In each IRAP, participants were exposed to six test blocks, which
alternated between consistent and consistent, each with 24 trials. The
category label and target stimuli within each block were randomised,
with the constraint that stimuli were not presented more than three
times within each sample. Visual instructions after each test block
indicated that the next block would involve reversing the previously
correct and incorrect responses. Once the final block was completed,
participants were debriefed (see appendix H).
IRAP data preparation
Raw latency data from the IRAP (time in milliseconds from trial onset to
participant response) was converted into a D measure (D-IRAP)
consistent with current implicit measure research outlined by Barnes-
Holmes and colleagues [75]. The D transformation serves to minimise
the impact of individual variability relating to extraneous variables such
as age, cognitive ability, and/or motor skills offering a cleaner response
latency-paradigm measurement [76]. D scores are relative to response
latency differences, with larger scores indicating greater differences in
response latencies between consistent and inconsistent trials. Positive
scores reflect responding in line with pre-experimentally determined
consistent items (i.e. self as capable and others as worthless; self as
calm, others as anxious) and negative scores reflect the reverse (i.e.
self as worthless and others as capable; self as anxious and others as
calm).
Each set of IRAP raw scores (one set for IRAP self-esteem and one for
IRAP anxiety) were transformed into five D-IRAP scores: one for each
of the four trial types, and an overall D-IRAP effect score (mean of the
four trial-type scores). Table 7 below details the conversion procedure
of the raw latency data.
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Table 7. The method for converting raw latency scores to D-
Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (D-IRAP) scores
Step
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Only use test block data.
Eliminate latencies above 10,000 milliseconds from the data set.
Remove all data for a participant if 10% of the test-block response
latencies are less than 300 milliseconds.
Calculate 12 standard deviations for the four trial-types: 4 from
the response latencies from test blocks 1 and 2, 4 from test
blocks 3 and 4, and a further 4 from test blocks5 and 6.
Calculate 24 mean latencies for the four trial-types in each test
block.
Calculate difference scores for each of the four trial types, for
each pair of test blocks, by subtracting the mean latency of the
consistent test block from the mean latency of the corresponding
inconsistent test block.
Divide each difference score by its corresponding standard
deviation from step 4, yielding 12 D-IRAP scores, 1 score for each
trial-type for each pair of test blocks.
Calculate the four overall trial-type D-IRAP scores by averaging
the three scores for each trial type across the three pairs of test
blocks.
Calculate an overall relative D-IRAP score by averaging all 12
trial-type D-IRAP scores from step 8.
Statistical analysis
Statistical analysis was completed with IBM SPSS for Windows version
20.0. As the explicit data violated the assumption of homogeneity of
variance-covariance, several one-way one-between analysis of
variance (ANOVAs) were conducted. Welch’s adjusted F is reported
where the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not met. As
there is no nonparametric alternative Analysis of Covariance
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(ANCOVA) was still used on these results to control for reported mental
health.
For comparisons, discrepancies were calculated as follows. Explicit
self-esteem was transformed into z-scores (the number of standard
deviations from the mean expected value) where zRSS = (observed
RSS score – mean RSS score)/standard deviation. Self-esteem
discrepancy = zRSS – mean D-IRAPSE (self trials). This was repeated
to calculate a z score for trait anxiety and then inversed due to the
direction of IRAP (i.e. positive scores reflecting self-calm); anxiety
discrepancy = (- zTrait) – mean D-IRAPANX (self trials).
Results
Demographics
Demographic variables available for analysis pertained to gender, age,
education, and self-report mental health difficulties (table 8). Groups
were relatively equal on the variables of gender, age, education and
seizure frequency (ps>0.05), but did differ significantly in relation to
reported mental health problems, c2 (2, N=86) = 33.65, p < .01.
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Table 8. Demographic characteristics of the three groups
Controls
n=31
Epilepsy
n= 25
NEAD
n=30 (p
value)
Gender (%)
Females
Males
21 (67.7)
10 (32.3)
16 (64.0)
9 (36.0)
22 (73.3)
8 (26.7)
.75
Mean age (SD) 42.97
(13.93)
39.40
(16.49)
40.87
(12.88)
.65
Level of
education (SD)
3.61
(1.23)
3.96
(1.67)
3.26
(1.11)
.30
Number
reporting Mental
Health Problems
(%)
None
Past
Present
23 (74.2)
6 (19.4)
2 (6.5)
17 (68.0)
5 (20.0)
3 (12.0)
14 (46.7)
4 (13.3)
12 (40.0)
<.01
Mean number of
seizures
reported per
month (SD)
-
4.38 (7.48) 7.36 (7.45) .09
Note: SD = Standard deviation; Level of education was calculated 1= less than
secondary school, 2 = secondary school, 3 = College/ Sixth form, 4 = diploma, 5 =
undergraduate degree, 6 = post-graduate certificate/diploma, 7= masters degree, 8 =
doctoral degree; seizure frequency was based on self-report estimates.
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IRAP Results
A small number of participants were unable to complete the IRAP tasks
within the set criterion (median <3 seconds, >80% accuracy). Data from
all other participants were retained following the transformation of raw
latencies into D-IRAP scores.
IRAPANX
The self and other mean D-IRAPANX scores for the three groups (N=78)
are presented in Figure 4. The data show that all groups demonstrated
a general bias toward self and others as calm, illustrated by positive
scores.2
A 3 x 4 mixed repeated analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted
on the D-IRAPANX scores, with diagnosis as the between participant
variable and trial-type as the within-participant variable. There was a
VXEVWDQWLDOHIIHFWIRUWULDOW\SH) SȘp2 = 0.01,
with faster responding on the self-trials. The analysis revealed no
significant interaction between diagnosis and trial-type, F, (6, 225) =
S Șp2 = 0.02 with all groups demonstrating similar
UHVSRQVHV) S Șp2 = 0.02. Four one-way between-
participants ANOVAs were also used to conduct planned comparisons
IRUHDFKWULDOW\SH1RVLJQLILFDQFHZDVIRXQGSYDOXHV
suggesting no differences in implicit anxiety between the diagnostic
categories.
2 See extended paper__ for further analysis on IRAP effect by trial-type
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Figure 4. Mean self and other DIRAP-ANX scores
- with standard error bars for nonclinical controls, epilepsy, and
NEAD groups. Positive D-IRAP scores suggest a general bias to
calm words and negative D-IRAP scores suggest a general bias
to anxious words. The zero point indicates no bias. All three
groups responded with faster responses to Self–Calm–True and
Self–Anxious–False relative to Self–Calm–False and Self–
Anxious –True. Similarly, all the groups responded faster to
Others-Calm–True and Others–Anxious–False relative to
Others–Calm–False and Self–Anxious–True.
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IRAPSE
Figure 5 depicts the mean self and other D-IRAPSE scores for the three
groups (N = 77). The data show that all groups revealed a bias toward
self as positive, illustrated by positive scores, and the epilepsy and
NEAD group demonstrated a bias towards others as positive.3
A 3 x 4 mixed repeated analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted
on the D-IRAPSE scores, with diagnosis as the between participant
variable and trial-type as the within-participant variable. There was a
VXEVWDQWLDOHIIHFWIRUWULDOW\SH) SȘp2 = 0.28,
with faster responding on self-trials. The analysis revealed no
significant interaction between diagnosis and trial-type, F, (6, 222) =
S Șp2 = 0.02, with all groups demonstrating similar
responses across the four trial-types. The main effect comparing the
WKUHHJURXSVZDVDOVRQRQVLJQLILFDQW) S Șp2 =
0.06 suggesting no differences in implicit self-esteem between the
diagnostic categories. Four one-way between-participants ANOVAs
were also used to conduct planned comparisons for each trial-type.
Only the Others-Negative trial-type produced a marginally significant
JURXSGLIIHUHQFH) S Șp2 = 0.08 (remaining p values
>0.34). Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that
the mean response time for the control group (M = 0.16, SD = 0.54)
was significantly different from the epilepsy group (M = -0.19, SD =
0.33), and NEAD group did not significantly differ from either (M = -
0.01, SD = 0.56).
3 See extended paper__ for further analysis on IRAP effect by trial-type
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Figure 5. Mean self and other D-IRAP-SE scores
- with standard error bars for nonclinical controls, epilepsy,
and NEAD groups. Positive D-IRAP scores suggest a general
bias to positive and negative D-IRAP scores suggest a
general bias to negative. The zero point indicates no bias. All
three groups responded with faster responses to Self–
Positive–True and Self–Negative–False relative to Self–
Positive–False and Self–Negative –True. Similarly, the
epilepsy and NEAD groups responded faster to Others-
Positive–True and Others–Negative–False relative to Others–
Positive–False and Self–Negative–True. The controls
showed no bias on ‘other’ trials.
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Explicit Measures
As expected, the NEAD group scored significantly lower on self-esteem
and higher on anxiety, somatisation, and avoidance. The epilepsy
group fell between the NEAD and control group (figure 6).
Figure 6. Mean scores on each of the explicit self-report measures
Self-esteem
A one-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to
explore differences in explicit self-esteem, as measured by
Rosenberg’s Self-esteem Scale. There was a statistically significant
difference at the p<0.05 level for the three different groups, F(2,83) =
3Șp2 = 0.19. Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test
indicated that the mean score for the NEAD group (M = 14.70, SD =
6.30) was significantly different from the control (M=20.68, SD = 4.82)
and epilepsy (M = 18.92, SD = 4.94) groups. The epilepsy and control
groups’ scores did not differ significantly from each other. After
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controlling for mental health, a one-way analysis of covariance
(ANCOVA) revealed there was still a significant difference between the
JURXSVRQVHOIHVWHHPVFRUHV) SȘp2 = 0.12.
State anxiety
A one-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to
explore differences in state anxiety, as measured by Spielberger’s
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. The differences approached significance
IRUWKHWKUHHGLIIHUHQWJURXSV) 3 Șp2 = 0.07.
Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean
score for the control group (M = 34.87, SD = 11.19) differed significantly
from the NEAD group (M = 42.10, SD = 16.67).The epilepsy group did
not significantly differ from either (M = 36.88, SD = 9.45). A one-way
ANCOVA found that no significant difference remained after controlling
for mental health (p>0.51).
Trait anxiety
A one-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to
explore differences in trait anxiety, as measured by Spielberger’s State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory. Since the assumption of homogeneity of
variance was not met for this data, the obtained Welch’s adjusted F
ratio was used. There was a statistically significant difference at the .05
alpha level for the three groups, Welch’s F (2, 54.5) = 6.17, P<0.005,
Șp2 =.15. Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test indicated that
the mean score for the NEAD group (M = 79.00, SD = 50.10) was
significantly different from the control group (M = 61, SD = 42.84).
However the epilepsy group (M = 64.00, SD = 38.23) did not differ
significantly from either the control or NEAD group. A one-way
ANCOVA found that the difference was marginally significant after
FRQWUROOLQJIRUPHQWDOKHDOWK) 3Șp2 = 0.07.
Somatisation
A one-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to
explore differences in somatisation scores as measured by the PHQ15.
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Welch’s ) SȘp2 = 0.49, indicated a
significant difference between the three groups on reported somatic
symptoms. Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test indicated that
the mean score for the NEAD group (M = 14.80,
SD = 6.19) was significantly different from the control group (M = 5.00,
SD = 3.33) and the epilepsy group (M = 6.60, SD = 3.46 ). However,
the epilepsy and control groups did not significantly differ from each
other. An ANCOVA revealed that there was still a significant difference
DIWHUFRQWUROOLQJIRUPHQWDOKHDOWK) SȘp2 = 0.42.
Experiential avoidance
A one-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to
explore differences in experiential avoidance, as measured by the
MEAQ. There was a significant difference between the three groups,
Welch’s ) SȘp2 = 0.21, Post-hoc comparisons
using Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for the NEAD
group (M = 235.50, SD = 48.86) was significantly different from the
control group (M = 190.03, SD = 34.73) and the epilepsy group (M=
198.68, SD = 33.37). The epilepsy and control groups did not differ
significantly from each other. After controlling for mental health, a
VLJQLILFDQWGLIIHUHQFHUHPDLQHG) S Șp2 =.16.
Six planned one-way between-participant ANOVAs were used to
conduct planned comparisons for each subscale of the MEAQ. There
was a statistically significant difference on behavioural avoidance
) S Șp2 = 0.11), distress aversion (F(2,83) =
SȘp2 = 0.20), procrastination F(2,83) = 3.48 , p = 0.04 ,
Șp2 GLVWUDFWLRQ) SȘp2 = 0.18), and
repression (Welch’s F SȘp2 = 0.14). However, no
significant difference was found for distress endurance (Welch’s F(2,83)
 S Șp2 = < 0.01). Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD
test indicated that there were no significant differences between the
epilepsy and control groups. On all but one of the five subscales that
reached significance, the NEAD group differed significantly (p< 0.03)
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from both the other groups. On the procrastination subscale the NEAD
group only differed significantly from controls (p<0.05).
Figure 7. Mean scores on each of the subscales of the Multi-
dimensional Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire (MEAQ)
Implicit-Explicit discrepancies
Figures 8 and 9 illustrate larger discrepancies between implicit and
explicit measures in the NEAD group. A one-way between-groups
analysis of variance was conducted to explore differences in discrepant
self-esteem and anxiety.4 There was a statistically significant difference
for the three different groups on discrepant anxiety, F(2,6) = 8.63,
SȘp2 = 0.19 and discrepant self-esteem scores, F(2,75)= 8.86,
SȘp2 = 0.20. Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test
indicated that the NEAD group had significantly larger discrepancies
than the control and epilepsy groups who did not differ significantly from
each other.
4 (explicit measure zscore – mean D-IRAP self-trials).
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Figure 8. Implicit and explicit self-esteem
Note: A high score reflects higher self-esteem.
Figure 9. Implicit and explicit anxiety
Note: A lower score reflects higher anxiety.
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Relationships with avoidance
No significant relationships were found between avoidance and implicit
scores (ps >.16). The relationship between experiential avoidance, self-
esteem and anxiety were explored using Pearson correlations (see
table 9). Avoidance was strongly associated with low and discrepant
self-esteem, and high trait and discrepant anxiety in NEAD group.
Table 9. Correlations with experiential avoidance
Controls Epilepsy NEAD
Self-esteem
Explicit
Explicit - implicit
-.39*
-.35
.08
-.30
-.62**
-.59**
State anxiety -.05 .02 .41*
Trait anxiety
Explicit
Explicit - implicit
.09
.05
.20
.26
.63**
.74**
Somatisation .01 -.13 .18
Note: Significant R value is indicated by * p<0.05 **p<0.01
Psychological factors and seizure frequency
The relationship between psychological factors and seizure frequency
was investigated using Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation. There
were strong correlations in the NEAD group, with increased seizure
frequency associated with low self-esteem as well as implicit-explicit
discrepancy, high trait anxiety as well as anxiety discrepancy, and high
avoidance. There were no significant correlations between implicit
scores and seizure frequency in any of the groups (ps>0.05).
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Table 10. Correlations with seizure frequency
Epilepsy group NEAD group
Self-esteem
Explicit
Explicit - Implicit
.19
.26
-.83**
-.78**
State anxiety .05 .36
Trait anxiety
Explicit
Explicit - Implicit
.03
.21
.67**
.49*
Somatisation .20 .38
Experiential avoidance -.01 .55**
Behavioural avoidance
Distress aversion
Procrastination
Distraction and
suppression
Repression
Distress endurance
.25
-.09
.01
-.02
-.21
.20
.49*
.20
.49*
.19
.27
-.55**
Note: Significant Rs value is indicated by * p<0.05 **p<0.01
Predicting of Diagnosis
As explicit self-esteem (RSE), somatisation (PHQ-15), and experiential
avoidance (MEAQ) were significantly higher in the NEAD than the
epilepsy group, these were analysed by univariate binary logistic
regression to assess how well they predicted diagnosis (0= epilepsy, 1=
NEAD). The full model containing all predictors was statistically
significant, c2 (3, N=55) = 35.69 p<0.001, indicating that the model
could predict individuals with either NEAD or epilepsy. The model was
able to explain between 49.0% (Cox and Snell R square) and 65.4%
(Nagelkerke R square) of the variance in diagnosis, and correctly
classified 84.9% of cases (82.1 % sensitivity; 88%specifity). As shown
in table 11 only somatic symptoms and avoidance made a unique
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statistically significant contribution to the model. Adding implicit scores
did not significantly add anything to the model.
Table 11. Logistic regression predicting diagnosis
B SE Wald
Odds
Ratio
95% CI for
odds ratio
Lower
Upper
Explicit self-esteem -.11 .07 2.59 .89 .78 1.03
Somatisation .33 .11 9.89** 1.34 1.13 1.72
Experiential
avoidance
.02 .01 4.03* 1.02 1.00 1.05
Note: *p<0.05 **p<0.01 CI= confidence interval
Discussion
The current study aimed to examine implicit and explicit self-esteem
and anxiety in people with non-epileptic seizures, explore their
relationship with experiential avoidance, and determine whether they
could be useful in discriminating people with NEAD and epilepsy.
In contrast to Moore and colleagues [42], this study found that people
with NEAD have a lower explicit self-esteem than those with epilepsy.
But replicating previous findings, people with NEAD explicitly reported
higher levels of anxiety than the general population, however not
significantly more than their epilepsy counterparts [77]. Additionally, the
NEAD group scored higher on experiential avoidance, and as
predicted, this was associated with both explicit self-esteem and
anxiety. The largest effect size was on the somatisation scale echoing
Reuber et al.’s [78] findings; the NEAD group reported significantly
more somatic symptoms than both the epilepsy and control group.
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This study also uniquely examined implicit self-esteem and anxiety in
people with NEAD, however found no significant differences with
epilepsy or healthy controls finding a significantly larger discrepancy
between scores in the NEAD group. Moreover, seizure frequency in the
NEAD group was found to be strongly associated with explicit and
discrepant scores. However, consistent with previous reports,
psychological factors were unrelated to the frequency of epileptic
seizures [43].
As mentioned previously, the IRAP is designed to specifically target
brief and immediate relational responses. According to the REC model,
these are in contrast to the extended and elaborated responses
typically seen on self-report measures. From this perspective, the
results suggest that people with NEAD differ only on their extended and
elaborated responses targeted at self-esteem but not their brief
relational responses. More simply, those with epilepsy or NEAD do not
differ in their spontaneous and automatic self-evaluations, but do on
their more carefully considered self-evaluations. With regards to
anxiety, the NEAD and epilepsy groups did not differ in either their
automatic or deliberate evaluations. This suggests that people with
NEAD experience equal levels of anxiety as those with epilepsy;
however hold more deliberate negative evaluations about themselves.
Furthermore, the frequency of non-epileptic attacks and avoidant
behaviour are strongly related to these deliberate and considered
evaluations. On balance, causality cannot be determined; however
some possible interpretations of the data are discussed below.
Self-esteem
The NEAD self-esteem profile of high implicit, low explicit reflects what
can be describe as ‘damaged’ self-esteem. According to Wilson et al.
[77] individuals with this profile may have historically had high self-
esteem damaged by more recent experiences. Critically, with similar
correlations it is difficult to determine whether non-epileptic attacks are
related to explicit scores alone or their discrepancy with the implicit
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measures. This relationship between seizures and discrepant scores
however, is consistent with previous reports that discrepancies between
implicit and explicit self-esteem are detrimental [39, 80] and support
cognitive dissonance theory [66].
Self-esteem is a considered a dynamic construct, vulnerable to
negative life-events [81]. Research suggests that individuals with NEAD
have more stressful life events in the year preceding seizure onset
compared with their epilepsy peers. In particular, they are more likely to
have experienced personal health issues, as well as perceive those
events to be negative, unexpected and difficult to adjust to [82]. It is
probable that such events alter the evaluations individuals hold about
themselves which may account for the lower explicit scores.
Critically, the same research found no differences in stressful life events
three months prior to seizure onset, and yet individuals with NEAD
perceive their on-going lives as significantly more stressful than those
with epilepsy [85]. Taking account of multiple studies proposing that
self-esteem mediates stress [84 – 86], one hypothesis is that explicit
self-esteem decreases in the year preceding seizure onset, causing
individuals’ to underestimate personal resources. Subsequently this
would result in higher levels of stress which for a prolonged period
could contribute to the onset and maintenance of NEAD [87].
This stress-mediation hypothesis is supported by strong negative
correlations between self-esteem and anxiety as well as seizure
frequency. Future studies are encouraged to examine stress and life
events whilst controlling for self-esteem to establish whether it does
have a mediating role in this client group. Moreover, research is needed
which examines self-esteem much earlier to seizure onset in
determining whether it is an aetiological or succeeding factor in NEAD.
This was a retrospective study, meaning that participants had already
received a diagnosis when they took part. These findings must
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therefore be considered within the context of receiving a diagnosis and
subsequent treatment of NEAD. Dekkers and van Domburg [88]
argue that the medical diagnosis of NEAD is a ‘negative’ process which
may prevent a positive diagnosis. Previous studies have reported that
people with NEAD have a limited understanding and uncertainty about
their condition post-diagnosis, identify a lack of post-diagnostic support
, and often experience services as stressful and abandoning [89,90].
Low explicit self-esteem could be considered the result of individuals
feeling marginalised by services [91] and subsequently responsible for
themselves [92]. In particular, feeling such responsibility, especially
within the context of limited personal resources has the potential of
being substantially overwhelming and being even more detrimental to
self-esteem. However, despite a poor understanding Carton et al. [40]
reported that a majority of individuals accepted their NEAD diagnosis
and with many describing a relief of not having epilepsy, which is
largely recognised for its associations with stigma [93, 94].
Given that both conditions have negative and stigmatising
consequences, one explanation is that individuals with NEAD are more
hyper- vigilant to the negative repercussions of their seizures and
diagnosis. If this were the case, it could be that such sensitivities are
moderated by attentional biases and cognitive distortions commonly
seen in psychosomatic disorders [95] and often develop within the
context of trauma and abuse [96].
Anxiety
As there were no differences across all of the groups on implicit anxiety,
it can be assumed that people with NEAD or epilepsy do not have any
automatic or unconscious biases to themselves as anxious. However,
the NEAD group scored significantly higher than the control group on
the explicit anxiety scales. This discrepancy between implicit and
explicit measures could reflect individuals who historically wouldn’t
identify as being anxious, but because of recent events are
considerably more so [77]. As with self-esteem discrepancies, this
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could be due to a number of factors including stressful life events,
traumatic memories, anxiety about having seizures, or worry about the
consequences.
Despite scoring higher than the general population, the NEAD group
did not significantly differ from the epilepsy group on state or trait
anxiety. However, trait anxiety significantly correlated with the
frequency of non-epileptic attacks. These findings support Merode et
al.’s [97] proposal that anxiety could have an aetiological role in NEAD
and such findings are accounted for within a variety of psychological
models.
Psychodynamic theories conceptualise anxiety as the by-product of an
intra-psychic conflict and propose that non-epileptic seizures are a
symptom of a conflict between the ego, the id and the superego [98].
Thus a relationship between non-epileptic seizures and anxiety also
infers a relationship with intra-psychic conflict. Behavioural models on
the other hand (e.g.[99]) can be adapted to NEAD and explain the
observed relationship in terms of conditioned responses and
reinforcement. They suggest that anxiety is a conditioned response to a
threat or trigger (e.g. a flashback or a familial conflict) and is reduced
through avoidance by having a seizure, thus non-epileptic attacks
become a negatively reinforced response to threat and anxiety. An
alternative account is that endorsed by CBT models (e.g.[100]) which
formulate anxiety and non-epileptic seizures within a “vicious cycle”
therefore when anxiety increases so do seizures and so on. Such
models incorporate cognitive factors such as worry and fear about
seizures as well as behavioural factors like avoidance and
reinforcement. However such models alone cannot account fully for
seizure behaviour and have more utility when integrated with biological
models (e.g.[103]).
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Experiential avoidance
As expected, individual’s with NEAD reported higher levels of
avoidance than those with epilepsy, complimenting previous studies
that people with NEAD are more likely to use avoidant strategies [26,
83, 101]. The results of this study suggest that people with NEAD work
harder to avoid painful and uncomfortable feelings, often feel
disconnected from their emotions, and believe that negative emotions
are damaging.
Avoidance appears to be associated with low self-esteem and high
anxiety, also found in other samples [102]. It also strongly correlated
with implicit – explicit discrepant scores, supporting a hypothesis that
avoidance functions to reduce dissonance. Furthermore, avoidance
strongly correlated with seizure frequency, which fits with cognitive
behavioural, systemic and psychodynamic theories that avoidance is
detrimental and has a key role in NEAD. One interpretation is that the
more attacks an individual has, the more likely they are to avoid
situations that are likely to trigger them. An alternative explanation is
that experiential avoidance is not just associated with NEAD, but is a
vulnerability factor in its development. Future studies examining
avoidance nearer to seizure onset could shed some light on these
accounts.
Critically, the items on the MEAQ’s repression subscale are similar to
those commonly seen on alexithymia measurements (e.g. I feel
disconnected from my emotions). Accordingly, a significantly higher
score on this subscale does not necessarily support a psychodynamic
account that people with NEAD are more likely to repress their
emotions. Interestingly, behavioural avoidance was the only subscale
which both differed significantly between the groups and correlated with
seizure frequency. So whilst people with NEAD are more likely to
struggle with feelings and want to get rid of painful or negative emotions
(as shown on the repression, distress aversion, distraction and
suppression sub-scales), their behaviour seems to be more related.
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However, distress endurance also appears be important and although
the NEAD group did not significantly differ from their epilepsy
counterparts on this scale, it significantly negatively correlated with
seizure frequency. Thus a person’s capacity and willingness to tolerate
pain or unhappiness is related to the number of non-epileptic seizures
they experience, recognised in Deary, Chalder, and Sharpe’s [103]
cognitive behavioural model of medically unexplained illness.
Limitations
Limitations have been partly integrated into the relevant sections above
with suggested directions for future research however, there are some
additional considerations.
In terms of design, this study recruited individuals who had a firm
diagnosis, but did not ask about their length of time since receiving a
diagnoses or seizure onset, making it difficult to draw any conclusions
on the direction of the relationship between psychological variables and
NEAD. In addition, only the relationship between psychological
variables and seizure frequency was explored. Baker et al. [43] showed
that seizure severity was a predictor of psychological variables in
epilepsy, therefore future studies may want to consider the role of both
severity and frequency using a validated measure (e.g seizure
severity scale [104]). Moreover, results are only generalisable to
individuals with NEAD and epilepsy currently receiving outpatient care.
In terms of methodology, The IRAP stimuli were developed specifically
for this study to reflect dimensions of the explicit scales and the term
‘others are’ was used to avoid a double negative (e.g. I am not anxious
– false) and explore people’s beliefs about themselves in relation to
others. It is possible that there are differences in implicit cognition in
people with NEAD and that our measure lacked validity producing a
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type II error. Future studies examining implicit cognition in this
population may want to consider using alternative stimuli.
This study did not use any scales of malingering or social desirability
measures, and whilst it seems unlikely that differences in explicit self-
esteem were the due to exaggerated responses, especially as the
NEAD group did not differ significantly from the epilepsy group across
other self-report measures, it is possible that the results were due to a
response biases [105]. Furthermore, this was a cross sectional study
that examined self-esteem at one time point, future work may want to
examine self-esteem stability which has been found to have a greater
predictive value than self-esteem alone [106, 107].
Implications for clinical practice
Recent developments in screening measures aimed at facilitating the
diagnostic process are promising [108]. Following our results it is
possible that the additional use of avoidance scales would enhance the
predictive utility of such tools. If nothing else, it may be particularly
helpful in facilitating discussion which could not only offer new
information but may support a rationale for psychological treatment.
Such measures could also be useful for mental health professionals to
aid formulations, intervention plans and evaluate outcomes.
CBT and psychodynamic therapy are the leading published
psychological interventions effective for NEAD [109 – 112]. Modifying
negative (and discrepant) self-evaluations or reducing unhelpful
avoidant behaviour patterns might represent mechanisms of change in
these approaches. Subsequently, other therapies which also facilitate
such changes including systemic and humanistic therapies may be
equally effective in treating NEAD. Psycho-education has also been
found to be helpful [110]. Another study [111] found that explicit self-
esteem correlated positively with knowledge about epilepsy, it might be
interesting to explore whether psycho-education programmes enhance
self-esteem in people with NEAD.
89
Mindfulness based therapies such as acceptance and commitment
therapy are also candidates for treating NEAD [115]. Mindfulness is a
way of paying attention to the present moment and aims to facilitate
being aware of thoughts and feelings in an accepting and non-
judgemental way. Mindfulness has been found to increase the ability to
reappraise thoughts, that is observe and evaluate negative ones and
replace them with more positive ones [116, 117]. Consequently,
teaching mindfulness skills may facilitate the re-evaluation of deliberate
and conscious judgements which this study found to be associated with
non-epileptic seizures. Cognitive reappraisal ability has also been
shown to moderate the effects of stressful life events [118]. Further, we
found that willingness to remain in contact with negative experiences is
related to fewer seizures, something that mindfulness can also facilitate
[119, 120]. And given that self-discrepancies are associated with
shame [121] shame-based interventions such as compassion-focused
therapy may also be worth exploring.
To conclude, this study found no differences in implicit self-esteem or
anxiety between people with NEAD, epilepsy or those without a history
of seizures, nor did there appear any relationship between implicit
cognition and non-epileptic seizures. Conversely, differences were
found on the explicit self-esteem and avoidance measures, as well as
significant relationships between non-epileptic seizures with explicit
self-esteem, self-reported anxiety, and experiential avoidance. These
findings support various psychological models of NEAD and offer a
rationale for a range of psychological treatments that target avoidant
behaviour patterns as well as deliberate evaluations that are within a
person’s awareness. In addition, it is likely that mindfulness-based
approaches will be highly beneficial, however this needs to be
investigated further.
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Rationale for journal choice
Epilepsy and Behaviour was launched only six years ago, and is the
fastest-growing international journal, with a five year impact factor
(2.111) comparing slightly favourable with the median factor for clinical
psychology journals (2.075) and clinical neurology journals (1.994).
Epilepsy and Behaviour is uniquely devoted to disseminating research
on the behavioural aspects of seizures and epilepsy. The journal has
published an array of articles on non-epileptic seizures including those
with a psychological perspective e.g. (LaFrance Jr. & Devinsky, 2002;
Markus Reuber & Elger, 2003; Thompson, Isaac, Rowse, Tooth, &
Reuber, 2009; Dickinson, Looper, & Groleau, 2011;). Published articles
also include an investigation of implicit cognition (Testa & Brandt,
2010). The second most cited article of Epilepsy and Behaviour relates
to non-epileptic seizures (Reuber, 2008; 46 citations).
Taking into account its impact factor and previous publications of
Epilepsy and Behaviour, it was anticipated that this paper would be
considered appropriate by the editors and effectively disseminated.
The journal does not enforce a word limit on manuscripts; however a
150 word limit is imposed for the abstract. Due to their length, author
guidelines are available from:
http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/622822/
authorinstructions
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1. Extended Introduction
1.1 Historical and societal context of non-epileptic seizures
Hysteria was a term used to describe a collection of symptoms only
found in women, thought to be the result of a wandering womb.
According to the Egyptian and Greek medics, the womb would travel
around the body, causing pressure in various places and therefore
symptoms. Although it is unclear what ‘hysteria’ actually referred to, it is
evident that symptoms including seizures were evident in two different
cultures, over twenty centuries ago (Trimble 2010).
Over the middle ages, a shift in emphasis from uterine theories moved
to ideas that the brain was somehow involved. Thomas Willis had a
central role in this movement and controversially went onto claim that
hysteria could be observed in men. He talked extensively about
hysterical fits and made parallels with epilepsy (Willis, 1684). Willis and
Sydenham (Sydenham, Greenhill, & Latham, 1848) were amongst
authors who emphasised the role of emotions in hysteria and
recognised the chronicity of the condition whilst implicating personality
factors.
The 18th century saw the links between epilepsy and hysteria
maintained, however Cheyne and Porter (1733) referred to the few
differences between hysteric fits and ‘epileptik’ fits. Mandeville (1730)
wrote:
As to Fits, some are seiz'd with violent Coughs; others with
Hickups; and abundance of Women are taken with Convulsive
laughing. There are Fits that have short Remissions, in which you
would think the Woman was going to recover, and yet last many Hours.
Some are so slight that the Patients only lose the Use of their Legs and
Tongue, but remain sensible; others again are so violent that those who
are seiz'd with them, foam at the Mouth, rave and beat their Heads
against the Ground; but whether they resemble an Apoplex, or are only
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fainting, or seem to be Epileptick, they all come under the
Denomination of Hysterick (p16).
In addition, he made explicit reference to the use of behavioural
treatment opposed to medicinal ones, a novel approach to something
that appeared so physical.
The French introduced the term ‘hystero-epilepsy’ in the 19th century,
again marking similarities between the epileptic and non-epileptic
seizures. And whilst many accepted that there was a clear differential
diagnosis, others claimed it was impossible to make a distinction
(Trimble, 2010). This era saw the whole debate about sexual organs
move towards the role of inhibited sexual passions (Carter, 1853), also
claimed to be the earliest theory of repression (Veith, 1970). In the
same period, the notion of post-traumatic hysteria developed, backed
by the observations of Briquet (1859) and Charcot (1889). Furthermore,
with his application of hypnotism, Charcot’s work moved towards a
more psychological approach and he veered towards the term
“neurosis” rather than hysteria.
Pierre Janet’s (1901) theories, although overshadowed by Freudian
philosophy, offered key ideas about the subconscious, traumatic events
and the concept of dissociation. According to Janet, dissociation
prevents psychological synthesis and seizures are an expression of
emotion brought about by ‘the dreaded perception and the
remembrances’ (Janet, 1901). After five months studying
neuropathology with Charcot in Paris, Freud developed an interest in
psychology. On his return to Vienna, he pursued his interest with
Joseph Breuer, leading on to the development of psychoanalysis
(claimed by Janet to be an extension of his ideas). According to Freud,
hysterical symptoms were related to traumatic memories in the
unconscious, and could be unearthed by the analytic method (Breuer &
Freud, 1956).
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Into the 20th century, the role of stress was highlighted as a precipitator
to seizures. The First World War witnessed mass cases of varied, but
typical symptoms associated over the centuries with hysteria;
convulsions, paralyses, contractures, anaesthesia, tics, loss of sight or
hearing, stammering and so on. This dispelled the Freudian theories
that neuroses were a result of sexual traumas. The same patterns were
seen in the wars throughout the 20th Century; the Second World War,
Vietnam, and the Falklands. By the Second World War, the
psychological impact of war was recognised followed by psychological
interventions for war veterans.
New techniques, in particular video-EEG, have welcomed older
arguments for attempting to separate epileptic from non-epileptic
seizures. Further efforts to separate the two can be seen across
research, which not only highlights the psychobiology of non-epileptic
seizures but its links with epilepsy. The ancient concept of hysteria has
not only evolved but its variant continues; now existing as part of the
somatization disorder in the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric
Association; APA, 2000). Overtime, swoons and convulsions have
been renamed pseudoseizures, psychogenic non-epileptic seizures,
and commonly now non-epileptic attacks/seizures.
In summary, the term hysteria has been used in different countries, for
over two millennia to describe patients with medically unexplained
syndromes. The role of emotions was hypothesised as early as the 17th
century and following observations, the role of trauma suggested
shortly after. Personality, unconscious forces and abuse were also
discussed well in advance of Freud’s ideas. Moreover, longstanding
links with epilepsy have seen hysteria renamed, compared and
arguably differentiated from it. Today, video-EEG offers substantial
support for the differential diagnosis of non-epileptic seizures and with
it, an exponential increase of research.
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1.2 Psychological aetiology of NEAD
Whilst there is some disagreement on the classification of NEAD, there
is a general consensus that the aetiology of non-epileptic seizures is
related to psychological factors. The following sections examine some
commonly discussed and debated topics in relation to NEAD.
1.2.1 Diagnoses and psychiatric co-morbidities
Although some non-epileptic seizures may be attributable to physical
causes other than epilepsy (Rugg-Gunn & Sander 2010) an organic
basis is considerably absent in a majority of individuals which supports
a psychological hypothesis. In such cases, ‘pseudoseizures’ or
dissociative convulsions as they are also called, are diagnosable
psychiatric conditions, recognised by both the Diagnostic and statistical
manual of mental disorders (4th ed., text rev; DSM-IV; APA, 2000) and
the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10; World Health
Organization, 1992).
However, there is a disagreement about what classification NEAD falls
into and whether it should be characterised as a somatoform or
dissociative disorder. The DSM-IV categorises non-epileptic seizures
(i.e., conversion disorder) within the broader category of somatoform
disorders. These are symptoms that are not intentionally produced (as
in Factitious Disorder or Malingering), and cannot be fully explained by
a general medical condition. A diagnosis entails one or more
neurological symptoms or deficits affecting voluntary motor or sensory
function, for example paralysis, deafness, blindness,
seizures/convulsions, accompanied by psychological factors which are
thought to intensify or initiate the onset (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000, p. 498). By contrast, the ICD-10 classifies non-
epileptic seizures under dissociation. It defines dissociation as ‘ a partial
or complete loss of the normal integration between memories of the
past, awareness of identity and immediate sensations, and control of
body movements’ (p.151, World Health Organisation, 1992).
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The debate of how non-epileptic seizures are classified is made more
complicated by the fact that dissociative and conversion (somatoform)
disorders both share symptoms characteristic of neurological
dysfunction. Furthermore, the two diagnoses may have similar
antecedents including high rates of trauma (Van der Kolk et al., 1996).
Some authors have suggested that non-epileptic seizures are a
dissociative deviation of post-traumatic stress disorder (Brewin,
Andrews, & Valentine, 2000) yet post-traumatic stress disorder, which
may be accompanied with dissociative symptoms, is classified in the
group of anxiety disorders. The conceptual differences of what non-
epileptic seizures constitute reflects the challenges of syndromal,
topographically oriented classification and arguably does not add
anything in identifying aetiological processes (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford,
Follette, & Strosahl, 1996).
Aside from the limitations, the literature around the psychology of NEAD
uses diagnostic taxonomies to illustrate further difficulties that
individuals with NEAD experience. Mökleby et al. (2002) reported
psychiatric comorbidity to be as high as 96%, although critically this
study was limited by a small sample. Most commonly, non-epileptic
seizures are associated with anxiety disorders, affective disorders,
personality disorders and posttraumatic stress disorder (Kanner et al.,
1999; Ettinger, Devinsky, Weisbrot, Ramakrishna, & Goyal, 1999;
Fiszman, Alves-Leon, Nunes, D’Andrea, & Figueira, 2004).
Although depression and anxiety disorders appear to be the most
common psychological disorders amongst people with NEAD (Bowman,
2001; Marchetti et al., 2008) these are also most common in people
with Epilepsy (Hermann, Seidenberg, & Bell, 2000; Rosenberg,
Rosenberg, Williamson, & Wolford, 2000; Devinsky, 2003;). There are
several possibly explanations for the lack of significant difference on
these diagnoses. Seizures, of whatever nature are both disabling and
stigmatising. Both groups are subject to the same problems, poor
schooling, unemployment and difficult interpersonal relationships, all of
113
which dramatically affect quality of life (Breier et al., 1998; Szaflarski et
al., 2003).
1.2.2 Stress and coping
Tojek and colleagues (2000) reported that the marginal differences in
anxiety scores between individuals with NEAD and can be accounted
and controlled for by stressful life events. Although, Stone, Binzer, and
Sharpe (2004) suggest that people with NEAD have a greater tendency
to deny non-health life stresses, they perceive their on-going lives as
significantly more stressful than those with epilepsy (Frances, Baker, &
Appleton, 1999). When compared with an affective disorder control
group however, people with NEAD show no significant differences on
the number or severity of life events preceding symptom onset
(Roelofs, Spinhoven, Sandijck, Moene, & Hoogduin, 2005). Roelofs and
colleagues (2005) found a significant relationship between symptom
severity and recent life events, particularly those which involved work
and relationships.
Despite this apparent relationship between stressful life events and
symptoms, people with NEAD are less likely to see psychological
factors as relevant compared with epilepsy participants, and are more
likely to have an external locus of control (Goldstein, Drew, Mellers,
Mitchell-O’Malley, & Oakley, 2000; Stone et al., 2004). One explanation
to this is differences in coping strategies; Studies have suggested that
people with NEAD are more likely to use escape-avoidant strategies,
and less likely to use problem solving approaches compared with non-
clinical controls (Frances et al., 1999; Goldstein et al., 2000).
1.2.3 Personality
There is a growing body of literature examining personality profiles of
individuals with non-epileptic seizures. Previous studies have
predominantly utilised the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory
(MMPI; Derry & McLachlan, 1996; Kalogjera-Sackellares & Sackellares,
1997; Storzbach, Binder, Salinsky, Campbell, & Mueller, 2000),
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however the MMPI has been criticised for difficulties with interpretation
(Reuber, Pukrop, Bauer, Derfuss, & Elger, 2004) and for only having
moderate convergence validity with the DSM-IV; (Widiger & Coker,
2002). More contemporary studies have attempted to address such
criticisms by employing alternative measures such as the Dimensional
Assessment Of Personality Pathology – Basic Questionnaire (DAPQ;
Reuber et al., 2004), Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; Wagner,
Wymer, Topping, & Pritchard, 2005) and the Structured Clinical
Interview for Axis II Disorders (SCID-II; Direk, Kulaksizoglu, Alpay, &
Gurses, 2012).
There is a consensus across studies that individuals with non-epileptic
seizures commonly report or exhibit personality traits which deviate
from the norm. Moreover, studies suggest that people with non-epileptic
seizures fall into clusters of personality pathology. Reuber and
colleagues’ (2004) DAPQ study showed that the largest cluster was
typical of that found in borderline personality disorder, which is
characterised by emotional dysregulation and issues with self-image
(Lieb, Zanarini, Schmahl, Linehan, & Bohus, 2004). The second largest
group resembled an overly controlled personality, with higher scores on
compulsivity, suggesting a need for order, precision, and
conscientiousness. The third and much smaller group scored higher on
traits associated with avoidant personality disorder.
A similar result was echoed with the SCID-II which found that 74.3%
with NES had a diagnosable personality disorder (Direk et al., 2012).
Borderline personality disorder was the most prevalent (40%) followed
by avoidant personality disorder (25.7%) and obsessive-compulsive
personality disorder (22.9%). Furthermore, personality traits, particularly
those associated with the DSM-IV disorders have been linked to poorer
outcomes in those with NEAD and vice versa. Lower scores on
dimensions of ‘inhibitedness’, ‘emotional dysregulation’, and
‘compulsivity’ for example, were associated with better outcomes in a
10 year follow up (Reuber, Pukrop, Bauer, et al., 2003).
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Alexithymia is another personality trait commonly observed in
individuals with NEAD. Alexithymia is associated with difficulties
recognizing, processing, and regulating emotions (Luminet, Bagby,
Wagner, Taylor, & Parker, 1999), often discussed in relation to
psychopathology. Psychological explanations suggest that alexithymia
develops as a coping response to severe psychological trauma and is
therefore a temporary state opposed to dispositional trait (Bewley,
Murphy, Mallows, & Baker, 2005). Studies using the 20-item Toronto
Alexithymia Scale have found that individuals with NEAD score
significantly higher compared with healthy controls, however not
significantly different from those with epilepsy (Tojek et al., 2000;
Bewley et al., 2005).
On a critical note, personality measures have been argued as
reductionist (Deary, 1996) with personality theories criticised for being
informal, implicit, unspecified, and that trait words only describe
behaviour not explain it (Hogan, 2005). Hogan (2005) goes on to
conversely argue that there is good data in support of personality
measures, with validity coefficients similar to those of medical
procedures. The discriminant validity of personality measures in this
population, although varied, is thought to be clinically meaningful. For
example Derry and McLachlan (1996) found a classification accuracy of
92% for NES, and 94% for epilepsy using the MMPI-2. Other authors
have found more modest outcomes with the PAI; 84% sensitivity and
73% specificity for NES versus ES (Wagner et al., 2005). Moreover,
Wagner and colleagues go on to discuss the cost implications of using
such measures. A clinical interview and PAI costs around £200, whilst
an inpatient, 24-hour VEEG hospital admission can cost up to £9700,
that is excluding inappropriate antiepileptic drug treatment. Despite
being based on costs in the United States they illustrate the financial
burden of seizure disorders and arguably justifies thinking about
personality in such simple terms.
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1.2.4 Trauma and abuse
Like the personality disorder literature, papers on non-epileptic seizures
make considerable reference to trauma, with this client group scoring
consistently high on various trauma scales (Fleisher et al., 2002). A
review by Fiszman and colleagues (2004) found a very high prevalence
of trauma (44-100%) and abuse (23-77%) in people with NEAD. These
figures were 15-40% higher than epilepsy and nonclinical control
groups. In terms of the variation observed in prevalence,
methodological approaches can probably account for a majority; in
particular definitions of abuse and trauma being different across studies
as well as employing a mixture of measures.
There is a breadth of literature which offers support more specifically for
links between childhood abuse and psychological distress (Mullen,
Martin, Anderson, Romans, & Herbison, 1993; Horwitz, Widom,
McLaughlin, & White, 2001; Noll, Horowitz, Bonanno, Trickett, &
Putnam, 2003). An association between unexplained seizures and
sexual abuse in childhood can be traced back to the Egyptians, the
Greeks, the Romans, and the Navajo (Sharpe & Faye, 2006). Sharpe
and Faye (2006) offered a comprehensive meta-analysis examining the
links between childhood sexual abuse and NEAD. Across all studies,
higher rates of sexual abuse were associated with non-epileptic
seizures, although no definitive conclusions could be made about the
saliency of sexual abuse over other forms of trauma due to
methodological discrepancies. The authors found that studies reported
lower rates of abuse when they allowed participants to define
themselves as victims. Furthermore, stronger relationships between
childhood sexual abuse and adult psychopathology is seen when
definitions are more restrictive (DiLillo, 2001). Such studies however,
are subject to ethical criticism by suggesting that milder forms of abuse
are acceptable.
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1.2.5 Dissociation and somatisation
Dissociation is commonly discussed in relation to trauma experiences
(Merckelbach & Muris, 2001), conceptualised as a mechanism rather
than a cause, and refers to ‘a loss or altered integration of the continuity
of the experience of the self’ (p.547, Bodde et al., 2009). The function
of dissociation is believed to be protective by altering consciousness
when exposed to painful or traumatic events, memories, images or
thoughts (Alper, 1994).
Several studies utilising different self-report questionnaires have
consistently found that individuals with NEAD show elevated scores on
measures of dissociation, but not significantly higher than those with
epilepsy (Alper et al., 1997; Kuyk, Spinhoven, van Emde Boas, & van
Dyck, 1999). Furthermore, Reuber, House, Pukrop, Bauer, and Elger,
(2003) found that scores on dissociation did not discriminate between
patients with NEAD and epilepsy, nor were they associated with
outcome or symptom severity. In contrast, the same research found
significant differences in somatisation scores between the two groups,
concluding that those with non-epileptic seizures have a greater
tendency to communicate psychosocial distress through somatic
symptoms. Whilst the results suggest that dissociation may play a part
for some, it certainly does not appear to be a standalone factor in
NEAD.
In conclusion, NEAD presents a complex psychological aetiology made
more difficult by some of the similarities with epilepsy and other
psychological problems. This has resulted in on-going diagnostic
debates (Brown, Cardeña, Nijenhuis, Sar, & van der Hart, 2007).
Arguably, a taxonomy system of symptoms has little to offer in the way
of aetiology and interventions, and theoretical models based on
function are more useful. Research suggests that NEAD may be elicited
by various early and later negative life events and consequently
requires a multifactorial model (discussed in 1.4).
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1.3 Experiential Avoidance
Experiential avoidance is a process recognised implicitly and explicitly
by various schools of thought including psychodynamic, cognitive,
behavioural, and systemic approaches. Experiential avoidance
describes the effort to avoid or escape particular private experiences
such as behavioural tendencies, bodily sensations, memories,
emotions, or thoughts, because of an unwillingness to remain in contact
with them (Hayes et al., 1996; Hayes & Gifford, 1997). Experiential
avoidance can be conceptualised on a continuum from subtle and self-
protective, to extreme and damaging. Containing ones anxiety during a
speech or managing feelings of boredom during an important meeting
are relatively benign forms of experiential avoidance, and any negative
consequences are likely to be minimal. However, if applied rigidly,
experiential avoidance can become a disordered process in which
excessive costs such as effort, time, and energy outweigh any benefit
and in turn become a struggle. It is thought that this ‘struggle’ and
unwillingness to experience negative private events contributes to
psychopathology (Forsyth, Eifert, & Barrios, 2006).
Indeed, experiential avoidance has been found to be associated with
general psychopathology; depression, anxiety, a variety of specific
fears, trauma, and a lower quality of life psychological distress in both
clinical and non-clinical samples (Hayes et al., 2004; Kashdan, Barrios,
Forsyth, & Steger, 2006). Moreover, several studies make an argument
that experiential avoidance is not just associated or a result of
symptomology, but a vulnerability factor in the development of
psychopathology. For example, individuals high in experiential
avoidance have been found to report more panic symptoms and
uncontrollability in response to challenge induced panic compared to
less avoidant participants (Karekla, Forsyth, & Kelly, 2004; Spira,
Zvolensky, Eifert, & Feldner, 2004).
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Experiential avoidance is also associated with increased sympathetic
activation and hyper-arousal as seen in PTSD (Gross & Levenson,
1997; Tull, Gratz, Salters, & Roemer, 2004). Although PTSD symptoms
are associated with experiential avoidance in general, the relationship
is not above that seen in depression, anxiety or somatisation disorder.
However, thought suppression in particular correlates with PTSD
symptoms, above and beyond general psychiatric symptoms (Tull et al.,
2004). This highlights the multidimensional nature of experiential
avoidance, and how various features may influence psychopathology
differently.
Experiential avoidance has also been linked to certain coping
strategies. Lower experiential avoidance is associated with positive
reframing and acceptance, whilst high experiential avoidance is
associated with more avoidant strategies (self-destruction, behavioural
disengagement, and denial), and emotion-focused strategies (seeking
emotional support, venting and self-blame). Consequently, individuals
higher in experiential avoidance not only engage in strategies that
facilitate emotional suppression and inhibition, but also process and
express emotion in unhelpful ways that more than likely play a part in
the development and maintenance of clinical difficulties (Kashdan et al.,
2006; Karekla & Panayiotou, 2011).
Although avoidance is recognised by psychological models and
interventions for NEAD (Bowman, 2000; Reuber & Mayor, 2012), there
is limited research that specifically examines experiential avoidance.
Nevertheless it is clearly indicated in the few studies that do exist, with
escape-avoidant strategies being more common in those with non-
epileptic seizures compared with epilepsy or healthy controls (Frances
et al., 1999; Goldstein et al., 2000; Goldstein & Mellers, 2006).
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1.4 Psychological theories and models related to NEAD
1.4.1 Psychodynamic
According to psychodynamic theory, the personality is composed of
three main forces: id, the ego, and the superego. A psychodynamic
model postulates that non-epileptic seizures are the result of ‘intra-
psychic conflict’ between these theoretical constructs. The id represents
the basic instinctual and unconscious drives, seeking pleasure and
avoiding pain which Freud termed the pleasure principle (Freud, 1990).
The ego signifies the conscious part of personality, mediating between
the id and reality, seeking out the id’s drives realistically in ways that will
have a long-term benefit, coined the reality principle. The superego is
the internalised moral agency, inherited from parents and authoritative
influences, and confines the ego with feelings of guilt and anxiety. In
the patient with hysteria, repression is employed to deal with thoughts,
affect and memories that are offensive to the superego and in doing so,
reduces intra-psychic tension.
Repression is a central tenet of psychodynamic models of NEAD. This
can be conceptualised as a mental process that allows an individual to
forget or keep unpleasant thoughts and affect out of the conscious
(Singer, 1995). If the balance between the id, ego and superego is
disturbed, as a result of some psychological crisis for example, the
repressed content may find an outlet (primary gain). Accordingly,
neurotic symptoms reflect some sort of disguised conflict “leakage” as
the ego’s unconscious attempts to prevent it coming into the conscious.
This in turn allows some of the repressed contents to be expressed
without an individual experiencing unnecessary anxiety or guilt as
imposed by the superego. Consequently, it allows them to exhaust
some of the ‘intra-psychic pressure’ and therefore continue repressing
material. Secondary gains like attention and care, or demand
avoidance for instance, may also follow the symptom (see figure 10.
below). For example, in a case of childhood sexual abuse, memories
that are too painful are forgotten and therefore repressed. The birth of a
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child may disrupt the dynamic balance between the main forces of the
personality (id, ego and superego), and trigger a neurological symptom,
for example a non-epileptic seizures.
Psychodynamic approaches have been criticised as being unscientific,
Freud’s theories of the unconscious and tripartite personality are
intangible and consequently are impossible to test empirically, making
them unfalsifiable. Alternative models offer more substantial
explanations which are subject to more systematic testing.
Despite these criticisms, Alper argues that the DSM-IV has been unable
to exclude psychoanalytic theory. The diagnostic criteria for conversion
disorder make specific reference to psychological factors as well as “not
intentionally” producing symptoms, which Alper claims reflects the
central psychoanalytic concept of the dynamic unconscious (Alper,
1994).
Repressed intrapsychic conflict
The symptom (seizure) expresses the conflict
(primary gain)
Thus making continued repression possible
And yielding excuses from responsibility
+ eventually attention, care, avoidance of
demands
(secondary gain)
Figure 10. A psychodynamic model of NEAD, taken from LaFrance
& Bjornaes (p 267. 2010).
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1.4.2 Learning theories
Classical conditioning, operant conditioning, and social learning can all
offer a framework on which to conceptualise NEAD (Munafo, 1997).
1.4.2.1 Classical and operant conditioning
A classical conditioning model sees an autonomic nervous response
associated with one stimulus, become associated with a neutral
stimulus because of temporal and situational contingencies.
Unconditioned stimulus (US) Æ Unconditioned response (UR)
Neutral stimulus + Unconditioned stimulus Æ Unconditioned response
(NS) (US) (UR)
Conditioned stimulus Æ Conditioned response
(previously neutral stimulus; CS) (CR)
Certain forms of non-epileptic seizures may be learned by classical
conditioning. For example, someone with epilepsy may find that a
neutral object in a place where flickering lights regularly triggers
seizures, say a kettle might eventually elicit similar seizures, but
perhaps without the epileptiform EEG correlates. The conditioned
response can later become generalised so that any kettle could trigger
a seizure.
Figure 11. The classical conditioning sequence
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Flickering light (US)Æ Seizure (UR)
Kettle (NS) + Flickering light (US)Æ Seizure (UR)
Kettle (CS)Æ Seizure (CR)
An operant conditioning model assumes that behaviours are reinforced
by subsequent events, which could be a pleasant consequence such as
positive attention, or could be the avoidance of an unpleasant one such
as evading demands. Responses do not have to be related to the
discriminative stimulus or antecedent prior to conditioning:
Discriminative stimulus (Sd)Æ Response(R)ÆReinforcing consequence (SR)
Operant conditioning principles have been demonstrated in patients
with chronic pain, where the presence of other people act as a
reinforcement for pain behaviour and complaints (Sullivan, Adams, &
Sullivan, 2004). The concept of shaping refers to a reinforcing event
being contingent on further advancement on successive responses
(operants). This could be applied to small non-epileptic seizures to
account for the development of disabling non-epileptic seizures similar
to epileptic ones.
Linton, Melin, and Götestam (1984) proposed an avoidance model
which combines classical and operant conditioning paradigms to
explain the maintenance of chronic pain syndrome, this could be
adapted for NEAD (see figure 13). A threatening and anxiety provoking
situation that may trigger a seizure (Sd/CS) elicits a conditioned
Figure 12. An example of how the conditioning paradigm may be
applied to seizure behaviour.
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response (CR) of sympathetic activation including anxiety, which in turn
leads to avoidance of the situation (R). The avoidance behaviour is
reinforced by a reduction of the unpleasant stimuli.
Using such a model to account for non-epileptic attacks is supported by
Goldstein and Mellers’s (2006) study which found that during their
attacks, people with NEAD report greater numbers of somatic
symptoms of anxiety compared with epilepsy participants as well as
identifying more avoidant behaviour. Studies evaluating behavioural
approaches as treatment also provide support for this explanatory
model, as well as its utility as a therapeutic modality for reducing
seizure behaviour. Integrating a functional behavioural analysis as well
as using operant conditioning principles with biofeedback have both
proved successful at preventing non-epileptic seizures (Rockstroh,
Birbaumer, Elbert, & Lutzenberger, 1984; Dahl, Melin, & Leissner,
1988; Sterman, 2000).
Unlike psychodynamic models, behavioural approaches are
scientifically more robust and subject to scientific testing. Furthermore,
these models focus on the ‘here and now’ and do not depend on
knowing a person’s history. For many, reducing seizure frequency may
CR
Sympathetic Activation
Anxiety
Muscle tension
A threat or trigger
(e.g. Flashback)
Avoidant behaviour
(e.g. Seizure)
Reinforcement via
reduction of
fear/anxiety
Sd/CR R SR
Figure 13. Activity avoidance model, adapted from (Linton et al., 1984).
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be more important than understanding how they came about. However,
it has been claimed that traditional behavioural approaches are
reductionist and that they ignore thought processes, even though
Skinner (1977) did argue a differentiation between covert from overt
behaviours.
1.4.2.2 Social learning theory
Social learning theory (Bandura, 1962) posits that behaviour is
modelled on others. For example, an individual may model a family
member who they see receiving attention due to a seizure, and may
imitate their symptoms. People with NEAD have higher rates of family
epilepsy (Aldenkamp & Mulder, 1997) and although that may support
claims that people with NEAD have a genetic vulnerability to seizures, it
is also makes an argument for modelling.
Bandura (1977) also highlighted the importance of cognitive factors in
learning, which could include illness beliefs. For example, an
individual’s beliefs and attitudes about their seizures may depend on
their family’s responses and attitudes towards their severity. Consistent
with this idea, patients with non-epileptic seizures have been found to
report higher levels of fear about the consequences of seizures and
their impact on the family compared with those with epilepsy (Hixson,
Balcer, Glosser & French, 2006).
Critically, explaining seizures in terms of social learning theory dos not
offer an explanatory account, rather it suggests what and not how
learning takes place. It does not describe what processes or
mechanisms in the same way behavioural accounts do. Similarly,
cognitive models offer more detail.
1.4.3 Cognitive models
Cognitive theories maintain that a person’s cognition (attention,
attribution, and beliefs) govern behaviour and physiological state.
Despite a scarcity of research specifically on cognition in NEAD, one
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study has shown promising results on biased attention with NEAD
participants demonstrating hypervigilance for social threat (Bakvis et al.,
2009). Beyond this, the literature on attention and attribution in those
with medically unexplained symptoms, somatoform disorder and PTSD
can also offer a useful framework in explaining the development and
maintenance of attacks.
Barsky and Wyshak (1990) focused on the role of perception and
cognition in people with medically unexplained symptoms and proposed
a process they and others call somatosensory amplification (see
figure14) initially developed to describe cognition in hypochondriacs.
Figure 14. The circle of somatosensory amplification (Barsky &
Wyshak, 1990).
According to Barsky and Wyshak (1990), somatic sensations are
experienced as more intense and amplified due to attention focusing on
bodily processes. These sensations are perceived as more noxious and
disturbing, so more likely to be misattributed to a serious disease. As a
consequence, physical signs and sensations are further amplified,
creating a vicious circle.
Perception
Attribution
Physical
complaints
Attention
focussing
Increase of
intensity
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In terms of supportive studies, there is mixed opinion for this model.
Research on individuals with hypochondriasis as well as somatoform
disorder has shown that both groups are more likely to report
catastrophic interpretations of bodily sensations (Rief, Hiller, & Margraf,
1998; Barsky et al., 2001; Duddu, Isaac, & Chaturvedi, 2006). However,
the literature on attribution is a little less clear cut than cognitive models
imply. Rief and colleagues (2004) found that people with medically
unexplained symptoms have multiple causal attributions including both
organic and psychological. Although those with somatoform disorders
are more likely to hold organic reasons, those with co-morbid anxiety
and depression more frequently attribute psychological causes
(Robbins & Kirmayer, 1991).
PTSD studies also suggest a role of attention and attribution, with those
suffering with acute stress disorder amplifying the probability of harm
and its cost compared with healthy controls (Smith & Bryant, 2000).
Similar findings have been shown in those with anxiety and depression
(e.g. Ahrens & Haaga, 1993; Mogg, Bradley, & Williams, 1995).
Despite the plausibility of cognitive models, there are a range of studies
reporting that medical reassurance does not work for those with
medically unexplained symptoms (McDonald, Daly, Jelinek, Panetta, &
Gutman, 1996; Coia & Morley, 1998). This questionably highlights the
simplicity of Barsky and Wyshak’s (1990) cognitive model. Marcus and
Church (2003) showed that estimates about the likelihood of symptoms
best predicted hypochondriasis scores when combined with
agoraphobic avoidance. Such criticisms have seen cognitive and
behavioural theories integrated.
1.4.4 Cognitive Behavioural (CBT) Models
Vlaeyen, Kole-Snijders, Boeren, and van Eek, (1995) blended Barsky
and Wyshak’s (1990) model with Linton et al.’s (1984) avoidance
model to create the ‘fear’-avoidance model. Again, this can be adapted
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to explain the maintenance of non-epileptic attacks, and the associated
avoidance and anxiety (figure 15). The utility of this model has been
shown in a single case design for an individual with NEAD, which
involved targeting avoided activities through graded exposure and a
four year follow up found that treatment gains were maintained
(Chalder, 1996).
Injury
and/or
trauma
Disability
depression
Recovery
Avoidance
hypervigilance
Non-
epileptic
seizure
Confrontation
Fear of
seizure
No
fear
Catastrophising
Figure 15. The ‘fear’-avoidance model, adapted from (Vlaeyen et
al., 1995)
The strength of cognitive behavioural models is their emphasis on the
interaction of cognition, behaviour, physiology and emotion. However,
although the fear-avoidance model combines cognitive and behavioural
approaches offering a framework to understand seizure maintenance, it
remains crude and struggles to account for seizure onset.
Traditionally, Beck’s CBT model of emotional distress distinguishes
between predispositions, precipitants, and perpetuating factors (Beck,
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Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1987). This model offers a formulation on the
generation of physical symptoms in the absence of physical pathology
or psychopathology, making it distinct from generic psychobiological
models (Wade, 2004). However, in doing so, overlooks the evidence-
base on biological markers and physiological sensitivity in those with
NEAD.
The principle of predispositions, precipitants, and perpetuating factors
or the ‘three P’s’ has been adopted in variants of CBT models for
medically unexplained symptoms and NEAD (Reuber & Elger, 2003;
Richardson & Engel, 2004; Hutton, 2005). Such models hypothesise
that perpetuating cognitive, behavioural, affective and physiological
factors are triggered, or precipitated by an event or events. Several
studies have shown that non-epileptic attacks are precipitated by ‘life
events’ which are also related to the severity of symptoms (Binzer,
Stone, & Sharpe, 2004; Roelofs et al., 2005). These precipitating
factors are thought to activate a prolonged stress response,
predisposed by genetics and early experiences that over time have
neurological consequences.
There is some support for the notion of prolonged stress response in
NEAD, derived from research which examines the major stress
response systems; the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis and the
autonomic nervous system. Bakvis et al. (2010) examined the links
between the hypothalamus–pituitary–adrenal axis and its end-product
cortisol. People with NEAD showed significantly increased cortisol
levels compared to healthy controls, particularly in those who reported a
sexual trauma. This is in line with findings examining hypercortisolism in
people with dissociative disorders (Simeon et al., 2007). Other studies
have examined autonomic signs and symptoms, with studies finding
significantly more hyper-arousal symptoms being reported such as
abdominal symptoms, tachycardia, palpitations, respiratory changes,
and sweating during non-epileptic attacks compared with epileptic
seizures (Galimberti et al., 2003; Goldstein & Mellers, 2006). However,
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a more recent study using skin conductance measures has not
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Brosschot, Pieper, and Thayer (2005) propose that the mediator
between stress factors and prolonged stress response is perseverative
cognition (see figure 16), ‘the repeated or chronic activation of the
cognitive representation of stress-related content’ (p1045) i.e. worry or
rumination.
Figure 16. Model of prolonged stress-related activation with
perseverative cognition mediating prolonged response
(Brosschot, Pieper, and Thayer, 2005)
Although this model overlooks behavioural factors, Deary, Chalder, and
Sharpe (2007) effectively integrate it within an expanded CBT model
that considers predisposing, precipitating and perpetuating factors from
a wider biopsychosocial perspective (figure 17). Early adversity
combined with innate personality factors increase distress sensitivity
and tolerance. Life events, stressors and viruses combine with these
predisposing factors as well as cognitive, behavioural, social and
physiological aspects to produce more symptoms. This initiates a
process of ‘sensitisation and selective attention which further lowers the
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threshold of symptom detection. Triggers become associated with
symptoms via classical conditioning, whilst avoidance strategies are
reinforced through operant conditioning. The prolonged stress produces
more symptoms, sensitisation, selective attention and avoidance which
produce a cycle that maintains symptoms and distress.
Although considerably more sophisticated in accounting for the
development of NEAD, on an intervention level the main focus would
be on the perpetuating cycle or factors. So although more robust and
offers a causal explanation, it differs little in terms of application from
Vlaeyen and colleagues’ model.
132
Predisposing and Precipitating Factors
Early
experience of
adversity
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threat
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Figure 17. CBT model of medically unexplained symptoms
(Deary, Chalder, & Sharpe, 2007).
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1.4.5 Systemic theory
Minuchin and colleagues used systems theory to construct a
conceptual model of somatisation that focuses on the family
environment and how it contributes and maintains somatic symptoms
(Minuchin et al., 1975). Although it was initially developed for cases of
‘brittle’ diabetes, psychosomatic asthma, and anorexia nervosa, it offers
a useful framework for NEAD. The authors proposed that severe
problems develop and are maintained by certain characteristics within
the family unit; overprotection, rigidity, enmeshment, and lack of conflict
resolution. Precipitating events are often those which challenge this
pattern, which could be a child’s need for change or distress. According
to systems theory illness behaviour is reinforced or extinguished by
familial, interpersonal and social environment factors. For example,
when a child experiences symptoms, attention may be taken away from
the conflict and is focused on the illness, a feedback loop can then
develop in which avoidance of conflict reinforces the symptom
behaviours. Although similar to a behavioural model, it is this circularity
that distinguishes it from its linear counterpart.
Moore, Baker, McDade, Chadwick, and Brown (1994) considered how
NEAD may fulfil a function within a family context. They found that
people with non-epileptic seizures perceive their families as less
committed and supportive than those with epilepsy. Wood, McDaniel,
Burchfiel, and Erba† (1998) had similar findings, concluding that family
distress, criticism, and tendencies to somatise may all contribute to
NEAD. Another study concluded that people with NEAD perceive their
families as more dysfunctional on measures of affective involvement,
communication, general functioning, and rate more familial conflict
(Krawetz et al., 2001).
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1.4.6 Attachment theory
John Bowlby (1988) first developed attachment theory and theorised
that a person’s early experiences shape enduring cognitive schemas,
or internal working models of themselves and others. According to
Bowlby, these models of self and other influence how we interpret our
interactions with others and subsequently behave, throughout life.
Based on the original work of Bowlby, Bartholomew and Horowitz
(1991) proposed a model of attachment styles in adulthood. The
authors identified four main attachment styles, based on a person’s
self- image and image of others (positive or negative): secure,
dismissing, preoccupied, and fearful. Table 12 summarises the
characteristics of the four styles.
Table12. Summary of the characteristics of the four attachment
styles proposed by Bartholomew and Horowitz
Model of Self
+ Positive
- Negative
M
o
de
lo
fO
th
er +
Po
si
tiv
e
Secure
Characterised by:
x Low avoidance
x Low anxiety
Preoccupied
Characterised by:
x Low avoidance
x High anxiety
-
N
e
ga
tiv
e
Dismissing
Characterised by:
x High avoidance
x Low anxiety
Fearful
Characterised by:
x High avoidance
x High anxiety
The relationship between attachment style and adult psychopathology
is well established (Muller, Lemieux, & Sicoli, 2001) and has been
examined within the context of medically unexplained symptoms.
Ciechanowski and colleagues (2002) found that those with preoccupied
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and fearful attachment patterns reported more somatic symptoms
compared with people with secure attachment. The authors proposed
that this is based on a tendency to have low self-esteem and to focus
on negative affect. Similar findings on attachment and symptom
reporting were also found in students (Feeney & Ryan, 1994).
In line with these findings Binzer et al. (2004) found that people with
NEAD recall less parental warmth and more paternal rejection.
Furthermore, a general personality measure indicated that people with
NEAD demonstrate more insecure attachment compared with epilepsy
controls (Reuber et al., 2004). More formally, an examination of
attachment style showed a significant difference between NEAD and
epilepsy, with fearful attachment (negative view of self and other) being
more frequent in individuals with NEAD. Conversely secure attachment
was more common amongst epilepsy controls (Holman, Kirkby,
Duncan, & Brown, 2008). The authors found that even after controlling
for psychopathology, attachment was still associated with NEAD
suggesting a specific link.
Unlike earlier propositions that attachment is formed in childhood,
contemporary models suggest that attachment style is dynamic and
subject to change with age (Crittenden & Claussen, 2003). Given the
reports of increased stressors with regard to relationships it is possible
that fearful attachment as reported by Holman et al. (2008) is in fact a
by-product of experiences nearer to symptom onset. The literature
would however benefit from an approach utilising interview based
attachment assessments, which could explore childhood attachment.
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1.5 Conceptualisation of anxiety
Anxiety can be defined as ‘the tense, unsettling anticipation of a
threatening but vague event: a feeling of uneasy suspense’ (p3,
Rachman, 2004). There is a general consensus that anxiety
fundamentally consists of physiological responses, overt behaviours,
and a cognitive appraisals, as discussed below (Barlow, 2004).
Although the three do not necessarily correspond (Lang, Levin, Miller, &
Kozak, 1983).
Whilst most consider anxiety to be an emotion, anxiety according to
Izard (1977 as cited in Barlow, 2004), is not a basic emotion, but a
blend or hybrid of others in which fear dominates. He viewed anxiety as
a combination of fear with one or more core emotions: sadness, anger,
shame, guilt, and excitement. In addition, this blend called “anxiety”
according to Izard could vary in different contexts, at different times.
Despite being used interchangeably with fear Rachman (2004) argues
that anxiety can be distinguished from fear by three things; cause,
duration, and maintenance (see table 13).
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Table13. Similarities and differences between fear and anxiety
(taken from p5, Rachman, 2004)
Fear Anxiety
Anticipation of danger or discomfort
Tense apprehensiveness
Uneasiness
Elevated arousal
Negative affect
Future orientated
Accompanied by bodily sensations
Present danger
- Specific source of threat
- Understandable connection
between threat and fear
- Usually episodic
- Circumscribed tension
- Identifiable threat
- Provoked by threat cues
- Declines with removal of
threat
- Offset is detectable
- Circumscribed area of threat
- Imminent threat
- Quality of an emergency
- Bodily sensations of an
emergency
- Rational quality
Anticipated danger
- Source of threat is elusive
- Uncertain connection
between anxiety and threat
- Prolonged
- Pervasive uneasiness
- Can be objectless
- Uncertain onset
- Persistent
- Uncertain offset
- Without clear boarders
- Threat seldom imminent
- Heightened vigilance
- Bodily sensations of
vigilance
- Puzzling quality
Despite a whole host of theoretical distinctions, ecologically it is blurry
to separate fear and anxiety. The relationship between the two is
complex; whilst fear is often followed by anxiety, recurrent anxiety can
also prompt fear (Rachman & Taylor, 1993). Furthermore, anxiety/fear
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can be triggered by a range of internal and external cues of threat or
danger and are associated with similar types of physiological responses
and behaviours (especially avoidance) (Mowrer, 1960; Rosen &
Schulkin, 1998).
Charles Darwin’s 1872 publication The Expression of the Emotions in
Man and Animals emphasised the fundamental role of behavioural
expression and spurred a long tradition (Darwin, 1998). The functional
significance of expressive behaviour has prompted much interest,
particularly into its function. The traditional view of anxiety seems to be
that it serves a role in preparing individuals for quick and crucial action,
such as ‘fight or flight’ thus increasing chances of survival. Fear
expression also communicates danger to others, prompting them to
respond to would may be an otherwise unanticipated threat,
subsequently improving their chances for survival.
Anxiety is related to a number of physiological markers associated with
arousal including insomnia, tension, increased heart rate, muscle
tension, and perspiration. William James and Carl Lange proposed that
anxiety resulted from physiological changes (James-Lange theory).
Walter Cannon however, was one of the first to dispute the James-
Lange theory, proposing that emotions also give rise to physiological
changes (Cannon, 1927). With the development of less invasive
techniques, there has been a growth of literature which attempts to
understand anxiety in terms of neurobiology and brain processes,
utilising brain imaging, in particular to establish the role of the limbic
system and cerebral cortex (Hoehn-Saric, 1993; Bremner, 2004).
Furthermore, researchers have discussed anxiety in terms of
neurochemistry and pharmacology, and endorsed the development of
drug treatments for pathological anxiety (Hoehn-Saric, 1993; Ninan,
1999).
Cognition is another fundamental aspect of anxiety. Beck, Emery, and
Greenberg (1985) proposed that a core element of anxiety is the
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automatic appraisal of danger. Whilst fear is associated with more
immediate threat, anxiety reflects an enduring state characterised by
perceived unpleasantness, uncertainty, helplessness, lack of control,
and future orientation (Clark & Beck, 2011). There is various support
for the role of cognition in the experience of anxiety. For example worry
or rumination was shown not only to be associated but have a causal
relationship with anxiety (Gana, Martin, & Canouet, 2001) that is,
continued and repeated attentiveness for future threat with lack of
resolution leads to increased anxiety.
Although anxiety appears to be innate and observed across cultures
(Wierzbicka, 1999; Ohl, Toschi, Wigger, & Landgraf, 2001), the idea of
fear/anxiety being learnt was given empirical support nearly a century
ago by Pavlov, and later Watson. They demonstrated that the fear
reflex could be shaped by experience and that fear could be elicited by
a previously neutral stimulus through classical conditioning (Pavlov,
1928). Freud also made a similar proposal, independent of the
behavioural schools. As well as appreciating that anxiety could be
learnt, both Pavlov and Freud described it as a biologically adaptive
defensive response (Kandel, 1983).
1.6 Defining self-esteem
Self-esteem is a long standing phenomenon in the realm of psychology,
which can be traced back to 1890. Succeeded by over a century of
psychological research, superficial keyword search for self-esteem on
OvidSP at the time of writing, yields 103,347 articles, chapters and
books, supporting Rhodewalt and Tragakis’s (2003) claim that ‘self-
esteem likely ranks among the top three covariates in personality and
social psychology research’ (p66). Furthermore, the expansion of self-
esteem into parenting manuals, self-help books, social policy, and the
media, has seen what was an arguably tenuous statement by William
James, become a widely accepted human phenomenon accepted by
both psychologists and non-psychologists.
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Defining this enduring and resilient concept that we call self-esteem,
perhaps unsurprisingly, involves entering a “definitional maze” (Mruk,
2006). Over the course of its history, three major definitions appear to
have transpired, perhaps better understood within their historical
contexts.
1.6.1 Self-esteem as competence
William James (1890) defined self-esteem as a ratio:
Our self-feeling in this world depends entirely on what we back
ourselves to be and do. It is determined by the ratio of actualities
to our potentialities; a fraction of which our pretensions are the
denominator and the numerator of our successes; thus, Self-
Esteem – Success/Pretensions (p.310)
This definition is one of action, in particular with an emphasis on
behaviour that is successful or competent. The success or competence,
according to this definition, is determined by an individuals’ ability to
achieve their hopes, beliefs or desires which James coined
“pretensions”. James also highlighted that general competence is not
particularly important in self-esteem. He argued that it is competence in
things that matter to an individual, given their developmental history
and values for example, which influence self-esteem.
Crocker, Sommers, and Luhtanen (2002) criticised success as a
contingency for self-esteem. They contend that whilst failure is a
constant possibility, instability is integral to such a definition. However,
this censure was addressed in advance by James (1890) when he
wrote:
here is a certain average tone of self-feeling which each one of
us carries about with him, and which is independent of the
objective reasons we may have for satisfaction or discontent.
(p.43)
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By describing self-esteem as a ratio and referring to an “average tone,”
this definition infers a certain amount of stability over time. Although
ratios are also subject to change, which suggests self-esteem is a
dynamic concept that needs to be maintained (Mruk, 2006), and not as
fragile as (Crocker et al., 2002) imply.
With the introduction of Watsonian behaviourism (Watson, 1913),
avoiding the unobservable and amorphous, self-esteem appeared to
have been a relatively modest concept within the psychodynamic
tradition until decades later. Despite other definitions of self-esteem
emerging, more recently work is based on this definition of competence
and Crocker and Park (2004) discuss the costs of people driving to
success and avoiding failure in the attempt of maintaining this concept
of self-esteem.
Maslow’s(1954) examination of self-esteem was amongst the first
comprehensive experimental studies, from which he described self-
esteem in terms of self-satisfaction, that is ‘strength, achievement,
adequacy, mastery and competence, confidence in the face of the
world, and independence and freedom’ (p21). Although superficially,
this appears to be an evolutionary definition from that of which James
first proposed, it is arguably still one of competence and success.
Nevertheless, this definition was popular amongst the early self-esteem
research that made clinical links. Raimy (1948) for example examined
self-esteem and success of therapy, claiming that self-approval was
associated with better outcomes. Self-satisfaction also began to be
associated with other perspectives of psychology, in particular the
humanistic schools of “client-centred therapy” (Rogers, 1951). Maslow
and Raimy’s clinical studies and perspective on self-esteem should be
commended for their inspiration of more self-esteem research and its
relation to a range of issues including psychopathology (Zuckerman &
Monashkin, 1957) and schizophrenia (A. H. Rogers, 1958).
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Half a century since its initial appearance in the psychology literature,
self-esteem was expanding from being a theoretical concept for
understanding human behaviour to being a clinically significant idea for
understanding and changing behaviour, with a realm of therapeutic
possibilities.
1.6.2 Self-esteem as worthiness
The 1950s - 1960s seem to be a revolutionary turning point for the
concept of self-esteem. Coopersmith (1959) began to use learning
theory to examine self-esteem, and approached the concept of self-
esteem from a behavioural perspective, calling for a need to examine
the antecedents of self-esteem. Whilst Rosenberg, a sociologist,
pioneered the first large scale survey into self-esteem, exploring its’
influential factors such as family structure, social class and ethnicity. He
made various links with personality and social problems, and
emphasised the role of parenting and education in the development of
self-esteem.
Rosenberg (1979) described self-esteem as an attitude, resulting from
the evaluation of one’s worth or value:
Self-esteem, as noted, is a positive or negative attitude toward a
particular object, namely, the self… High self-esteem, as
reflected in our scale items, expresses the feeling that one is
“good enough.” The individual simply feel that he is a person of
worth; he respects himself for what he is, but he does not stand
in awe of himself nor does he expect others to stand in awe of
him. He does not necessarily consider himself superior to others.
(p30-31)
As referred to in the text, Rosenberg developed a self-esteem scale
which became the ‘gold standard’ for self-esteem research (Rosenberg,
1965). Notably, he viewed self-esteem as a component of self-concept
which he described as the ‘totality of the individual's thoughts and
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feelings with reference to himself as an object’ (p.4, M. Rosenberg,
1976).
This perspective of self-esteem as an attitude, suggests that cognition
has a greater role in self-esteem than affect; note that James talked
about ‘self-feeling’. This move to a cognitive focus of self-esteem
enabled the psychology of attitude formation to be applied, pointing to
the contextual factors that influence the development of attitudes, and
also how we measure them.
Similarly to James, this definition also draws on the principle of values
by regarding to a person’s own “worth.” Differently though, the
competence definition roots value in certain behaviours that matter to
an individual, whereas self-worth is a more universal value, arguably
shared by most. On a basic level that is, it matters whether we are
worthy or unworthy. Presumably this is because of the former being
innately sought after and even advantageous, whilst the latter is
perceived as undesirable and sub-standard.
Still adopting this definition of self-esteem as one of worth, Epstein
(1985) was the first to state that this self-assessment not only occurs at
the conscious, explicit level of awareness, but also the non-conscious
or implicit level. Furthermore Epstein and other cognitive theorists
argue that self-esteem is motivational and fundamental to perception
and experience, which must make it a significant aspect of human
behaviour. However, there seems to be little empirical evidence to
support this claim; and the literature does in fact indicate variable
results (Mecca, Smelser, & Vasconcellos, 1989; Baumeister,
Campbell., Krueger, & Vohs, 2003).
This has several implications. The first is that self-esteem is an
insignificant concept, put on a pedestal by social discourse. Another
possibility is that self-esteem is indeed substantial, however
methodological limitations make it difficult to unravel and distinguish
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from other behaviour, which calls for a development in how self-esteem
is measured. Alternatively, defining self-esteem as competence or
worthiness alone may lead researchers to a behavioural stalemate, in
which case a more inclusive definition of self-esteem could prevent a
skewed understanding of this arbitrary concept.
1.6.3 Self-esteem as competence and worthiness
This leads to another definition of self-esteem as competence and
worthiness, as first offered by (Branden, 1969):
Self-esteem has two interrelated aspects: it entails a sense of
personal efficacy and sense of personal worth. It is the
integrated sum of self-confidence and self-respect. It is the
conviction that one is competent to live and worthy of living.
(p110)
Branden’s definition is rooted in the philosophical traditions of
objectivism. Objectivism views pose that reality does exist but
independently of consciousness, and only through sense perception
such as concept formation and inductive logic can humans have
contact with reality. According to objectivism, pursuit of happiness is the
moral purpose of life. From this position, Branden argued that a sense
of worthiness is a fundamental need for human beings, yet only
achieved through competence. Competence from this view is rational
decision making, which allows a person to solve problems realistically.
Competence therefore requires goals that are personally significant and
uncompromising of integrity. Relating competence to worth in this way
and vice versa, differentiates self-esteem from simply competence of
worthiness alone. For self-esteem, competence must implicate worth,
and equally, feeling worthy must be rationally grounded in competent
behaviour.
With its roots in philosophy, Branden’s definition of self-esteem has not
been as explicitly drawn on in the literature, illustrated by the popularity
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of Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Scale which contributed to 25 per cent of
self-esteem studies published between 1967 and 1991 (Blascovich &
Tomaka, 199 ). Despite intending to be uni-dimensional Tafarodi and
Swann Jr. (1995) point out that the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale does
in fact tap into two axes; competence as well as worthiness. This
highlights the interchangeable definitions that are adopted across the
self-esteem literature, and whilst some may appear to be uni-
dimensional, the validity of the measurements should always be
considered.
Beyond this paper, (Mruk, 2006) draws attention to a richer more
elaborate approach to this dual model. As well as competence and
worth being individual components of self-esteem, then so is the
relationship between them. Whilst this dynamic reciprocity is often
overlooked, Mruk argues that perhaps it is the relationship between
competence and worthiness that actually creates or generates self-
esteem.
1.6.4 Clinical applications of self-esteem
It has been suggested that experiential avoidance is a strategy
employed to regulate self-esteem (Udachina et al., 2009), the costs of
which have been discussed earlier. This may offer an explanation for
the link between self-esteem and psychological disorders. Low self-
esteem has been shown to predict depression and anxiety across the
lifespan (Orth, Robins, & Roberts, 2008; Orth, Robins, Trzesniewski,
Maes, & Schmitt, 2009;Sowislo & Orth, 2012), be a risk factor for
paranoia and persecutory delusions (Ben-Zeev, Granholm, & Cafri,
2009; Freeman et al., 1998), and also play a role in body dysmorphic
disorder (Buhlmann, Teachman, Gerbershagen, Kikul, & Rief, 2008).
Furthermore self-esteem has been show to mediate the effect between
insecure attachment and PTSD symptomology in survivors of
interpersonal trauma, as well as emotional abuse and psychopathology
(Finzi-Dottan & Karu, 2006; Lim, Adams, & Lilly, 2012).
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1.7 IRAP methodology
1.7.1 Construct validity of the IRAP
Construct validity refers to how well a test or measure quantifies what it
claims to measure. As many psychological variables including implicit
cognition cannot be directly observed, there is no direct way to gage
how well certain measures do so. Accordingly, it is not the measure
itself that holds validity, but the scores and the meaning(s) that we
attribute to them (Messick, 1995). Furthermore, our interpretation of
these scores is dependent on our acceptance that the construct
reasonably exists (Sechrest, 2005). Assuming the construct is
accepted, it must demonstrate both convergent and discriminant validity
in order for construct validity to be estimated.
1.7.1.1 Convergent validity
Convergent validity demonstrates that measures that should be related
are related and therefore converging on the same construct (i.e. implicit
cognition, self-esteem, or anxiety). This could be demonstrated by
correlation between tests, although cautiously a correlation does not
automatically define whether that construct is in fact what the measure
claims to measure. Another method to assess convergent validity is to
examine expected differences between groups.
In terms of implicit cognition, IRAP and IAT studies examining attitudes
to weight (Roddy, Stewart, & Barnes-Holmes, 2010) replicated previous
findings that the two measures are not significantly correlated (Barnes-
Holmes, Waldron, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2009). Whilst this may be
indicative of non-convergence of the IRAP with other implicit measures,
it appears reflective of implicit measurement per se (Bosson, Swann, &
Pennebaker, 2000). Moreover, the different features of the IRAP may
account for some of the variation, for example absolute relational
responding rather than relativist associative responding (Moghaddam &
Hart, submitted for review). As far as differences across groups, IRAP
effects have successfully discriminated known groups based on cultural
preferences (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2009), food preferences (Barnes-
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Holmes, Murtagh, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2010) and child-sexual
classifications (Dawson, Barnes-Holmes, Gresswell, Hart, & Gore,
2009).
The IRAP’s convergence validity as a measure of self-esteem is
supported by correlational data and its discriminative ability. A study
conducted amongst prisoner groups and undergraduates not only
demonstrated a higher correlation with explicit measurement compared
with other implicit measures (Bosson et al., 2000), but also successfully
discriminated the groups (Vahey, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, &
Stewart, 2009).
To the author’s knowledge, there are no IRAP studies which examine
anxiety. IAT studies have found that implicit and explicit anxiety
measures are significantly correlated on the same specification level
(Gschwendner, Hofmann, & Schmitt, 2008). Given that the IRAP
operates in a similar way to the IAT (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006) and
has been shown to have similar and higher correlations with explicit
measures, it is anticipated that the IRAP will show convergence also.
1.7.1.2 Discriminant validity
In contrast to convergent validity, discriminant validity relies on a
measure not relating and therefore assumed to be captured in terms of
non-correlational data between constructs understood to be
theoretically distinct. A variety of studies suggest that the IRAP taps
something different to that captured by explicit measures.
Barnes-Holmes, Murphy, et al. (2010) found that the IRAP responses
on racial stereotyping diverge from explicit measures in a theoretically
coherent way, reflecting social desirability. Power and colleagues
(2009) reported similar findings on implicit preferences, and consistent
with in-group theories on social similarity. At best, such findings may be
explained as the result of a separate implicit construct. At a minimum
148
the IRAP capture just one, but nevertheless different aspect of a single
construct.
1.7.2 Criterion validity of the IRAP
Beyond construct validity, a measure may have utility in relating to
concrete criteria that are more central to a theoretical construct and
practically relevant. This is referred to criterion or concrete validity, of
which there are two subtypes, concurrent and predictive.
1.7.2.1 Concurrent
Concurrent validity is determined by how well the IRAP correlates with
a previously validated test. In a recent study, the derivation and
flexibility of relational responding as measured by the IRAP was shown
to be associated with different measures of executive functioning
(Stark, submitted for review). Similarly, O’Toole and colleagues (2009)
reported correlations between raw IRAP responses i.e. speed in flexible
relational responding and higher scores on IQ tests5. IRAP performance
has also been shown to correlate with event-related potentials, with
inconsistent trials generating more negative wave forms (Barnes-
Holmes, Hayden, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2008).
1.7.2.2 Predictive validity
The degree to which a score the IRAP predicts (opposed to correlates
with) behaviour or scores on a standardised measure is termed
predictive validity. Numerous IRAP studies have illustrated its utility to
predict behaviour and responses above and beyond explicit measures,
across a range of areas. One study found that the IRAP could
significantly predict spider approach behaviour (Cochrane, Barnes-
Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2008). Another showed that the IRAP could
predict behavioural intentions towards the overweight (Roddy et al.,
2010) whilst Power (2010) concluded that it has a predictive validity for
examining racial bias.
5
The current study applies the D-IRAP transformation to control for
possible effects of individual differences in cognitive ability on responding.
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Such predictive studies offer unequivocal support for the IRAP,
however there is a dearth of literature on the use of the IRAP amongst
clinical populations. Some have gone some way towards
psychopathology using student samples however. Juarascio et al.
(2011) reported that an IRAP on thin-ideal could predict weight,
disordered eating and body image dissatisfaction in college students,
significantly greater than explicit measures. An IRAP examining disgust
tendencies and sensitivity predicted self-report obsessing and washing
concerns as well as avoidance on behavioural approach tasks
(Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, 2012). (Hussey & Barnes-Holmes, 2012)
examined the effects of a sad mood induction procedure on implicit
depression in a non-clinical sample as measured by the IRAP.
Individuals’ who scored higher on an explicit depression measure
demonstrated a significant decrease in the positivity of their responses
compared with those who scored lower.
Dawson et al. (2009) were one of the first studies to examine a non-
student sample and found significant implicit differences between
sexual offenders against children and non-offenders. More recently, an
IRAP study with cocaine-dependent participants enrolled in a treatment
program showed that poorer outcomes were predicted by positive
implicit attitudes about cocaine use prior to treatment (Carpenter,
Martinez, Vadhan, Barnes-Holmes, & Nunes, 2012). Despite
demonstrating promising predictive validity in more clinical populations,
the IRAP has yet to be utilised across other areas.
1.7.3 Reliability
The reliability of implicit measures in general is considerably limited. In
one study, the split half reliability of the IRAP is similar to that of the
IAT, with a reasonably strong level of internal consistency (r=.72;
Dermot Barnes-Holmes, Murtagh, et al., 2010), particularly for an
implicit measure (Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007).
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1.8 REC model
Although the REC model draws on the single process of arbitrarily
applicable relational responding and thus different to dual-process
theories, it is not strictly a ‘single-process’ model either. Offering a
behaviour-analytic account, it also recognises other behavioural
processes separate from relational framing, which includes respondent
conditioning and primary stimulus generalization. In this light the REC
model is a multi-process model, however in contrast to dual process
models, the distinction between implicit and explicit cognition is not
explained by different psychological processes. More precisely, it is the
elaboration and coherence of the single process of relational framing
that is central in distinguishing implicit and explicit variance.
Opposed to creating an explanation based on arbitrary mental
constructs such as associations in memory, the REC model, formulates
an IRAP explanation in terms of public or private behavioural events. It
hypothesises that on certain IRAP trials before an individual presses a
key, they produce an immediate and relatively brief relational response.
The probability of which is governed by an individual’s verbal and
nonverbal history and their context. According to the REC model, it is
the most probable immediate response will be produced first and most
frequently, and therefore IRAP trials which require a key press
consistent with an immediate and brief relational response will be
faster. Trials that require a key press that competes with the immediate
response may be slower. In essence, the IRAP effect is driven by
immediate and relatively brief relational responses, whereas extended
and coherent relational networks are captured by less spontaneous
explicit measures.
If immediate and brief relational responses do not cohere with a
person’s more elaborate and extended responses, the model supposes
they are “rejected.” However the model does not predict what direction
divergence will be in, nor that the extended responses will always be
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positive or socially desirable. Some people may respond in a way that
coheres with initial negative brief responses (e.g. “The fat person in the
photograph looks lazy and it is okay to discriminate on the basis of
weight/size”). It is also possible that a further extended response may
allow two originally incoherent networks to cohere (e.g. “The fat person
looks lazy, but it’s wrong to discriminate on the basis of weight/size.
However, the fat person in this particular photograph does look quite
lazy”).
Specific findings of the IRAP support the REC model, such as the
difficulty faking an IRAP effect especially with a shorter latency criterion.
Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, and Boles (2011) argue that
an increase in response latency increases the chances of elaborated
relational responding impacting or ‘contaminating’ the response.
Indeed, increasing time pressures have been found to increase the
IRAP effect (Barnes-Holmes, Murphy, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart,
2010). The REC model however does not necessarily expect an
increase in convergence with explicit measures as a result decreasing
time pressure. Experimental data from Barnes-Holmes, Murphy, et al
(2010) does however suggest that with increased latency responses
the internal reliability of the IRAP decreases, and thus its value.
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2. Extended Methods
2.1 Recruitment
Participants were sent a participant information sheet with their
appointment reminder 2-4 weeks prior to their visit to the clinic.
Potential participants who met the inclusion criteria were identified by a
neurologist at their appointment and invited to further discuss taking
part with the researcher. Interested participants were offered a copy of
the information sheet to re-read and the researcher was available to
answer any questions before obtaining signed consent.
2.1.2 Inclusion/exclusion criteria.
Prospective participants were considered eligible for inclusion in the
study if they met the following criteria: 1) video/EEG diagnosis of either
NEAD/epilepsy6; 2) fluent in reading English (due to validation of the
explicit measures). Individuals under the age of 18 were excluded in
accordance with the validated measures age restrictions, as were
individuals who were unable to give informed consent or use a
computer monitor and keyboard.
6 The control group had no history of seizures.
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2.1.3 Sample size.
The data was tested by a Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA).
The information described below was used to find (in an a priori power
analysis) that the current study needed to recruit at least 54 participants
to have sufficient power (.90) to detect any significant differences.
G*Power 3.0 software (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2009) was
used to calculate sample size based on:
alpha = 0.05
f (effect size) = .24 [based on previously found effect size on a
meta-analysis of implicit measurement
(Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, &
Schmitt, 2005)]
power = 0.9
number of groups = 3
response variables = 7 [state anxiety, trait anxiety,
somatisation, self-esteem,
experiential avoidance, implicit
anxiety, implicit self-esteem]
An estimated sample size of 54 was considered realistically obtainable.
It was anticipated that some participants would not manage to complete
the IRAP and recruitment continued until a sufficient sample was
exceeded within the given time frame.
2.2 RSS
Rosenberg’s self-esteem scale is one of the most commonly used self-
esteem measures and it’s predictive utility has been used in a range of
studies including depression (Kernis, Grannemann, & Mathis, 1991),
body dissatisfaction in obesity (Grilo, Masheb, Brody, Burke-Martindale,
& Rothschild, 2005), anger and arousal (Kernis, Grannemann, &
Barclay, 1989), bulimic symptoms (Vohs et al., 2001), effects of
stressors (Hall, Kotch, Browne, & Rayens, 1996).
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Furthermore, it is the dominant explicit self-esteem scale used in
studies comparing implicit and explicit self-esteem in clinical
populations (Franck, De Raedt, Dereu, & Van den Abbeele, 2007;
McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2007; McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart,
2007; Buhlmann, Teachman, Gerbershagen, Kikul, & Rief, 2008;
Cockerham, Stopa, Bell, & Gregg, 2009; MacKinnon, Newman-Taylor,
& Stopa, 2011; Kesting, Mehl, Rief, Lindenmeyer, & Lincoln, 2011)
2.3 STAI
There is an abundance of anxiety measures; however the utility of the
STAI to examine both state and trait constructs has been made use of
in NEAD research. Interestingly, studies have reported mixed results.
Merode et al. (2004) reported significant differences in both state and
trait scores between individuals with epilepsy and newly diagnosed
non-epileptic seizures. Hixson, Balcer, Glosser, and French (2006)
conversely reported no significant differences on both state and trait
scores between seizure groups, although the significance on trait
scores was only marginally insignificant (0.055). Cautiously, the sample
size was small (48 participants) compared to that of Merode and
colleagues (178) which could account for the variance. Supporting this
explanation, Ozenli, Ozisik, Tugal, & Yoldascan (2008) also found a
significant difference with a large sample of 330.
In comparing implicit and explicit anxiety measurements within clinical
populations, three studies have examined the predictive utility of
anxiety (Glashouwer & de Jong, 2010; Glashouwer et al., 2010; Rusch
et al., 2007). Two chose to generate their own explicit measure of
anxiety; however Rusch and colleagues were the only study to use a
validated measure of anxiety, which was the STAI.
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2.4 PHQ-15
According to Interian and colleagues (2006) the PHQ-15 compares well
with other screening tools for somatisation. The PHQ-15 has a
particularly high concordance rate with other measures, assessing 9 of
the 12 items as part the World Health Organization Screener for
Somatoform Disorders (Janca et al., 1995) 7 of the 12 items on the
Hopkins Symptom Checklist (Derogatis, Lipman, Rickels, Uhlenhuth, &
Covi, 1974), 8 of the 11 points from Swartz and colleagues’ screening
index (Swartz et al., 1986) and 4 of the 7 items proposed by Othmer &
DeSouza (1985).
The somatoform module of the Composite International Diagnostic
Interview (Robbins & Kirmayer, 1991) is a fully-structured interview
designed to assess mental disorders. A review of the test–retest
reliability of the somatoform module reported estimates that ranged
from 0.66 to 0.74 (Hiller W. & Janca A., 2003). This PHQ-15 is not
much lower than this, and is considerably more time efficient.
The PHQ-15 has shown moderate to high-moderate convergence with
medically unexplained symptom history, even after psychiatric factors
were controlled for (Interian et al., 2006). The PHQ-15 also correlated
with functional impairment, disability, and health care use (Kroenke,
Spitzer, & Williams, 2002; Kroenke, 2007).
Beyond validation studies, the PHQ-15 has been exploited in seizure
research, particularly in building up the psychological profile of NEAD
(Reuber, Burness, Howlett, Brazier, & Grünewald, 2007; Lawton,
Mayor, Howlett, & Reuber, 2009; Baslet, Roiko, & Prensky, 2010;
Mayor, Howlett, Grünewald, & Reuber, 2010; Uliaszek, Prensky, &
Baslet, 2012).
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2.5 MEAQ
Experiential avoidance can be conceptualized as a behavioural choice
(overt or covert) which can either be in a particular context at a specific
time or as a general tendency toward avoidance across a variety of
conditions in the absence of temporal contingencies. The MEAQ
focuses on the latter conceptualization of experiential avoidance,
adopting the instructions “Please indicate the extent to which you agree
or disagree with each of the following statements,” across a range of
areas: behaviours, emotions, thoughts, memories, autonomic
sensations, and pain.
The MEAQ was designed with over-inclusivity in mind; items reflect a
range of theoretical models as follows (i) non-acceptance of negative
experiences, consistent with experiential models (Rogers, 1961,) (ii)
stopping a person acting consistently with values and/or goals,
emphasised by third-wave CBT models (Hayes, 2004), (iii) strategies
that utilise avoidance in the absence of explicit awareness,
conceptualised as defence mechanisms by psychodynamic approaches
(Freud & Strachey, 1989), and (iv) attitudes or beliefs toward negative
experiences, identified by cognitive theories (Beck et al., 1987).
The MEAQ was preceded by the Acceptance and Action
Questionnaire, or AAQ (Hayes Strosahl et al., 2004) and it’s briefer
revised version (AAQ-II; Bond et al., 2011) specifically designed to
measure experiential avoidance. Distress, poor general mental health,
and psychopathology have all been found to correlate with the AAQ
(Kashdan et al., 2006; Kashdan, Morina, & Priebe, 2009; Abramowitz,
Lackey, & Wheaton, 2009).
The MEAQ shows good correlations with the AAQ, however it was
chosen not only because of its multi theoretical orientation, but also its
ability to demonstrate greater unique content coverage, as illustrated in
appendix M. In addition it has greater convergence with other measures
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of avoidance, more divergence from measures of negative emotionality,
and a higher overall internal consistency. There is little research yet
which has used the MEAQ, however (Gámez, Chmielewski, Kotov,
Ruggero, & Watson, 2011) found correlations with other measures of
psychopathology and differences in psychiatric and non-psychiatric
populations. (See appendix P. for comparison of MEAQ and AAQ
items).
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3. Extended Results
This section extends the reported results in the journal paper. All of the
data considerations and testing procedures reported were derived with
reference to the following texts: Field (2009), Pallant, and Tabachnick
and Fiddell (2001).
3.1 Preliminary data considerations
The data was initially checked for errors to ensure that no values fell
outside the possible range for each variable. Duplicated data was
deleted. Two participants had a diagnosis of both NEAD and epilepsy.
These were included in the NEAD group.
3.1.1 Missing cases
The number of valid and missing cases was examined. There were 86
valid cases for each of the explicit measures (zero missing), 78 for the
IRAP-ANX (8 missing), and 77 for the IRAP-SE (9 missing). The
missing cases were checked and corresponded with participants who
were unable or unwilling to complete the IRAP, but who were happy for
their questionnaires to be included in the data analysis. The ‘exclude
cases pairwise’ option was selected so that cases were only excluded
where specific analyses required it.
3.1.2 Outliers
Box-plots were examined for all variables to check for univariate outliers
(which could excessively influence estimates in subsequent analyses).
Box-plots present a graphical representation depicting 50 per cent of
cases within a rectangle. Any scores that fall more than 1.5 box-lengths
from the edge of the rectangle are considered outliers. Outliers were
sought separately within each group on each measure.
As trait anxiety was non-normally distributed in the control group with
three outliers (59, 60, 64), the whole variable was transformed using the
formula SQRT. This resulted in normally distributed data, with no
outliers across all three groups. Experiential avoidance was normally
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distributed, with comparable means and trimmed means suggesting
little impact. Therefore the three outliers in the epilepsy group (283,
136,132) were kept. Somatisation was non-normally distributed in the
control group which appeared to be the result of one outlier (16), this
was replaced with mean (5). The result was normal distribution with no
outliers.
D scores were examined for outliers as described above. A number of
outliers were found. Given that the mean and trimmed means were
comparable and removing the outliers did not improve IRAP effects,
these outliers were retained.
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Table 14. Comparison between mean and 5% trimmed mean on
each of the measures for each group.
Controls Epilepsy NEAD
Explicit self-esteem
Mean
(SD)
Trimmed mean
20.67
(4.82)
20.81
18.92
(4.94)
18.90
14.70
(6.30)
14.63
State anxiety
Mean
(SD)
Trimmed mean
34.87
(11.18)
34.40
36.88
(9.45)
36.46
42.10
(13.67)
42.02
Trait anxiety
Mean
(SD)
Trimmed mean
38.23
(10.65)
37.79
42.84
(8.52)
42.54
50.10
(15.09)
50.20
Somatisation
Mean
(SD)
Trimmed mean
5.36
(3.87)
5.12
6.60
(3.47)
6.56
14.80
(6.19)
14.91
Experiential
Avoidance
Mean
(SD)
Trimmed mean
190.03
(34.73)
189.12
198.68
(33.37)
198.09
235.50
(48.86)
236.22
I am calm – true
Mean
(SD)
Trimmed mean
0.46
(0.50)
0.49
0.39
(0.44)
0.38
0.55
(0.63)
0.60
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I am calm- false
Mean
(SD)
Trimmed mean
0.08
(0.50)
0.07
<0.00
(0.43)
<0.00
0.05
(0.59)
0.05
Others are calm -
True
Mean
(SD)
Trimmed mean
-0.12
(0.41)
-0.12
-0.22
(0.35)
-0.23
-0.10
(0.56)
-0.09
Others are calm-
False
Mean
(SD)
Trimmed mean
0.03
(0.54)
0.02
-0.11
(0.40)
-0.13
-0.13
(0.53)
-0.13
I am positive – True
Mean
(SD)
Trimmed mean
0.49
(0.53)
0.47
0.42
(0.43)
0.42
0.48
(0.61)
0.50
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3.1.3 Multivariate outliers and normality (explicit measures)
Mahalanobis distance was calculated for each group to assess for
multivariate outliers on the explicit measures, this is the distance of a
case from the centroid of the other cases, the centroid being the point
created by the means of all the variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).
With 5 variables, a criterion alpha of .001, critical x2 of 20.52; no
multivariate outliers were found. The maximum value for each group
was less than this critical value (11.58 in the control group, 10.00 in the
epilepsy group, and 10.50 in the NEAD group). Therefore the
assumption of multivariate normality was supported.
3.1.4 Group comparisons
The age variable met the assumptions for a parametric test, a one-way
ANOVA found that there was also no significant associate between
diagnosis and age, F (2, 83) = .44, P= .65.
Gender, education, mental health, and seizure frequency were
examined with non-parametric tests. A chi-square test for
independence indicated no significant association between diagnosis
and gender, c2 (2, N=86) = .57, p = .75. The assumption of chi-square
regarding minimum expected cell frequency was violated for education,
with 10cells (55.6%) having an expected count less than 5. Education
was therefore transformed into a continuous variable (1-7) and as it did
not meet the assumption of normality, a Kruskal-Wallis Test conducted.
The results indicated that there was no significant difference between
the groups in terms of education, c2 (2, N=86) = .2.39, p = .30. Seizure
count was positively skewed, a Mann-Whitney U Test revealed no
significant difference between the NEAD and epilepsy group on seizure
frequency, U = 120, z = -1.68, p= .09. A chi-square test for
independence indicated that there was however, a difference between
the groups on reported mental health difficulties, c2 (2, N=86) = 33.65, p
< .00.
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3.2 Supplementary testing on implicit measures
A mixed between-within ANOVA was used on each IRAP, with three
variables. The independent between subjects variable was diagnostic
group (three levels), the independent within subjects variable was IRAP
trial-type (four levels), and the dependent variable was the D-IRAP
score reflecting response latency. The assumptions of a mixed ANOVA
that are considered below for each IRAP are: a) independence b)
normal distribution c) homogeneity of variance d) homogeneity of
intercorrelations and e) sphericity.
3.2.1 IRAPANX
a) Participant responses were assumed to be independent of one
another and data collected only used in one group.
b) Pallant (2007) suggests visual inspection histograms, normal
probability plots and detrended plots when checking for
normality, this was carried out in addition to calculating
skewness and kurtosis z scores (table 15).
Self-Calm: Plots appeared to be lyptokurtic for the control group,
positively skewed in the epilepsy group, and negatively skewed
in the NEAD group. Significance testing also supported that the
NEAD group scores were significantly non-normally distributed
on these D scores, therefore rejecting the assumption of
normality. The control group scores ranged from -0.86 to 1.12
with skewness of -0.43 (SE = 0.43) and kurtosis of -0.72
(SE=0.85). The epilepsy group ranged from -0.21 to 1.31, with
skewness of 0.59 (SE = 0.49) and kurtosis of -0.69 (SE = 0.95).
The NEAD group ranged from -1.17 to 1.45 with skewness of -
1.07 (SE= 0.45) and kurtosis of 1.45 (SE=0.87).
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Self-anxious: On inspection, the plots appeared to be relatively
normally distributed across the three groups, with Z scores
supporting the assumption of normality. The control group scores
ranged from -0.81 to 1.25 with skewness of -0.09 (SE = 0.43)
and kurtosis of -0.25 (SE=0.85). The epilepsy group ranged from
-0.87 to 0.78, with skewness of -0.14(SE = 0.49) and kurtosis of -
0.43 (SE = 0.95). The NEAD group ranged from -1.13 to 1.12
with skewness of -0.37 (SE= 0.45) and kurtosis of -0.15
(SE=0.87).
Others-calm: The distribution of the D scores on this dimension
appeared reasonably normal across the groups, with non-
significant z scores. The control group scores ranged from -0.89
to 0.89 with skewness of 0.35 (SE = 0.43) and kurtosis of 0.40
(SE=0.85). The epilepsy group ranged from -0.78 to 0.47, with
skewness of -0.41(SE = 0.49) and kurtosis of -0.39 (SE = 0.95).
The NEAD group ranged from -1.14 to 0.75 with skewness of -
0.21 (SE= 0.45) and kurtosis of -0.97 (SE=0.87).
Others-anxious: The histogram and normality plots appeared
normal across the control and NEAD group groups, supported by
non-significant z scores. The epilepsy sample displayed some
positive skewness., with only marginally non-significant z scores.
The control group scores ranged from -1.07 to 1.15 with
skewness of 0.19 (SE = 0.43) and kurtosis of -0.12 (SE=0.85).
The epilepsy group ranged from -0.62 to 0.92, with skewness of
0.71(SE = 0.49) and kurtosis of -0.36 (SE = 0.95). The NEAD
group ranged from -1.17 to 1.00 with skewness of 0.03 (SE=
0.45) and kurtosis of -0.41 (SE=0.87).
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Table 15. Skewness and kurtosis Z scores by group and trial-type on the IRAPANX
Control
Skewness
Z score
Control
Kurtosis Z
score
Epilepsy
Skewness
Z score
Control
Skewness
Z score
Control
Kurtosis Z
score
Epilepsy
Skewness
Z score
Self - calm -1.00 -0.09 1.20 -0.72 *-2.40 1.66
Self - anxious 0.21 -0.03 -0.29 -0.45 -0.83 -0.17
Others - calm 0.80 0.47 0.84 -0.41 -0.47 -1.11
Others - anxious 0.44 -0.15 1.44 0.38 0.07 -0.47
* Indicates more than 1.96 standard deviations
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c) The groups had approximately equal variance, as indicated by
the non-significant Levene’s Tests on each trial-type (ps >.05).
d) The assumption of homogeneity of inter-correlations was
supported by a non-significant Box’s M statistic (p = .09).
e) Sphericity assumption was met as indicated by a non-significant
result on Mauchly’s test of sphericity (p=0.67).
3.2.2 IRAPSE
a) As with the IRAPANX, participant responses were assumed to be
independent of one another and data collected only used in one
group.
b) Each trial type was checked for normality by inspection of plots
and examination of skewness and kurtosis z scores (table 16).
Self-positive: Inspection of plots appeared to meet the
assumption of normality for the three groups, with some positive
skewness in the control scores. These assumptions were
supported by z the scores. The control group scores ranged from
-0.46 to 1.79 with skewness of 0.84 (SE = 0.43) and kurtosis of
0.71 (SE=0.85). The epilepsy group ranged from -0.45 to 1.18,
with skewness of- 0.18 (SE = 0.49) and kurtosis of -0.43 (SE =
0.95). The NEAD group ranged from -1.11 to 1.65 with skewness
of -0.56 (SE= 0.46) and kurtosis of 0.56 (SE=0.89).
Self-negative: On inspection, the plots appeared to be relatively
normally distributed across the three groups, with Z scores
supporting the assumption of normality. The control group scores
ranged from -0.55 to 0.92 with skewness of 0.22 (SE = 0.43) and
kurtosis of -0.83 (SE=0.85). The epilepsy group ranged from -
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1.02 to 1.28, with skewness of 0.25(SE = 0.49) and kurtosis of
0.61 (SE = 0.95). The NEAD group ranged from -0.93 to 1.11
with skewness of 0.32 (SE= 0.46) and kurtosis of 0.13
(SE=0.89).
Others-positive: The distribution of the D scores on plots
generated for this dimension appeared to be lyptokurtic in the
control and epilepsy groups, and negatively skewed in the NEAD
group. Non-significant z scores also rejected the assumption of
normality. The control group scores ranged from -0.63 to 0.96
with skewness of 1.08 (SE = 0.43) and kurtosis of 2.2 (SE=0.85).
The epilepsy group ranged from -1.48 to 1.06, with skewness of -
0.45(SE = 0.49) and kurtosis of 1.41 (SE = 0.95). The NEAD
group ranged from -1.89 to 0.26 with skewness of -1.54 (SE=
0.46) and kurtosis of 2.18 (SE=0.89).
Others-negative: The histogram and normality plots appeared
normal across the three groups (with slight leptokurtosis in the
NEAD group), supported by non-significant z scores. The control
group scores ranged from -1.03 to 1.42 with skewness of 0.41
(SE = 0.43) and kurtosis of 0.80 (SE=0.85). The epilepsy group
ranged from -0.83 to 0.46, with skewness of 0.12(SE = 0.49) and
kurtosis of 0.09 (SE = 0.95). The NEAD group ranged from -1.21
to 1.42 with skewness of 0.18 (SE= 0.45) and kurtosis of 1.15
(SE=0.87).
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Table 16. Skewness and kurtosis Z scores by group and trial-type on the IRAPSE
Control
Skewness
Z score
Control
Kurtosis Z
score
Epilepsy
Skewness
Z score
Control
Skewness
Z score
Control
Kurtosis Z
score
Epilepsy
Skewness
Z score
Self- positive 1.94 0.84 -0.36 -1.01 -1.23 0.63
Self- negative 0.51 -0.98 0.51 1.18 0.71 0.15
Others- positive *2.48 *2.55 -0.92 *2.56 *-3.37 *2.46
Others- negative 0.94 0.94 0.25 0.27 0.40 1.29
* Indicates significance (more than 1.96 standard deviations)
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c) The groups had approximately equal variance, as indicated by
the non-significant Levene’s Tests on each trial-type (ps >.05).
d) The assumption of homogeneity of inter-correlations was
supported by a non-significant Box’s M statistic (p = .05).
e) Sphericity assumption was met as indicated by a non-significant
result on Mauchly’s test of sphericity (p>0.05).
In practice, ANOVA models have been found to be robust to violations
of normality (Schmider, Ziegler, Danay, Beyer, & Bühner, 2010) and
therefore given the other assumptions were met on both IRAP tasks, a
non-parametric test was not considered.
3.3 Supplementary testing for reported analyses on explicit
measures
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) would be the usual
statistical test for comparing multivariate means of numerous groups
(reference) followed by a multivariate analysis of covariance. However,
the data violated the assumption of homogeneity of variance-
covariance, indicated by Box’s Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices
(M = 88, p<0.001). Thus several one-way one-between analysis of
variance tests (ANOVAs) were conducted, followed by analysis of
covariance tests (ANCOVAs) in order to examine whether differences
were due to differences in mental health difficulties.
3.3.1 Assumptions
There are several assumptions used in ANOVA and ANCOVA. First is
that samples are independent of each other and as participants only
provided data to one group, this condition was met. There are further
assumptions which will be considered below for each measure, these
are a) the data is normally distributed within each group; b) the variance
of data in each group is the same, also known as homogeneity of
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variances or homoscedasticity. ANCOVA also has a further
assumption, c) homogeneity of regression slopes, that there is no
interaction between the covariate (mental health) and the independent
variable (diagnostic group) in the prediction of the dependent variable
(explicit measure score). Mental health was dummy coded into a
continuous variable, 0 = no difficulties, 1 = difficulties in the past, 2 =
current difficulties.
3.3.1.1 Self-esteem
a) Plots appeared reasonably normal for all three groups on self-
esteem, supported by skewness and kurtosis z scores (table 17).
The control group ranged from 9 to 30, with skewness of -0.19
(SE= 0.42) and kurtosis of 0.12 (SE=0.82). The epilepsy group
scored from 10 to 28 with skewness of 0.13 (SE = 0.46) and
kurtosis of -0.55 (SE = 0.90). The NEAD group ranged from 3 to
28, with skewness of 0.15 (SE= 0.43) and kurtosis of -0.48
(SE=0.83).
b) The groups had approximately equal variance, as indicated by
the
non-significant Levene’s Test, F(2, 83) = 1.61, p = .20. This
suggested that the assumption of homogeneity was met.
c) There was no significant interaction between mental health and
diagnosis on self-esteem scores, F (2,80)=1.32, p=0.274,
therefore meeting the condition of homogeneity of regression
slopes.
3.3.1.2 State anxiety
a) State anxiety also appeared fairly normal (with a slight positive
skew in the control and epilepsy groups) on inspection of
histogram and probability plots. Skewness and kurtosis Z scores
were within one standard deviation (1.96), supporting the
assumption of normality. Control groups scores ranged from 20
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to 61, with skewness of -0.61 (SE= 0.42) and kurtosis of -0.55
(SE=0.82). The epilepsy group ranged from 24 to 57, with
skewness of 0.86 (SE = 0.46) and kurtosis of -0.11 (SE = 0.90).
The NEAD group ranged from 3 to 28, with skewness of 0.16
(SE= 0.43) and kurtosis of -0.97(SE=0.83).
b) A non-significant Levene’s Test, F(2, 83) = 2.05, p = .14
suggested that the assumption of homogeneity was met.
c) There was no significant interaction between mental health and
diagnosis on state-anxiety scores F(2,80)= .24, P=.79.
3.3.1.3 Trait anxiety
a) Trait anxiety appeared reasonably normal for in the epilepsy and
NEAD groups, however scores for the control group deviated
considerably from the norm on the probability plot. Skewness
and kurtosis Z scores supported the assumption for normality in
the epilepsy and NEAD groups and rejected the assumption of
normality in the control group. The control group ranged from 21
to 64, with (significantly positive) skewness of 0.88 (SE = 0.42)
and kurtosis of 0.52 (SE=0.82). The epilepsy group ranged from
30 to 60, with skewness of 0.59 (SE = 0.46) and kurtosis of -.47
(SE = 0.90). The NEAD group ranged from 21 to 79 with
skewness of -0.11 (SE= 0.43) and kurtosis of -0.74 (SE=0.83).
Trait anxiety was therefore transformed using the formula square
root7, therefore transforming the distribution and producing non-
significant z scores.
7 Square root (Tabachnick & Fiddell, 2012)
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b) A significant Levene’s test (p<0.05) suggested that the
assumption of homogeneity of variance not met for this data,
therefore the obtained Welch’s adjusted F ratio was used8
c) There was no significant interaction between mental health and
diagnosis on trait anxiety: F(2,80)= .38, p=.69.
3.3.1.4 Somatisation
a) Somatisation scores appeared to have a fairly normal distribution
for the epilepsy and NEAD groups. However, somatisation
scores were positively skewed for the control group, and deemed
significant by the skewness z score. The control group scores
ranged from 0 to 16 and were non-normally distributed, with
(significantly positive) skewness of 0.92 (SE = 0.42) and kurtosis
of 0.82 (SE=0.82). The epilepsy group ranged from 1 to 13, with
skewness of 0.01 (SE = 0.46) and kurtosis of -0.54 (SE = 0.90).
The NEAD group ranged from 2 to 26 with skewness of -0.39
(SE= 0.43) and kurtosis of -0.35 (SE=0.83).
b) The assumption of homogeneity of variance not met for this data
as indicated by a significant Levene’s test (p<0.05) therefore the
obtained Welch’s adjusted F ratio was used.
c) There was no significant interaction between mental health and
diagnosis on somatisation, F(2,80)= .69, P=.50.
3.3.1.5 Experiential avoidance
a) The plots appeared moderately normal across all three groups
on avoidance (with slight negative skewness in the NEAD
group). Z scores supported this assumption of normality. Control
scores ranged from 127 to 167, with skewness of -0.41 (SE=
8 The F statistic is considered quite robust against violations
Lindman (1974, p. 33)however Welchs F is specifically considered
robust to violations of homogeneity of variance (Levy, 1978).
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0.42) and kurtosis of -0.19 (SE=0.82). The epilepsy group
ranged from 132 to 283, with skewness of less than 0.00 (SE =
0.46) and kurtosis of 1.08 (SE = 0.90). The NEAD group ranged
from 136 to 330 with skewness of -0.46 (SE= 0.43) and kurtosis
of -0.56 (SE=0.83).
b) The assumption of homogeneity of variance not met for this data
as indicated by a significant Levene’s test (p<0.05) therefore the
obtained Welch’s adjusted F ratio was used.
c) There was no significant interaction between mental health and
diagnosis on experiential avoidance, F (2,80)= 1.50, p=.23.
3.3.2 Linearity
ANCOVA also assumes that there is a linear relationship between the
dependent variable and the covariate for all groups. Linearity was
assessed by inspection of generated matrix of scatterplots for each
group. The plots did not show any obvious evidence of non-linearity;
therefore supporting the assumption of linearity.
There were significant correlations (ps < 0.01) between all of the explicit
measures, with correlations less than 0.90, rejecting multicollinearity
and supporting linearity.
3.3.3 Violations of homogeneity of variance
Trait anxiety, somatisation and experiential avoidance did not meet the
condition of homoscedasticity. Olejnik and Algina (1984) showed that
ANCOVA is robust to violations of homogeneity of variance when other
assumptions are met and given that there is not a non-parametric
alternative in SPSS, the ANCOVA was still used.
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Table 17. Skewness and kurtosis Z scores by group, for each measure.
Control
Skewness
Z score
Control
Kurtosis Z
score
Epilepsy
Skewness
Z score
Epilepsy
Kurtosis
Z score
NEAD
Skewness
Z score
NEAD
Kurtosis
Z score
Self-esteem -0.44 0.14 0.27 -0.61 0.36 -0.57
State anxiety 1.46 -0.67 1.86 -0.13 0.38 -1.17
Trait anxiety *2.09 0.64 1.27 -0.52 -0.25 -0.88
Avoidance 0.97 -0.23 0.01 1.20 -1.08 -0.67
Somatisation *2.17 1.00 0.03 -0.60 -0.92 -0.42
* Indicates significance (more than 1.96 standard deviations)
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Table 18. Correlations amongst the explicit measures and mental health difficulties.
Self-
esteem
State
anxiety
Trait
anxiety
Avoidanc
e
Somatis-
ation
Mental
Health
Self-esteem - -0.61** -0.81** -0.52** -0.40** -0.42**
State anxiety - 0.73** 0.29** 0.37** 0.47**
Trait anxiety - 0.49** 0.47** 0.56**
Avoidance - 0.37** 0.28**
Somatisation - 0.49**
** significance p<0.01
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3.4 Logistic regression
The assumptions were checked as above. A dummy variable was
created (NEAD = 1, epilepsy = 0)
Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness of Fit Test also indicated support for the
model X2 = 14.04, df 8, p>.08
3.5 IRAP effects
To determine if the D-IRAPANX scores for each of the trial types were
significantly different from zero for each of the groups, Twelve one-
sample t tests were used. T-tests were significant for all groups on the
Self-Calm trial-type (p<0.001). However, all but one of the other trial-
types were non-significant (p>0.15), with a significant effect obtained for
the Others – Calm trial-type for the epilepsy group (p<0.01).
Twelve one-sample t tests were also undertaken to determine if the D-
IRAPSE scores for each of the trial types were significantly different from
zero for each of the groups All three groups produced a significant
UHVXOWRQ6HOI±3RVLWLYHWULDOW\SHSV2QO\WKHFRQWUROJURXSKDG
a significant effect on Self–Negative trial-type (p=0.01). The epilepsy
and NEAD groups failed to produce an IRAP effect (ps>0.30). The
control and NEAD groups (ps<0.03) but not the epilepsy group (p=0.14)
produced a significant effect on Others–Positive trial-type. Only the
epilepsy group were significantly different from zero on Others-Negative
trial-type (p=0.01). The NEAD and control groups failed to produce an
effect (ps>0.12).
3.6 Reliability and validity of the IRAP
An odd-even split-half procedure (applying the Spearman-Brown
formula) was used to assess the reliability of the IRAP (Barnes-Holmes
et al., 2009). Split-half reliability was 0.81 and 0.85 for the D-IRAPANX
and D-IRAPSE scores respectively. The value for the D-IRAPANX is good
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and comparable to other IRAP measures (r=.72; Barnes-Holmes,
Murtagh, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2010) and the reliability of the
anxiety and self-esteem IAT (alphas of .78 - .84, Egloff & Schmukle,
2002; Egloff & Schmukle, 2003; Schmukle & Egloff, 2004; Nosek,
Greenwald & Banaji, 2007)
Correlations (table 19) were inspected to examine the convergence the
two IRAP measures. As expected, self-calm trial-type significantly and
positively correlated with self-positive, as did self-anxious and self-
negative. This was also true of the other-calm with other-positive and
other-anxious with other-negative. This offers support for convergent
validity of the IRAP as a measure.
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Table 19. IRAP correlations by trial type
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1.Self- calm - 0.37** 0.28* 0.28* 0.33** 0.06 0.08 0.25*
2.Self-anxious - 0.26* 0.13 0.13 0.23* 0.025 0.03
3.Others-calm - 0.23* 0.19 0.17 0.28* 0.13
4.Others-anxious - 0.09 0.03 0.11 0.28*
5.Self- positive - 0.35** -0.06 0.19
6.Self-negative - 0.07 0.02
7.Others- positive - 0.19
8.Others-negative -
* P=0.05 **P = 0.01
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Implicit-explicit correlations (table 20) offer further support for the
IRAP’s validity. There were significant correlations in the expected
direction on the self-anxious trial-type with explicit self-esteem, state
anxiety and trait anxiety scores. In other words, an implicit bias to self
as calm correlates with higher explicit self-esteem and lower self-report
anxiety. Similarly, an implicit bias to self as positive was associated with
higher explicit self-esteem. A greater implicit bias of others as positive
was significantly associated with lower state anxiety and somatisation,
whilst an implicit view of others as negative significantly correlated with
higher self-esteem.
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Table 20. Implicit and explicit measure correlations, by trial-type.
Self-esteem State Anxiety Trait Anxiety Avoidance Somatis-ation
Self- calm 0.07 -0.13 -0.10 -0.01 0.05
Self-anxious 0.28** -0.23* -0.28** -0.10 <0.01
Others- calm 0.05 -0.04 0.01 -0.05 0.25*
Others anxious 0.06 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 <0.01
Self-positive 0.12 -0.07 -0.11 0.08 -0.11
Self-negative 0.20* -0.04 -0.08 -0.03 0.02
Others- positive 0.15 -0.27** -0.09 <0.01 0.02
Others- negative 0.22* -0.14 -0.18 -0.11 -0.19*
* p=0.05 **p=0.01
4. Extended discussion
4.1 Cognitive dissonance and coherence
The implicit – explicit discrepancies found in this study may support
clinical observations that people with NEAD experience cognitive
dissonance (Quinn, Schofield, & Middleton, 2010) and therefore
advocates some discussion.
Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) is among many theories
which propose that contradictory or “inconsistent” beliefs are related to
discomfort. Festinger (1957) described dissonance (that is conflicting
thoughts, ideas, beliefs, or behaviours) producing uncomfortable
feelings and tension, claiming that individuals have an innate
motivational drive to avoid inconsistency (or dissonance). Moreover,
Festinger acknowledged that behaviours could become irrational and
maladaptive in an attempt to maintain or achieve consonance.
Considering this idea from an RFT perspective, contingencies of
reinforcement and punishment shape how a person frames their
experience. The socio-verbal context normally demands a person’s
narrative to be changed if it does not cohere with other information
available (Blackledge, Moran, & Ellis, 2009). Consistent or coherent
accounts are reinforced, while inconsistent ones are punished and are
therefore aversive. Festinger’s (1957) studies demonstrated that
individuals make an exerted effort to think and behave coherently. In
his studies, the availability of discrepant information, thus leading to
dissonance was repeatedly found to be aversive and motivated
individuals to achieve consistency in spite of contradictory evidence.
More recently, studies on implicit cognition have drawn on cognitive
dissonance theory. Interestingly, Rydell, McConnell, and Mackie (2008)
found that dissonance and dissonance-related discomfort increased
where there was divergence on implicit and explicit measures,
concluding that inconsistent implicit and explicit attitudes are aversive.
Furthermore, discrepant implicit-explicit self-esteem in either direction is
associated with more dissonance reduction behaviours (e.g.
defensiveness) than consistent implicit-explicit self-esteem (Jordan,
Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2003).
Assuming that the inconsistent implicit-explicit results observed in this
study leads to dissonance and therefore discomfort, it is possible that
avoidance behaviour (which could include seizures) functions to reduce
that dissonance. Another possibility is that individuals may well have
high self-esteem (illustrated by the implicit score), but as a result of
dissonance arising in the context of multiple stressors (e.g. life events,
abuse memories, relationship difficulties, seizures and so on) they are
driven to achieve consistency with their socio-verbal environment.
Therefore, individuals may be forced to construct a story of themselves
as bad or unworthy, as reflected in the explicit self-esteem score.
4.2 Unstable self-image and attachment
Implicit-explicit discrepancies may also reflect self-esteem instability. A
study on participants with depression as well as suicidal ideation
demonstrated high implicit self-esteem and low explicit self-esteem but
those without suicidal ideation had both low implicit and explicit self-
esteem (Franck et al., 2007). Based on earlier findings that self-esteem
stability has been shown to moderate the relationship between self-
esteem and suicidal ideation (De Man & Gutiérrez, 2002), Franck and
colleagues (2007) suggest that higher implicit but low explicit could
therefore reflect unstable self-esteem. They go on to argue that
instability is only possible when there are remaining positive
evaluations, which may be what implicit measures are able to reflect.
This notion of instability is also characteristic of those with borderline
personality disorder (Lieb et al., 2004). Likewise, this client group
exhibit the same pattern of high implicit, low explicit self-esteem (Vater,
Schröder-Abé, Schütz, Lammers, & Roepke, 2010). Given that
personality traits associated with borderline personality disorder are
commonly seen in those with NEAD (Reuber et al., 2004) as is suicidal
ideation (Reuber, Pukrop, Mitchell, Bauer, & Elger, 2003) this similarity
in implicit-explicit difference is perhaps unsurprising.
Early parenting may offer an explanation for such instability. DeHart,
Pelham, and Tennen (2006) examined the relationship between
parenting styles in relation to implicit and explicit self-esteem. From
their results, they considered that implicit self-esteem is better
accounted for by early parental experiences and explicit self-esteem is
more influenced by later experiences. For example, they showed that
nurturing parenting was associated with both high implicit and explicit
self-esteem, making the argument that positive parental relationships in
childhood increase the likelihood of translating those experiences into
relationships during adolescence and adulthood. Overprotectiveness on
the other hand related only to low implicit self-esteem. Based on the
idea that implicit self-esteem is based on those overprotected early
experiences, the authors suggest that explicit self-esteem is more
dependent on the experience of other relationships during adolescent
and adulthood and therefore has a lesser association.
The same study found that permissiveness negatively correlated with
explicit self-esteem, but was unrelated to implicit self-esteem.
Permissive parents are characterised by low demandingness with high
responsiveness, so although they may be warm and affectionate they
tend to have poor boundaries and are inconsistent (Baumrind, 1971).
DeHart and Tennen (2006) proposed that despite being open and
caring, the lack of rules or structure (i.e. reinforcement) gives mixed
messages to their children which may account for the lack of
relationship with implicit self-esteem. Studies have also demonstrated
that permissive parenting leads to long term emotional and behavioural
problems (Feehan, McGee, Stanton, & Silva, 1991; Arnold, O’Leary,
Wolff, & Acker, 1993). DeHart and Tennen suggest that impulsive and
egotistic behaviours once endured in childhood are not tolerated in
adults therefore leading to progressively more negative responses and
reactions, which in the context of adulthood may relate more to explicit
self-esteem.
Based on DeHart and Tennen’s findings, it could be expected that
people with NEAD would report permissive parenting. Although
research specifically on parenting is lacking, there are a few studies
that look at family dynamics in people with NEAD and whilst they do
perceive their families to be more dysfunctional they identify higher
familial control and less emotional expression, with control found to be
a mediater between abuse and non-epileptic seizures (Moore et al.,
1994; Krawetz et al., 2001; Salmon, Al-Marzooqi, Baker, & Reilly,
2003). Salmon and colleagues (2003) also found that people with
NEAD reported higher levels of parental overprotection.
In search of an explanation for these differences between the expected
permissive parenting and actual reporting of overprotection, the
literature on borderline personality disorder was reviewed. A similar
contradiction was indeed apparent there too; people with borderline
personality disorder report inconsistent and alternating images of their
mothers as both uncaring and overprotective, or overprotective and
permissive (Nickell, Waudby, & Trull, 2002). This provided empirical
support for Melges and Swartz (1989) who proposed that as a result of
problematic and inconsistent family relationships and parenting, people
with borderline personality disorder fluctuate between fears of
abandonment and fears of domination that give rise to oscillating
attachment behaviours (i.e. seeking proximity versus disengagement).
Likewise, Allen and Farmer (1996) proposed that interactions in these
families are polar, where there are oscillations between hostile parental
over-involvement and under-involvement. Rather than being separate
extremes, they suggest that they are two sides of the same coin. Given
the links between borderline personality disorder and NEAD, it is
anticipated that there may be some overlaps, it would be interesting to
examine whether people with NEAD also have inconsistent images of
their care-givers.
On a similar note Holman et al. (2008) examined adult attachment and
concluded that individuals with NEAD were more likely to have an
insecure attachment, with a negative view of themselves and others.
This is characteristic of fearful attachment; that is high avoidance and
high anxiety (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991). The results on the
explicit measures echo Holman and colleagues’ conclusions. Certainly,
a low explicit self-esteem score supports a negative view of self;
however the results on the IRAPSE did not show any implicit differences
in views of self. Additionally, the IRAPSE found that those with epilepsy
and NEAD in fact showed a stronger implicit bias to others as more
positive compared with their healthy counterparts. This supports the
notion that attachment is a dynamic concept (Crittenden & Claussen,
2003) and the differences may be as said previously, a result of
instability. This discrepancy could also be reflective of oscillating
attachment as suggested by Melges and Swartz. Nevertheless, our
findings raise questions about the role of attachment and early
experiences in non-epileptic seizures. Longitudinal studies or other
assessments examining attachment in childhood are needed that
further explore the role, pattern and stability of attachments and
parental bonds in those with NEAD.
4.3 Cognitive styles
According to Beck’s cognitive model, psychological difficulties are the
result of maladaptive thinking and subsequent behaviour. Although
Beck recognised the role of maladaptive thinking in ‘hysterical seizures’
(Beck, 1976 p.206) there is little empirical evidence for certain thinking
styles in people with NEAD. Still, the effectiveness of CBT for non-
epileptic seizures infers support for the notion of distorted and biased
thinking in this client group (Goldstein et al., 2010). Reuber, Pukrop,
Bauer, et al. (2003) also reported that people with NEAD scored higher
on the cognitive distortion dimension of a personality measure.
However critically, they do not report what this subscale comprises off
or how the score is calculated. Here, the various cognitive biases
observed in emotional problems often discussed in relation to NEAD
will be considered.
Common thinking styles associated with psychopathology include
attribution bias (i.e. overemphasis on dispositional explanations for
behaviour rather than situational explanations), catastrophising (i.e.
thinking that something is much worse than it really is), personalising
(i.e. taking undue responsibility for negative events), dichotomous
thinking (i.e. thinking in absolutes or “all or nothing” terms), negative
focus (i.e. not seeing the positives in situations or people), jumping to
conclusions (i.e. mind reading). Such “distortions” are understood to sit
under a wider umbrella of “dysfunctional schemas,” that is a more broad
belief system that evolves within the context of person’s learning
history. Beck and colleagues proposed that depression and anxiety can
be separated on the basis of their schemas, also known as the content-
specificity hypothesis. Accordingly, loss and failure are central to
depression schemas (Beck et al., 1987), whilst the fear of harm and
danger characterise anxiety schemas. There have been mixed results
in favour of this hypothesis however (R. Beck & Perkins, 2001), and
given that both depression and anxiety are common in NEAD, the focus
will remain on lower level cognitive processes opposed to schemas.
High rates of somatisation (Reuber, House, et al., 2003), trauma (van
der Kolk et al., 1996), similar PTSD symptomology (Brewin et al., 2000)
and pathological personality characteristics (Direk et al., 2012) are
commonly observed in people with NEAD. Subsequently, the literature
on these areas may be valuable in anticipating what thinking styles may
be typical in this population. Medically unexplained symptoms such as
somatisation have been found to be commonly associated with
catastrophisation (Rief et al., 1998; Tsao et al., 2009). Similarly,
catastrophic thinking has been shown to be a mediating factor for
developing stress symptoms following a traumatic event (Bryant &
Guthrie, 2005). Wells (2000) describes how thinking styles including
worry or ruminative styles of thinking, attentional strategies particularly
those to threat, and negative interpretation of symptoms in addition to
avoidant coping contribute to trauma symptomology. Likewise, avoidant
personality disorder is associated with high levels of anxiety and
consequently hyper-vigilance (Alden, Laposa, Taylor, & Ryder, 2002).
Dichotomous thinking on the other hand is a typical feature of
borderline personality disorder, with a tendency to think in concrete
terms (Bender & Skodol, 2007).
With the expectation that people with NEAD exhibit similar unhelpful
patterns of thinking, it may be useful to consider the concept of
distorted thinking in interpreting the results of this study. Whilst naturally
people may experience higher levels of anxiety as a consequence of
seizures, anxiety and its relationship with seizure frequency may also
reflect excessive worry, hyper-vigilance to threat and catastrophising
costs of recent events or from having seizures. Cautiously, the term
“catastrophising” is by no means intended to minimise the
consequences of having seizures, but it may be that people who do
exhibit this thinking style expect the consequences to be much worse.
Although, given that both groups reported similar levels of anxiety it
would be interesting to explore whether people with NEAD do
catastrophise and if they do, whether it is any more than those with
epilepsy.
Dichotomous thinking may also explain the tendency of the NEAD
group to score higher across most of the measures. For example, if
individuals think in absolutes they are more likely to report accordingly
and use either ends of a Likert scale opposed to thinking on a
continuum that includes grey areas. Black and white thinking may also
have consequences that impact on self-esteem. Such tendencies may
mean that others are also evaluated in the same way; viewing people
as “all bad” versus “all good” or “completely trustworthy” versus
“completely untrustworthy” is likely to create interpersonal problems
which would expectedly lower self-esteem.
The meanings that people ascribe are an important part of
psychological distress. Despite a gap in the literature examining
cognitive styles in NEAD, it is likely that unhelpful ways of thinking
contribute to avoidance behaviour and the experience of non-epileptic
attacks. Consequently, future studies are encouraged to examine
thinking styles and consider their implications in this client group.
4.4 Psychosocial impact of seizures
Velissaris, Wilson, Saling, Newton, and Berkovic, (2007) undertook a
longitudinal study examining the adjustment following seizure onset.
Psychological concerns were the most frequently raised issues and
included worries about the uncertainty of seizures (i.e. why it occurred,
where and when it will happen again), attempting to cope (i.e. keeping
perspective, making positive changes, trying to prevent recurrence),
emotional impact (i.e. shock, fear, surprise, annoyance, disappointment
and confusion), feeling vulnerable, increased awareness of mortality
(i.e. shortness of life), reduced sense of self (i.e. less of the person they
were). Collectively, many of these concerns appear to pertain to loss of
control. Furthermore, several studies have also shown that people with
NEAD also demonstrate an external locus of control (Goldstein et al.,
2000; Stone et al., 2004). It is not surprising that having seizures, which
are often experienced as sudden and unpredictable prompt individuals
to reconsider their sense of control.
Seizures are also associated with multiple social, family and leisure
issues including reduced quality of life and changes to leisure activities,
frustration with driving restrictions and subsequence dependence on
others, concerns on the effects of seizures on the family, not being able
to fulfil their role in the family, not being able to work or perform usual
employment duties, job loss (Lancman, Brotherton, Asconapé, & Penry,
1993; Breier et al., 1998; Strine et al., 2005; Velissaris et al., 2007;
Ozenli et al., 2008).
There is a breadth of literature that considers the stigmatising
consequences of seizures, however these are mostly concentrated on
epilepsy (e.g. Baker, Brooks, Buck, & Jacoby, 2000; DiIorio et al., 2003;
de Boer, Mula, & Sander, 2008). There is an even greater abundance
of studies on the stigma of mental health (e.g. Corrigan, 2000;
Sartorius, 2007; Mak, Poon, Pun, & Cheung, 2007). Given that NEAD is
characterised by similar features and consequences as epilepsy in
addition to psychiatric comorbidities, it would be naïve to assume that a
lack of specific studies on the stigma of NEAD represents an absence.
To illustrate this point, the meaning of stigma must first be considered.
Goffman, (1963) defined stigma as ‘the process by which the reaction
of others spoils normal identity’. He acknowledges that stigma arises
from having an undesirable attribute that makes a person different.
Accordingly, this quality signifies a discrepancy between a person’s
actual self and who they could be without it. Furthermore, he
recognises three kinds of stigma: the “tribal stigmas” e.g. race,
nationality and religion; blemishes of personality e.g. mental illness or
addiction; and overt deformations e.g. physical disability. The latter two
both apply to people with NEAD.
Furthermore, bearing in mind that 25-35% of NEAD patients become
chronic (Bodde et al., 2009) the stigma of chronic illness also warrants
some consideration. According to Field (1976) whether a chronic illness
becomes stigmatising depends on three features a) how much difficulty
others have understanding the symptoms, b) how central the illness
becomes to a person’s identity, and c) the gravity and permanence of
the social consequences. Given that people with NEAD as well as
healthcare workers struggle to make sense of non-epileptic seizures
(Thompson et al., 2009; Worsely, Whitehead, Kandler, & Reuber,
2011), it is fair to presume that relatives, co-workers and friends will
also struggle to apprehend what non-epileptic seizures are. Consider
the psychosocial consequences mentioned above. Coupled with the
potential changes to areas that people define themselves by such as
career, familial role and independence as well as taking on new roles
such as those within support groups, NEAD not only has substantial
social costs, but has the potential to become central to a person’s
identity.
Whether an illness creates discomfort in social situations is also thought
to contribute to its associated stigma (Albrecht, Walker, & Levy, 1982)
as does attribution of responsibility (Rush, 1998; Weiner, Perry, &
Magnusson, 1988). Worsely et al. (2011) revealed that the second,
which includes the perception of control, was something that healthcare
professionals believe people with NEAD have more of, highlighting the
potential stigma people with NEAD face even in clinical settings.
In sum, people with NEAD face extensive psychosocial consequences
following seizure onset, which may become chronic and enduring.
Coupled with high rates of mental health problems, those with NEAD
are subsequently vulnerable to stigma not only from the lay person but
healthcare professionals too. In the context of such demanding
adjustments and marginalisation, it is not surprising this study found
people with NEAD to have lower self-esteem and anxiety similar to that
of those with epilepsy.
4.5 Avoidance
The relationship between avoidance, anxiety and self-esteem is open to
several interpretations. It has been suggested that as well as avoiding
emotional hurt, individuals engage in avoidance strategies to maintain
control (Rosenfeld, 1979). Taking the previous discussion into account
about problematic family relationships and parental overprotection, it is
possible that people with NEAD could have a fear of domination.
Avoidance may function to surmount this fear. An alternative function
may be to preserve self-esteem, whereby events that threaten self-
esteem are averted (Crocker & Park, 2004). However, if all situations
that involve evaluative judgements are avoided, that could also mean
that there is a lack of opportunity to bolster self-esteem. So what
behaviour may have intended to be functional becomes maladaptive.
Avoidance could also be a by-product of low self-esteem or anxiety. If a
person has a low self-esteem they are likely to underestimate their
personal resources and feel less able to cope. Equally, anxiety and
worry may mean that situations where seizures would have costly
consequences are avoided which will feedback into self-esteem and so
on.
Also, despite there being a non-significant between-group difference on
procrastination, this subscale of the MEAQ had a significant positive
correlation with seizure frequency in the NEAD group suggesting that
not dealing with problems sooner is also associated with having more
seizures. Previous studies have examined the effects of procrastination
and found that it is associated with lower stress in the short-term but
higher stress in the long-term (Tice & Baumeister, 1997). Whilst causal
links can only be speculative, long-standing avoidance strategies such
as procrastination may contribute to prolonged stress responses and
hence increase the probability of attacks, as suggested by Deary and
colleagues (2007).
4.6 Further limitations and strengths
A number of people were unable to complete the IRAP, which reflects
the complex nature of the task involved especially with strict criterion.
Participants were given multiple prompts on rules and instructions on
how to complete the task. One of the reasons for this may have been
the stimuli set, especially the use of ‘I am’ or ‘others are’. Qualitatively,
some individuals found it difficult to conceptualise what others meant
and struggled to answer ‘true’ on others-negative trials. Although there
were respectable reasons for choosing the IRAP, a task such as the
IAT which is less dependent on executive functioning could offer more
utility in this clinical population.
A more stringent latency condition of 2,000ms has been set on the
IRAP in recent studies and found to increase both IRAP effect sizes
and internal reliability (Barnes-Holmes, Murphy, et al., 2010). Given the
small effect sizes in this study, setting shorter response latencies are
encouraged. However, the reason for not setting such stringent limits
was the cognitive deficits people with epilepsy and NEAD tend to
experience. From the experience of this study, particularly with difficulty
meeting the limits it is anticipated that answering correctly within
2,000ms would be too difficult for these client groups. Whilst the
minimum response criterion could be reduced to >80%, there are also
disadvantages to that which must be considered.
Despite VEEG being the gold standard, there is no test that is able to
diagnose with 100% accuracy and EEG abnormalities are common in
the non-epileptic “normal” adult population (Shelley, Trimble, & Boutros,
2008). Furthermore, of those who go for VEEG only 85% receive a
clear diagnosis (Benbadis, O’Neill, Tatum, & Heriaud, 2004),
highlighting the importance of clinical knowledge and experience.
Without suggesting that any of the participants in this study were
wrongly diagnosed, there are longstanding arguments on the reliability
of making diagnostic judgements based on intuitive thinking (Higgs,
2008).
Also, this study recruited participants from a secondary care epilepsy
clinic which is an advantage in the sense of being diagnosed by
specialists with access to VEEG. However it also meant that a lot
tended to have refractory seizures. Many people with epilepsy are
diagnosed and managed in primary care by their GP (Montouris, 2000)
which may mean that our sample was not representative of a typical
sample with epilepsy.
Another possible limitation is that people were asked whether they had
any mental health problems, but no diagnostic interviews (such as the
SCID) were used nor were they asked specifically about diagnosis.
Whether or not this is a weakness of the study depends on the reader’s
viewpoint on diagnoses as a concept. The extended introduction talks
at length about the overlaps and difficulties of syndromal classifications.
The purpose of this question was not to explore diagnoses, but to
determine whether our sample was typical. One in five of the controls
reported either having or having had a mental health problem, which is
in line with the general population. Although this was much higher in the
NEAD group (53%), this may not be representative (Mökleby et al.,
2002) and has implications for the ANCOVAs that were run.
Previous studies recognise that NEAD is a heterogeneous disorder and
have gone so far as to undertake cluster analyses, providing evidence
for different sub-groups of NEAD based on semiology and personality
characteristics (Gröppel, Kapitany, & Baumgartner, 2000; Cragar,
Berry, Schmitt, & Fakhoury, 2005). This study looked more broadly at
NEAD; it may be that different characteristics relate differently to implicit
cognition or implicit – explicit discrepancies as is the case with
depression with and without suicidal ideation (Franck et al., 2007).
Future studies may want to consider the implicit – explicit profile within
the context of such NEAD clusters.
Finally, whilst there are a number of limitations it is important to also
recognise the strengths of this study. Participants were all identified by
experienced consultant neurologists and had the additional support of
video-EEG/EEG evidence. The sample size was considerably greater
than the calculated suggestion and therefore offers greater power and
reliability. As well as offering a unique perspective, some similar
findings from previous studies also support our study design. All
participants included in the study reached less than 3000ms on the
practice trials which is better than some previous IRAP studies. The use
of the IRAP not only offers further evidence for its validity but rather
than the IAT allows us to make conclusions about the direction and
relationship of associations.
4.7 Implications for Practice
A lack of scientific rigour for psychodynamic approaches is reflected by
a limited evidence-base. However, support for intensive short-term
psychodynamic therapy is growing, across a broad range of somatic
disorders (Abbass, Kisely, & Kroenke, 2009). Kalogjera-Sackellares
(2004) has extensively reviewed the application psychodynamic theory
specifically to NEAD, and other authors have used case studies to
illustrate how the approach may be tailored (Howlett & Reuber, 2009).
There still however remains a gap in the literature of prospective and
controlled trials for people with non-epileptic seizures. Despite CBT
lending itself to such controlled studies, CBT for NEAD has only gone
as far as a pilot RCT (Goldstein et al., 2010). Whilst this is considerably
more robust than the evidence base for psychodynamic approaches, it
illustrates the infancy of empirical evidence on psychological
interventions for NEAD.
Such infancy is an opportunity for alternative approaches to flourish.
The outcomes of our study and subsequent discussion make an
argument for mindfulness approaches such as ACT, an approach
already shown to have utility in NEAD (Baslet & Hill, 2011). Willingness
(or acceptance) to tolerate uncomfortable feelings is a central tenet of
ACT, something that this study demonstrated was related to seizure
frequency. Whilst there is a contemporary understanding that
psychological factors have an aetiological role, there are a number of
people who don’t report such difficulties (Moore et al., 1994) and
understandably struggle to come to terms with their diagnosis. Taking a
functional contextualist approach such as ACT may be useful even for
those who do not identify contributing psychological factors.
Based on the discussion previously about implicit explicit discrepancies
reflecting an unstable self-image, it may be that approaches proven to
be effective for borderline personality disorder (associated with
instability) are also excellent contenders for NEAD. These tend to be
integrative approaches and include dialectical behaviour therapy
(Linehan , 2006), cognitive analytic therapy (Ryle, 2004), and schema
therapy (Nordahl & Nysæter, 2005). Further, in view of family dynamics
and the likelihood that early parenting may contribute to such instability
it may be worth contemplating systemic therapy for families, or
parenting groups for parents of adolescents with NEAD.
There is a growing evidence base for eye movement desensitisation
reprocessing (EMDR) which has also been shown to be a promising
treatment for NEAD or comorbid trauma symtoms (Chemali &
Meadows, 2004; Schneider, Nabavi, & Heuft, 2005; Kelley & Benbadis,
2007). In brief, EMDR encourages individuals to focus on negative
(explicit) cognitions about the self and to identify positive ones that can
replace them. This study showed that people with NEAD hold a lot of
negative evaluations of themselves which were incoherent with their
implicit view. Based on these findings, the mechanism of change
therefore may be facilitating coherence.
4.8 Implications for theory
A range of theoretical frameworks of NEAD were outlined in the
extended introduction: psychodynamic, CBT and systemic models. The
findings of this study offer support for avoidance, anxiety and
appraisals, recognised by all of those. Additionally, when interpreting
the results the notion of cognitive dissonance theory has been applied
clinically in a novel way, providing scope for future meaningful work.
Also importantly, stigma theory was uniquely used in relation to the
psychosocial impact of NEAD.
Furthermore, the IRAP is rooted in RFT, a relatively recent behavioural
account of human language and cognition (Y. Barnes-Holmes, Hayes,
Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2002) and although this was not the focus of
the current study, it offered a novel opportunity to apply RFT clinically.
With such a huge scope for application (Blackledge et al., 2009), the
future of RFT depends on how it is utilised in research and practice.
Furthermore, RFT underpins acceptance and commitment therapy
(Hayes, 2004), for which not only has a growing evidence base but has
also been acknowledged as a therapy for NEAD (Baslet & Hill, 2011).
This study not only increased the applicability of the IRAP and offered
support for acceptance and commitment therapy for NEAD, but
inadvertently supports RFT’s claim as a theory of human cognition.
Moreover, it offers a range of possibilities for future research in which
RFT can be directly or indirectly applied.
4.9 Future work
Some ideas for further research are presented in the relevant sections
above and in the journal paper however some additional ideas are
encouraged.
Exploring how people with NEAD respond to cognitive dissonance
tasks (e.g. the belief disconfirmation or the induced-compliance
paradigms) could offer further insight into the cognitive processes of
this clinical population. Based on the hypothesis that NEAD is
associated with cognitive dissonance and that seizures may serve to
reduce that dissonance, it could be useful to study the effects of that
response and whether it is associated with physiological arousal.
A potentially useful framework is self-discrepancy theory (Higgins,
1987) which builds on earlier ideas and identifies different types of self-
state representations, made up of one domain of the self (actual; ideal;
ought) and one standpoint on the self (own; significant other).
Furthermore, it outlines how particular types of self-discrepancies relate
to specific types of discomfort. If we assume that our explicit measures
examined actual/own self-state (i.e. an individual’s beliefs about how
they actually are) and given its direction, the IRAP picked up on a more
ideal self-state9 (i.e. an individual’s beliefs about how they would like to
be), a discrepancy between the two would suggest a lack of successful
or positive outcomes. According to Higgins, this discrepancy is
accompanied by dejection-related emotions, disappointment and
dissatisfaction. Certainly, this fits with higher reports of depression
amongst people with NEAD (Bowman & Markand, 1996; Szaflarski &
Szaflarski, 2004). Furthermore, given that self-discrepancies are
associated with shame (Tangney, Niedenthal, Covert, & Barlow, 1998),
coupled with the higher prevalence of abusive trauma histories
observed in this client group, future work may also want to consider
investigating shame and self-criticism in people with NEAD.
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This is hypothetical to facilitate discussion. It is not clear what the IRAP
measures, it could be interesting to research what self-state domains and
standpoints implicit measures reflect if any. In addition, self-discrepancy theory
does not consider explicit actual/own versus implicit actual/own.
Although there is a breadth of literature on the stigma of epilepsy and
mental illness, studies are lacking which specifically look at stigma in
NEAD. Stigma is likely to reduce self-esteem, deprive people of social
opportunities, and importantly, impede engagement with psychological
interventions. Research on stigma in NEAD could expand knowledge
on the barriers they face in getting care and psychological support.
Such barriers have important implications for anti-stigma campaigns
and developing ideas on what might promote care seeking and
engagement.
As suggested above, schema therapy could be a suitable intervention
for NEAD. There are a number of measures associated with schema
theory that explore central themes and patterns of thinking and
behaviour, parenting, coping styles and would be worthwhile utilising in
future NEAD research. These include the Young Schema
Questionnaire, Young Parenting Inventory, Young-Rygh Avoidance
Inventory and Young Compensation Inventory. As well as being useful
clinical tools, the findings of research utilising these measures would
have implications for cognitive behavioural theories of NEAD. Likewise,
the parenting inventory may offer further support for the role of
childhood factors in the aetiology.
4.9 Critical Reflections
Reflection is a process, in which a person thinks about their
experiences within a broader context (Murray, Kujundzic, & Murray,
2005). This section will reflect on my experiences of the theoretical,
scientific and ethical dimensions of the research process and guided by
four activities which according to (Brookfield, 1988) are central in critical
reflection: assumption analysis, contextual awareness, imaginative
speculation, and reflective scepticism.
4.9.1 Theoretical
There were a number of theoretical challenges. I believe one of the key
issues was the assumption of implicit cognition and whether that is what
latency-response methods measure. I became very aware early on of
an on-going debate and struggled to position myself accordingly. On
one hand there was a breadth of IAT literature conceptualising implicit
and explicit cognition as dual processes, the very literature I had based
my proposal around. Yet here I was some months later, using the IRAP,
a measure based on the theoretical views that implicit and explicit
cognition are a continuous process. This brought up an important
question: what contextual factors influence our understanding?
This IAT/ IRAP dilemma and how I struggled to make sense of implicit
cognition was a reflection of my position in a much wider network. I had
a clinical supervisor with an interest in the IAT and a research tutor
passionate about the IRAP. Whilst negotiating the theoretical focus was
an early ordeal, it was also an opportunity to think about what it was I
was researching. In that process I had to sit with the uncomfortable
position that this abstract idea – implicit cognition -was different things
to different people, and perhaps I would never discover a “truth”.
Although uncomfortable, it was also liberating and offered a wider
scope to work from.
Another theoretical point was the many models of NEAD. My approach
to such models was an evolving process throughout this research (and
the course). Similar to the previous paragraph, I was initially determined
that one of these models must reflect a “truth” and the results of this
study would favour one of those models. During the middle phase of
the research, the results were starting to show patterns and I struggled
to demonstrate a preference for one approach, in fact the findings
translated into a variety of thought. Ultimately I shifted in position; rather
than trying to substantiate one model, I was able to widen the empirical
evidence in favour of different therapeutic models and hypothesise
mechanisms of change that were consistent with a range of
approaches. On reflection, I think limited research on the theoretical
constructs in relation to NEAD warrants such a wide approach.
4.9.2 Scientific
My struggle to negotiate between truth and uncertainty reflects the
epistemological position of the study. It falls within the post-positivist
tradition that an objective reality exists and assumes that implicit
processes are a reality, but can only be partly understood because of
their intractable nature. The study was scientific in that it was able to
offer objectivity using standardised assessment tools and assumed that
there is knowledge to be found, through the process of falsification.
To my surprise, I became frustrated with the scientific rigour of the
study which maybe indicates an evolution in my critical realist stance. I
met people who had so much more than they wanted to say and that
this study was not able to reflect. On reflection, I wonder what a mixed
methods study would have been able to offer or add. Perhaps
triangulating the data would have given us some insight into the result
and supported or refuted the notions of damaged self-esteem, mixed
self-images, or experiences of stigma. Some of the suggested research
out of this project however would benefit from a mixed methods
approach and should be encouraged.
This has also encouraged me to reflect on the discourse around
research and academia. Certainly within medical settings, more validity
seems to be given to studies that are able to quantify their results. The
value of qualitative methods is heavily underestimated (as reflected in
medical journal publications) – perhaps another reason for choosing a
quantitative project.
4.9.3 Ethical
The impact of undertaking the actual tasks presented an ethical
dilemma. When the ethics committee demanded that participants
should be supplied details for support agencies, I thought it was just a
formality and naïvely didn’t expect anyone to become distressed.
Although a small number, several people did become distressed. Of
course, they were assured that there was no need to continue, but my
mind was saying “I need more numbers, please don’t drop out.” Not
only does this illustrate the pressures involved in completing a
quantitative project which requires numbers within a limited time frame,
but also the flexibility of guidelines. The BPS Code of Ethics offers five
principles of research, one of which is maximising benefit and
minimising harm. When it comes to harm or distress how much is too
much? If everyone that became upset at answering emotional
questions was prevented from taking part in research then how
scientific or representative is that study? One debateable advantage of
DClinPsy projects is the dual role that trainees have and the skills that
we bring, in particular offering containment. I believe those skills
enabled me to support those participants appropriately, ensure their
safety and hopefully gave them confidence in taking part in future
research.
On the other hand, being a trainee clinical psychologist conducting
research placed me in a clinician-research dilemma. People were very
eager to share their stories, and whilst it was very easy to informally
formulate some of their difficulties in my mind there was little I could do
with that. Subsequently, I was conscious of information and strategies
that were likely to help but beyond signposting, I could do little more.
To conclude, the research process has been one of challenge and
reappraisal. I have been compelled to reconsider my assumptions, not
only of psychological constructs and measures, but also about what
constitutes good research. On a personal note, I am more comfortable
with uncertainty, can tolerate the idea of not knowing, and more
confident at managing constraints. I anticipate that these qualities will
lend themselves in the future, both in research and clinical practice.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A Inclusion/ exclusion criteria
Inclusion : Study using at least one implicit association test
(Greenwald et. al. 1998)
Study reports findings between groups
Original studies published in English
Studies focused on the adult population, 19 years and
above
Clinical sample will have at least one formal psychiatric
diagnoses
Exclusion : Case reports, letters, reviews, conference papers,
editorials, and guidelines
Learning disability groups
Appendix B Search strategy
Databases
1. Implicit Association Test.mp.
2. Implicit Measure.mp.
3. Implicit Attitudes.mp.
4. Automatic attitudes.mp.
5. Implicit Social Cognition.mp.
6. Attentional Processing Task.mp.
7. Clinical.mp.
8. Clinical Sample.mp.
9. Clinical Population.mp.
10. Patient*.mp.
11. exp Patients/
12. Psychiatric.mp.
13. exp Psychiatric Patients/
14. Diagnos*.mp.
15. exp Diagnosis/
16. 7 or 8 or 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 or 15
17. 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6
18. 16 and 17
19. limit 18 to "all adult (19 plus years)"
20. limit 19 to english language
21. limit 20 to peer reviewed journal
22. remove duplicates from 21
Google Scholar
All words: Implicit association test
Exact phrase: clinical sample
At least one: ‘self-esteem’ ‘self-concept’
Without: young, alcohol, overweight, smoking, gambling, sex
offenders.
Appendix C Data extraction pro-forma
Title:
Author(s):
Date:
Journal:
Volume/pages:
Country:
Sample size:
Recruitment:
Age mean/range:
% Females:
Diagnostic methods:
Design:
IAT:
Explicit measures:
Other measures:
Words in ‘self’ category:
Words in ‘other’ category:
Target words a):
Target words b):
Algorithm:
Exclusion latencies:
Errors & penalties:
Stats tests:
P value(s):
Findings:
Implications:
Limitations:
Relevant additions:
Appendix D Critical Appraisal Skills Programme
Available from:
http://www.phru.nhs.uk/casp/casp.htm
Participant Information Sheet
Thought processes in people with seizures
We would like to inform you about a study for which we are currently recruiting
participants in the neurology outpatient clinic at the Royal Hallamshire
Hospital. The study will compare responses of people with epilepsy or non-
epileptic attack disorder (NEAD) with healthy controls. We would like you to
look at this information sheet about this study now so that you understand why
the research is being done and can consider whether you may want to take
part in the study. You do not have to decide whether you want to take part
straight away. Your neurologist will check whether you meet the inclusion
criteria of this study when you go to hospital for your next appointment. If so, a
member of the research team may approach you, answer any questions you
may have about this study and whether you would like to take part.
The findings of this study will form the basis of a postgraduate degree (Doctor
of Clinical Psychology) awarded by the University of Nottingham.
Reading this information sheet should take about 10 minutes. Feel free to talk
to the research team or others about the study if you wish and please ask if
anything is not clear.
Part 1 of the information sheet
What is the purpose of the study?
The study will aim to look for differences in thinking between people
with epilepsy, NEAD, and healthy controls. It can be difficult to tell the
difference between epileptic and non-epileptic seizures sometimes, this
study hopes to show that measurements of anxiety and how people feel
about themselves (self-esteem) could lead to the development of a
screening tool which would help with the distinction of epilepsy and
NEAD .
Why have I been invited?
You have been invited to read this information sheet because you are a
patient at the neurology clinic at the Royal Hallamshire Hospital in
Sheffield. Our study aims to recruit 40 people with a confirmed
diagnosis of either NEAD or Epilepsy to take part in the study as well as
inviting staff to form a control group. Your neurologist has identified that
you fulfill the inclusion criteria for this study.
Do I have to take part?
It is up to you to decide to join the study. We will describe the study and
go through this information sheet. If you agree to take part, we will then
ask you to sign a consent form. You are free to withdraw at any time
without giving a reason, just let one of the research team know.
Withdrawing would not affect the standard of care you receive.
What will happen to me if I take part?
The research involves you completing some questionnaires and doing some
tasks on a computer during a one-off session, which will last approximately 55
Appendix E: Participant information sheet
minutes. You may be able to complete the research tasks on the same day as
your appointment in the neurology clinic, return to the hospital for a separate
appointment or decide to do the research tasks at home.
Expenses and payments
Ideally, your participation would be at a hospital appointment, however if you
come at another time, or If taking part in the study means that you have had to
pay for additional parking then your reasonable expenses will be refunded.
We will also offer you a £5 gift voucher for your participation.
What will I have to do?
You will be required to undertake two computer-based activities. Don’t worry if
you’re not confident with using a computer, this will not affect you taking part.
The other tasks involve you completing four questionnaires, looking at anxiety,
self-esteem, how aware you are of emotions, and some information about you
such as your age, gender, and mental health.
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?
Although the tests will be on offer at a routine appointment, we will still
require up to 55 minutes of your time. Some people may find it difficult
to think about their emotions and may experience some discomfort. The
computer tasks do not involve any exposure to flashing lights. It is
extremely unlikely that computer use will trigger a seizure, even in
those with photosensitive epilepsy.
What are the possible benefits of taking part?
We cannot promise the study will help you directly but the information
we get from this study will help improve the treatment of people with
epileptic and non-epileptic seizures.
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?
Yes. We will follow ethical and legal practice and all information about
you will be handled in confidence. The details are included in Part 2.
If the information in Part 1 has interested you and you are considering
participation, please read the additional information in Part 2 before
making any decision.
Part 2 of the information sheet
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study?
If you withdraw from the study at any point during the tests and after
you have completed the tests we will destroy all your data. However,
after seven days the data will be anonymised and we are unable to
delete your scores. Withdrawing will not affect your usual care.
What if there is a problem?
Complaints
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to
speak to the researchers who will do their best to answer your
questions (contact details below). If you remain unhappy and wish to
complain formally, you can do this via the NHS Complaints Procedure.
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Details can be obtained from The Patients Services Team on 0114 271
2400 or email on PST@sth.nhs.uk or in person in the Patient
Partnership Department on B Floor, RHH.
NHS based research
In the unlikely event that something does go wrong during the research
and this is due to someone‘s negligence then you may have grounds
for a legal action for compensation against the NHS, but you may have
to pay your legal costs. The normal National Health Service complaints
mechanisms will still be available to you.
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?
All information which is collected about you during the course of the
research will be kept strictly confidential, and any data records will be
held securely, in a locked room, or locked cupboard or cabinet at the
University of Nottingham. Computer held data will be held securely on
encrypted password protected software. All information held will be
treated in line with the Data Protection Act, 1998.
What will happen to the results of the research study?
The results of the research will be used as part of a doctoral thesis and
hopefully published in a peer journal. Results will reflect average scores
across all groups. Participants will not be identifiable in any
report/publication.
Who is organising and funding the research?
The research is being organised and funded by the University of
Nottingham as part of a Doctoral Thesis, sponsored by Sheffield
Teaching Hospital Foundation Trust.
Who has reviewed the study?
All research in the NHS is looked at by an independent group of people,
called a Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This
study has been reviewed and given favourable opinion by the Leeds
Central NHS Research Ethics Committee.
Further information and contact details
You can speak with your care team about the study or if you’d like to
speak with one of the researchers you can contact Lian Dimaro on
+44(0)115 846 6646 or via email lwxlvd@nottingham.ac.uk
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Staff Participant Information Sheet
Thought processes in people with seizures
We would like to inform you about a study for which we are currently recruiting
participants in the neurology outpatient clinic at the Royal Hallamshire
Hospital. The study will compare responses of people with epilepsy or non-
epileptic attack disorder (NEAD) with healthy controls. We would like you to
look at this information sheet about this study now so that you understand why
the research is being done and can consider whether you may want to take
part in the study. You do not have to decide whether you want to take part
straight away. A member of the research team may approach you in the next
few months, answer any questions you may have about this study and ask
whether you would like to take part.
The findings of this study will form the basis of a postgraduate degree (Doctor
of Clinical Psychology) awarded by the University of Nottingham.
Reading this information sheet should take about 10 minutes. Feel free to talk
to the research team or others about the study if you wish and please ask if
anything is not clear.
Part 1 of the information sheet
What is the purpose of the study?
The study will aim to look for differences in thinking between people
with epilepsy, NEAD, and healthy controls. It can be difficult to tell the
difference between epileptic and non-epileptic seizures sometimes, this
study hopes to show that measurements of anxiety and self-esteem
could lead to the development of a screening tool which would help with
the distinction of epileptic and non-epileptic attack disorders.
Why have I been invited?
You have been invited to read this information sheet because you are a
staff member and could meet the criteria for the healthy control group of
this study. A member of the research team may approach you at work
and ask you whether you would like to take part in this study.
Do I have to take part?
It is up to you to decide to join the study. We will describe the study and
go through this information sheet. If you agree to take part, we will then
ask you to sign a consent form. You are free to withdraw at any time
without giving a reason, just let one of the research team know.
Withdrawing would not affect effect your employment.
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What will happen to me if I take part?
The research involves you completing some questionnaires and some
computer tasks during a one-off session, which will last approximately 55
minutes. You can complete the study with the researcher in the hospital or
over the internet on your own computer at home.
Expenses
Ideally, your participation would be during your working hours, however if you
come at another time, or If taking part in the study means that you have had to
pay for additional parking then your reasonable expenses will be refunded.
What will I have to do?
You will be required to undertake two computer-based activities. Don’t worry if
you’re not confident with using a computer, this will not affect you taking part.
The other tasks involve you completing four questionnaires, looking at anxiety,
self-esteem, emotional awareness, and some information about you such as
your age, gender, and mental health.
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?
Although the tests will be on offered at work, we will still require up to
55 minutes of your time. Some people may find it difficult to think about
their emotions and may experience some discomfort.
What are the possible benefits of taking part?
We cannot promise the study will help you directly but the information
we get from this study will help improve the treatment of people with
epileptic and non-epileptic seizures.
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?
Yes. We will follow ethical and legal practice and all information about
you will be handled in confidence. The details are included in Part 2.
If the information in Part 1 has interested you and you are considering
participation, please read the additional information in Part 2 before
making any decision.
Part 2 of the information sheet
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study?
If you withdraw from the study at any point during the tests and after
you have completed the tests we will destroy all your data. However,
after seven days the data will be anonymised and we are unable to
delete your scores. Withdrawing will not affect your usual employment.
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What if there is a problem?
Complaints
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to
speak to the researchers who will do their best to answer your
questions (contact details below). If you remain unhappy and wish to
complain formally, you can do this via the NHS Complaints Procedure.
Details can be obtained from The Patients Services Team on 0114 271
2400 or email on PST@sth.nhs.uk or in person in the Patient
Partnership Department on B Floor, RHH.
NHS based research
In the unlikely event that something does go wrong during the research
and this is due to someone‘s negligence then you may have grounds
for a legal action for compensation against the NHS, but you may have
to pay your legal costs. The normal National Health Service complaints
mechanisms will still be available to you.
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?
All information which is collected about you during the course of the
research will be kept strictly confidential, and any data records will be
held securely, in a locked room, or locked cupboard or cabinet at the
University of Nottingham. Computer held data will be held securely on
encrypted password protected software. All information held will be
treated in line with the Data Protection Act, 1998.
What will happen to the results of the research study?
The results of the research will be used as part of a doctoral thesis and
hopefully published in a peer journal. Results will reflect average scores
across all groups. Participants will not be identifiable in any
report/publication.
Who is organising and funding the research?
The research is being organised and funded by the University of
Nottingham as part of a Doctoral Thesis, sponsored by Sheffield
Teaching Hospital Foundation Trust.
Who has reviewed the study?
All research in the NHS is looked at by an independent group of people,
called a Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This
study has been reviewed and given favourable opinion by the Leeds
Central NHS Research Ethics Committee.
Further information and contact details
You can speak with your care team about the study or if you’d like to
speak with one of the researchers you can contact Lian Dimaro directly
via email lwxlvd@nottingham.ac.uk
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Letter of Invitation
Thought processes in people with seizures
Dear Patient,
We are currently conducting a study designed to help understand
thought processes in people with seizures. We would like to invite you
to consider taking part in this study.
We enclose an information sheet which tells you more about the study.
After reading the information sheet, if you have any further questions or
decide that you would like to take part, please email Lian Dimaro email
at lwxlvd@nottingham.ac.uk or return the slip at the bottom of this
letter, with your name and contact details. We will then call you to
arrange a convenient time for you to come to the Royal Hallamshire
and undertake the tasks described in the information sheet.
Whether you choose to take part or not will not affect your usual care in
any way.
Thank you for looking at the enclosed information sheet and thinking
about taking part.
Yours sincerely,
[Name of patient’s consultant neurologist]
Consultant Neurologist Clinical Psychologist in
Training
Royal Hallamshire Hospital University of
Nottingham
Name:
__________________________________________________
Contact number:
__________________________________________________
Email address:
__________________________________________________
Appendix G: Letter of invitation
Study Number:
Patient Identification Number for this trial:
CONSENT FORM
Title of Project: Thought processes in people with seizures
Name of Researcher: Lian Dimaro
Please initial
box
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated....................
for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask
questions
and have had these answered satisfactorily.
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any
time
without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights being affected.
3. I understand that data collected during the study, may be looked at by regulatory
authorities from the University of Nottingham or from the Sheffield Teaching Hospitals
NHS Trust. I give permission for these individuals to have access to my records
relating to the study.
4. I agree to take part in the above study.
_______________________ ___________ _____________
Name of Patient Date Signature
________________________ ____________ _____________
Name of Person Date Signature
taking consent
When completed: 1 for participant; 1 for researcher site file; 1 (original) to be kept in medical
notes.
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Debrief
Thank you for taking part in our study looking at thought processes in people
with seizures.
The computer task you completed is called the implicit relational assessment
procedure. The task assesses associations between concepts by measuring
how quickly a person can categorise them. The idea is that the more strongly
associated the two concepts are in memory, the more quickly you will be able
to categorize words. We were looking specifically at your association to
anxious words and pleasant words in relation to yourself. We are looking to
see if the test reveals associations that are different than your conscious
beliefs, as measured by the questionnaires that you completed.
If you have any questions about the task please review the participant
information sheet, or you can email Lian Dimaro at lwxlvd@nottingham.ac.uk.
As the data is all anonymised, it is not possible to give individual feedback.
However, if you would like a summary of the results when the study is over,
please contact Lian.
Support services for participants
In the unlikely event that you have found taking part in this study
distressing you should seek support. Below there are a number of
options and details which you may find useful.
x Your local GP may offer you support and refer you for specialist
services.
x Samaritans offer 24 hour emotional support call 08457 909090
or alternatively email jo@samaritans.org
x NHS direct available 24hours a day for expert health advice
and information, call 0845 4647
There are numerous organisations supporting people with epilepsy and
non-epileptic attack disorder. You may find some of the following links
useful and/or interesting:
x NEAD Trust http://www.neadtrust.co.uk/
Appendix H: Debrief
x Non epileptic attacks http://www.non-epilepticattacks.info/
x Epilepsy Society http://www.epilepsysociety.org.uk/
x Epilepsy Action http://www.epilepsy.org.uk/
x Neuro Support http://www.neurosupport.org.uk/index.php
Participant information
1. Are you male or female?
Male Ƒ
Female Ƒ
2. What is your age? ………… years
3. Do you have seizures?
No Ƒ
Yes Ƒ If yes, what is your diagnosis?
Epilepsy Ƒ
Non-epileptic attack disorder (NEAD)?Ƒ
On average, how many seizures do you have a week/month?
4. Do you have any existing mental health difficulties?
Yes Ƒ
No Ƒ
If “yes”, please state your difficulties…………………………
If “no”, have you had any difficulties in the past?
No Ƒ
Yes Ƒplease specify…...……………....................
5. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
Less than secondary school Ƒ
Secondary school Ƒ
College/ Sixth form Ƒ
Diploma Ƒ
Undergraduate degree Ƒ
Post-graduate certificate/diploma Ƒ
Masters degree Ƒ
Doctoral degree Ƒ
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INSTRUCTIONS
NOTE: The same instructions were used for the IRAP self-esteem, replacing ‘calm’
with ‘capable’ and ‘anxious’ with ‘useless’
Shown below are illustrations of the four different types of task that
will be presented repeatedly in this part of the experiment. To help
you understand the tasks each of the four illustrations is explained
immediately underneath. Please examine each illustration and then
read carefully the explanation attached to it. Please make sure that
you understand each task before continuing with the experiment.
Illustration 1
________________________________
I AM
Calm
Select d for Select k for
True False
________________________________
Explanation for Illustration 1
If you select True by pressing the D key, you are stating that I
am calm.
If you select False by pressing the K key, you are stating that I
am not calm.
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Illustration 2
________________________________
OTHERS ARE
Anxious
Select d for Select k for
True False
________________________________
Explanation for Illustration 2
If you select True by pressing the D key, you are stating that
Others are anxious.
If you select False by pressing the K key, you are stating that
Others are not anxious.
Illustration 3
________________________________
I AM
Anxious
Select d for Select k for
True False
________________________________
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Explanation for Illustration 3
If you select True by pressing the D key, you are stating that I
am anxious.
If you select False by pressing the K key, you are stating that I
am not anxious.
Illustration 4
________________________________
OTHERS ARE
Calm
Select d for Select k for
True False
________________________________
Explanation for Illustration 4
If you select True by pressing the D key, you are stating that
Others are calm.
If you select False by pressing the K key, you are stating that
Others are not calm.
NOTE: During the experiment a range of words will be presented
under the term I AM or the term OTHERS ARE.
I refers to you, the participant, OTHERS could be any person
other than yourself.
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FINAL INSTRUCTIONS
During the experiment you will be asked to respond as quickly and
accurately as you can across all trials.
It is very important to understand that sometimes you will be required
to respond to the tasks in a way that agrees with what you believe
and at other times you will be required to respond in a way that
disagrees with what you believe. This is part of the experiment.
An incorrect response will result in the appearance of a red X in
the centre of the screen. To remove the red X and continue please
make the correct response quickly.
YOUR AIM IS TO AVOID THE RED X BY LEARNING THE
SORTING RULE WITHIN EACH SESSION
After each session, further instructions will appear and they will tell
you that the general rule that applied in the previous session is now
completely reversed. Please pay close attention to these instructions
and do your best to follow them.
So, just to clarify, there will be two general sorting rules, and so the
first thing you should do at the beginning of each session is to
discover the rule by using the feedback you get in the form of the
red X.
The first two sessions are for practice only and these are repeated
until you respond accurately on at least 80% of the sorting trials, and
select the correct answer within 3 seconds. When you complete the
practice phase, the test-phase will then start. Remember, you should
try to make your responses as accurately and quickly as possible.
The presentation tasks will be in short sessions that are separated by
the appearance of instructions on the computer screen. You can take
a short break if you like while these instructions are on on-screen.
Good Luck!
If you do not understand something about these instructions or have
any further questions please talk to the researcher before clicking on
the blue button.
Appendix J: IRAP instructions
Appendix K: REC correspondence
Appendix K: REC correspondence
Appendix K: REC correspondence
Appendix K: REC correspondence
Appendix K: REC correspondence
Lian Dimaro
IWHO, Jubilee Campus
University of Nottingham
Wollaton Road
Nottingham
NG8 1BB
08 December 2011
c/o Nicola Malleander-Ward
NRES Committee Yorkshire & The Humber – Leeds Central
Yorkshire and Humber REC Office
First Floor, Millside
Meanwood
Leeds
LS6 4RA
Dear Committee
Study title: Examining implicit cognitive processes in people with
seizures
REC reference number: 11/YH/0393
Clarification requested
1. You should confirm who will be approached to take part in the
control group.
2. You should explain how members of staff will be approached or
how they will find out about the study to volunteer.
Only staff members will be invited to take part to form the control group.
The staff participant information sheet will be circulated to staff via their
administrative teams, in addition to being pinned on staff notice boards.
After 2 weeks of circulation and up to 6 months after, staff will be
approached by one of the researchers. If an approached member has
read the information sheet, they will be invited to take part. If they have
not read the information sheet but are interested in volunteering for the
study, they will be provided with an information sheet then and
contacted by the researcher after 48hours to confirm whether or not
they wish to take part at a later date.
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Only informed and consenting participants will take part in the study.
Participants may withdraw at any time during the testing phase without
it affecting their employment.
Application for minor amendment
1. Replace the Implicit Association Test (IAT) with the Implicit
Relational Association Procedure (IRAP)
The IRAP is a more recently developed computerised response latency
procedure designed to target stimulus relations similar to the IAT.
Specifically, the task involves presenting relational terms (e.g., similar,
opposite, more than, less than) so that the properties of the relations
among the relevant stimuli can be assessed in addition to the
association terms. The rationale behind the IRAP is that it offers
direction of association and thus is arguably more meaningful.
The IRAP demonstrates comparative levels of predictive validity to the
IAT (Barnes-Holmes, Murtagh, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2010;
Barnes-Holmes, Waldron, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2009; Roddy,
Stewart, & Barnes-Holmes, 2010). Moreover, recent work has provided
compelling evidence that participants cannot manipulate the magnitude
or direction of the IRAP effect even when given direct instructions to do
so, more robustly than the IAT (McKenna, Hughes et al. Barnes-
Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2007).
The IRAP will require the same amount of time, and will be set at the
same frequency as the IAT. It will not involve any additional
involvement for participants to the originally proposed IAT.
I hope this clarification is sufficient. Thank you for reviewing this
application, particularly in consideration for my request for an
amendment.
Yours Sincerely
Lian Dimaro
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IWHO, Jubilee Campus
University of Nottingham
Wollaton Road
Nottingham
NG8 1BB
Email: lwxlvd@nottingham.ac.uk
29 December 2012
Ram Patel
Research Co-ordinator
STH NHS Foundation Trust, STH Research Department
1st Floor, 11 Broomfield Rd
Sheffield
S10 2SE
Dear Ram
STH Project Number: STH16157
Please find the following documents enclosed for the above study:
x NRES Application form
x Copies of all correspondence from the REC
x Copies of all documents approved by the REC:
Protocol
Participant Information Sheet
Consent Form
Staff Participant Information Sheet
Staff Consent Form
Support Services for Participants
Questionnaires
CVs
x Site Specific Approval application
x Letter of access request
I have forwarded the STH Finance Form and Data Protection form to
Markus, these should be with you shortly via Jodie.
I would also like to take this opportunity to submit a non-substantial
amendment; replacing the Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale with
the Multidimensional Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire (Gamez et
al., September 2011) which has been validated. This questionnaire will
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take less time than the originally proposed one, and offers subscales
that may be more useful to our findings.
If you require any further information or clarification, please don’t
hesitate to contact me.
Kind regards
Lian Dimaro
Enc: Approval documents
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Appendix O: Recruitment process
Potential participants who were due to attend
the epilepsy clinic for a routine appointment
were sent a participant information sheet, two
weeks prior to their appointment.
Potential participants
who had previously
been identified were
sent letters of invitation.
Suitable participants were
identified at their appointment
and approached by one of the
research team. Any questions
answered.
Did not
opt-in, no
further
involveme
nt
Participant
contacted
researcher.
Any questions
answered
Participant interested: Arranged to take part – either following their
appointment or another time.
Questionnaires completed and IRAP administered, followed by debrief.
